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ABSTRACT
From 1969–82, the United States and Great Britain redefined national security in a
distinctive way, separating the notion of national security from its traditional foundations in
realist thought. The way the two powers come to define national security was the result of more
than a century of historical interaction with Latin America and their own historical experience
with ideology, imperialism, and colonialism. As such, the way the United States and Great
Britain perceived their respective special relationships influenced the way they chose to
intervene in matters of national security, particularly in Latin America’s Southern Cone countries
of Chile and Argentina. Furthermore, ideology came to play a more pronounced role in the
United States’ foreign policy, which belies an ideological focus and fear that is theoretically
absent from traditional realist conceptions of international relations. For the British, there was
more ideological flexibility in the conduct of foreign affairs that inherently led to a more
nuanced, amoral approach. In both countries, the result of such redefinition was that the notion of
national security was reduced to an amorphous term that can justify any number of foreign
policy interventions regardless of the geostrategic threat to traditional national security. Thus,
Latin America becomes an important case study in Anglo-American relations and transatlantic
understandings of Cold War foreign policy.
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Introduction

When historians speak of the “special relationship,” it is often used to describe the
relationship between the British Commonwealth and the United States (U.S.) that was first
articulated by Winston Churchill in his famous Iron Curtain speech of March 1946. The AngloAmerican special relationship, as it has been formally understood, has been a bedrock of U.S.
foreign policy from Franklin Roosevelt to Barack Obama. Yet, Great Britain is far from the only
country with which the United States has a special relationship. A study of U.S.-Latin America
policy ordered by the Nixon administration in 1969 concluded, “The ‘special relationship’ [with
Latin America] exists as an historical fact.”1 The study went on to conclude that such a
relationship is not only fact, but that it is in the interest of both the U.S. and Latin America for
the relationship to continue.2 This dissertation seeks to bring these two special relationships into
conversation with regard to American foreign policy and the way the U.S. and Great Britain
conceive of national security.
This project examines the coordination and divergence of Anglo-American foreign policy
regarding Chile, Argentina, and the Falkland Islands from 1969 to 1982. I argue that the United
States and Great Britain redefined national security in a distinctive way, separating the notion of
national security from its traditional foundations in realist thought. This project contends that the
way the two powers come to define national security is the result of more than a century of
historical interaction with Latin America and their own historical experience with ideology,
imperialism, and colonialism. As such, the way the United States and Great Britain perceived of

1

“A Study of U.S. Policy Toward Latin America (NSSM 15): Precis,” July 5, 1969, National Security
Council Institutional Files, Box H-134, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, CA.
2
Ibid.
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their respective special relationships influenced the way they choose to intervene in matters of
national security. Furthermore, ideology comes to play a more pronounced role in the United
States’ foreign policy, which belies an ideological focus and fear that is theoretically absent from
traditional realist conceptions of international relations. For the British, there is more ideological
flexibility in the conduct of foreign affairs that inherently led to a more nuanced, amoral
approach. In both countries, the result of such redefinition is that the notion of national security
is reduced to an amorphous term that can justify any number of foreign policy interventions
regardless of any geostrategic threat to traditional national security. Thus, Latin America
becomes a critical region for Anglo-American relations and transatlantic understandings of Cold
War foreign policy.
As a study of both transatlantic and inter-American relations, this dissertation adds to two
very diverse bodies of literature on U.S.-Latin American Relations and Anglo-American
relations during the Cold War. In Anglo-American relations, the historiography yields a mixed
portrait of the special relationship. Several historians have written broad synthetic overviews of
the entire Cold War, while others have chosen to focus on the relations between specific
administrations on both sides of the pond.3 These various approaches have led to a
characterization of the special relationship that yields clear moments of cohesion and
cooperation, as well as times of great tension and difficulty. Yet few works address the role

3

For synthesis works, see William Roger Louis and Hedley Bull, eds., The “Special Relationship”: AngloAmerican Relations since 1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986); David Dimbleby and David Reynolds, An
Ocean Apart: The Relationship Between Britain and American in the Twentieth Century (New York: Random
House, 1988); C.J. Bartlett, “The Special Relationship”: A Political History of the Special Relationship since 1945
(New York: Longman, 1992); and John Dumbrell, A Special Relationship: Anglo-American Relations from the Cold
War to Iraq (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006). For more focused works, see Andrew Scott, Allies Apart:
Heath, Nixon, and the Anglo-American Relationship (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011); Richard Aldous,
Reagan and Thatcher: The Difficult Relationship (New York: W.W. Norton, 2012); and Christopher Sandford,
Harold and Jack: The Remarkable Friendship of Prime Minister Macmillan and President Kennedy (Amherst, NY:
Prometheus Books, 2014).
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foreign policy plays in shaping the special relationship. In the field of U.S.-Latin American
relations, new conversations have begun to push back against the prevailing notion that Latin
America was a helpless region with no control or agency against the powerful United States. In
this vein, some works have begun to show that Latin American nations were important actors in
the various incidents in Latin America’s Cold War.4 The inclusion of Latin American agency has
brought about a more balanced approach to the study of U.S.-Latin American relations. Yet,
even these works are still confined to Inter-American dialogs.
Neither of these distinct historiographical fields engages with the other, which my work
seeks to do. Given that identical descriptions are employed for the relationships between the
United States and Great Britain and Latin America respectively, it is only logical for one to ask if
the connections stop there. Thus far, no major work in the scholarship on the Anglo-American
Relationship has engaged in a case study of Latin America as a region of involvement in the
post-1900 period.5 My work seeks to address this void by showing that the unique relationships
afforded to the two regions affected the coordination of policy in Latin America, with problems
and conflicts in Latin America playing a significant role in transatlantic dialogs on foreign policy
and national security. Far from facing a presumed British decline in the world, the UK’s
interactions in Latin America indicate that Britain was deeply concerned about security and

4
See Hal Brands, Latin America’s Cold War (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010); Virginia
Garrard-Burnett, Mark Atwood Lawrence, and Julio E. Moreno, Beyond the Eagle’s Shadow: New Histories of Latin
America’s Cold War (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2013);, Tanya Harmer Allende’s Chile and the
Inter-American Cold War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2011); Jonathan Haslam, The Nixon
Administration and the Death of Allende’s Chile: A Case of Assisted Suicide (London: Verso, 2005); Gilbert Joseph
and Daniela Spenser, eds., In from the Cold: Latin America’s New Encounter with the Cold War (Durham: Duke
University Press, 2008); and Aaron Moulton, “Guatemalan Exiles, Caribbean Basin Dictators, Operation
PBFORTUNE, and the Transnational Counter-Revolution against the Guatemalan Revolution, 1944–1952,” doctoral
dissertation, 2016, University of Arkansas.
5
The only book to use Latin America as a case study for Anglo-American relations is Joseph Smith,
Illusions of Conflict: Anglo-American Diplomacy toward Latin America, 1865-1896 (Pittsburgh: University of
Pittsburgh Press, 1979).
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political developments across the globe. The place afforded to Latin America in the AngloAmerican dialog from 1969 to 1982 challenges the prevailing narrative that Africa and the
Middle East were the only regions that affected Anglo-American relations, pushing the
conversation beyond the context of decolonization.

Toward a Definition of National Security
At the center of the argument in this work lies the idea of national security. In recent
decades, largely thanks to the work of Melvyn Leffler and others, national security has received
a great deal of attention in scholarly assessments from both historians of the Cold War and IR
theorists in security studies. Leffler alone has devoted several major works to the idea, most
notably Preponderance of Power and his most recent work, Safeguarding Democratic
Capitalism, not to mention the numerous articles in which he has advocated the use of national
security as a lens for understanding the motivations of various actors, most notably the U.S.,
during the Cold War.6 Other notable diplomatic historians to have done work on national
security include Michael Hogan, John Lewis Gaddis, Julian Zelizer, and most recently, Dexter
Fergie.7 These works have made significant contributions to the historiography of national
security, particularly with regard to the creation of the national security state, the

6

See Melvyn Leffler, “National Security,” Journal of American History 77, no. 1 (June 1990): 143–152;
Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1992); Leffler, Safeguarding Democratic Capitalism: U.S. Foreign Policy and National
Security, 1920–2015 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017).
7
See Michael J. Hogan, A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State,
1945–1954 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998); John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A
Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War, rev. ed. (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2002); Julian E. Zelizer, Arsenal of Democracy: The Politics of National Security—From World War II to the
War on Terrorism (New York: Basic Books, 2009); and Dexter Fergie, “Geopolitics Turned Inward: The Princeton
Military Studies Group and the National Security Imagination,” Diplomatic History 43, no. 4 (September 2019):
644–70.
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interrelationship between domestic politics and national security, and the psychological
component of national security.
Beyond the work of historians, the field of security studies and the International Relations
(IR) world more broadly have also devoted considerable attention to the study of national
security and the very idea of what constitutes security. One of the best treatments of the subject
is David Baldwin’s essay “The Concept of Security,” in which—from a social science
perspective—Baldwin examines the broad notion of security, and national security in particular,
from a theoretical and explanatory point of view in hopes of positing a more specific set of
standards by which to define and discuss the idea of national security.8 Others, like Peter
Katzenstein, Jean-Marc Blanchard, Edward Mansfield, and Norrin Ripsman have examined the
place that outside factors such as economics, identity, and culture have played in shaping the
way national security is understood on a global scale.9 Even still other political scientists, like
Kenneth Waltz, have focused on the way that national security and foreign policy are affected by
the nature of democratic politics.10 These works, and many others within IR and security studies,
all demonstrate the ever advancing conversation going on within academic and political circles
regarding the theory and ideas of national security.
Yet for all that has been written on national security, it remains a rather difficult concept
to define. While testifying before Congress on the Freedom of Information Act, Representative
John Moss declared, “National security [is] such an ill-defined phrase, that no one can give you a
definition. . . . In 16 [sic] years of chairing the committee prior to Mr. Moorhead, I could never

8

David A. Baldwin, “The Concept of Security,” Review of International Studies 23 (1997): 5–26.
See Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); Jean-Marc Blanchard, Edward Mansfield, and Norrin Ripsman, eds.,
Power and the Purse: Economic Statecraft, Interdependence, and National Security (Portland: Frank Cass, 2000).
10
Kenneth Waltz, Foreign Policy and Democratic Politics: The American and British Experience (Boston:
Little, Brown, and Company, 1967).
9
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find anyone who could give me a definition."11 Representative Moss was not alone in
acknowledging this challenge. There have, however, been attempts by journalists, politicians,
and academics alike to attempt to provide a definition of the traditional components of national
security. As early as 1943, Walter Lippmann contended that “a nation has security when it does
not have to sacrifice its legitimate interests to avoid war and is able, if challenged, to maintain
them by war.”12 In their classic text, American National Security, Amos Jordan and William
Taylor have observed that, when narrowly defined, national security is almost synonymous with
defense. Such a definition, however, would be too rigid to convey the idea of the term. They go
on to note, “National security, however, has a more extensive meaning than protection from
physical harm; it also implies protection, through a variety of means, of vital economic and
political interests, the loss of which could threaten fundamental values and the vitality of the
state.”13 Such definitions also roughly correspond to the definitions posited by government
officials and international organizations. A 1986 United Nations report entitled Concepts of
Security defined national security as “a condition in which states consider that there is no danger
of military attack, political pressure or economic coercion, so that they are able to pursue freely
their own development and progress.”14 Similarly, Fred Buzhardt, General Counsel of the U.S.
Department of Defense in 1976, defined national security as:
A generic concept of broad connotations referring to the Military Establishment and the
related activities of national preparedness including those diplomatic and international
political activities which are related to the discussion, avoidance or peaceful resolution of
11

House Committee on Government Operations, Executive Classification Of Information-Security
Classification Problems Involving Exemption (B)(L) Of The Freedom Of Information Act, H.R. Rep. No. 93-221,
93d Cong., 1st Sess. 64 (1973).
12
Walter Lippman, U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company,
1943), 51.
13
Amos A. Jordan and William J. Taylor, American National Security: Policy and Process (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), 3.
14
Department of Disarmament, United Nations, Concepts of Security: A Report of the Secretary-General,
(New York: United Nations, 1986), 2, accessed July 31, 2019,
https://heinonline.org/HOL/Contents?handle=hein.unl/ consec0001&id=1&size=2&index=&collection=unl.
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potential or existing international differences which could otherwise generate a military
threat to the United States or its mutual security arrangements.15
Furthermore, the British government, in its 1989 Security Service Act specified what it meant to
protect British national security as the “protection against threats from espionage, terrorism and
sabotage, from the activities of agents of foreign powers and from actions intended to overthrow
or undermine parliamentary democracy by political, industrial or violent means,” and to
“safeguard the economic well-being of the United Kingdom against threats posed by the actions
or intentions of persons outside the British Islands.”16 Thus, what emerges from all of these
definitions offered above are a common understanding of national security as a political and IR
concept based upon protecting the political, economic, and military interests of a state.
Historically, these definitions have been reflected in the way politicians and diplomats
defined national security during the formative years of the national security state. George
Kennan, the architect of the grand strategy of containment, believed that protecting national
security was one of the main objectives of all American foreign policy. For Kennan, national
security meant “the continued ability of this country to pursue the development of its internal life
without serious interference, or threat of interference, from foreign powers.”17 In this regard,
Kennan’s ideas of national security were indeed wrapped up in conceptions of geopolitics and its
importance for correlations of economic, technological, and military power.18 With regard to
geostrategic concerns, Kennan even went so far as to identify the regions or countries that he
believed could potentially produce serious threats to American national security—Great Britain,
Germany, Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, and Japan.19 While this list was far from exhaustive

15

House Committee, 65.
Security Service Act, 1989, chap. 5 (United Kingdom).
17
George Kennan, quoted in Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 26.
18
Leffler, Preponderance of Power, 10.
19
George Kennan, quoted in Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 29.
16
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in terms of places that Kennan believed were important, it did nevertheless represent the primary
focus of American national security in the early years of the Cold War. Furthermore, the
protection of Eurasia was seen by many as critical in safeguarding American national security.
From the perspective of President Truman and his advisors, “Soviet/Communist domination of
the preponderant resources of Eurasia would force the United States to alter its political and
economic system.”20 Such thinking emphasizes the extent to which “economic interests often
reinforced geostrategic imperatives and ideological predilections” within national security.21 The
combination of ideas shaping foreign policy after World War II resulted in a view of national
security that reinforced the definitions offered above, and that, for the purpose of this study,
demonstrate that a foreign policy forged on national security notions pursues the coordinated
protection of the political, geostrategic, and economic interests of a state and its power on the
global stage.
It is worth noting in this discussion that the British have long talked about the protection
of national security, and have operated as a national security state well before one was officially
created. The above Security Service Act of 1989 marked the official, legal acknowledgement of
the long-existing British intelligence service, MI5, and its incorporation into existing premises of
the national security landscape. The UK did not create its own National Security Council or
National Security Advisor until 2010 (compared to the National Security Act of 1947 in the US).
That is not to say that National Security was not a primary concern of the British—it indeed

20
21

Leffler, Preponderance, 13.
Ibid., 14.
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was—but merely it must be acknowledged that the UK experienced a delayed creation of what
historians consider the formal mechanisms of the “national security state.” 22

National Security and Realist Thought
Critical to the definition of national security offered above is the connection between
national security and the IR theory of realism. Realism is a theory with origins as far back as the
days of Thucydides and Machiavelli, and with practitioners as famous as Otto Von Bismarck,
Klemmens von Metternich, & Lord Castlereagh. Yet it was scholars such as E.H. Carr, Hans J.
Morgenthau, and Kenneth Waltz in the mid-twentieth century that resurrected and reinvigorated
realism as a major theory of state-to-state relations.23 According to Morgenthau, in his landmark
text Politics Among Nations (1948), realism is the rejection of moralistic approaches to
international relations, instead focusing on the balancing of interests and power to prevent and
resolve conflict.24 Operating on the assumption that states are rational actors, making decisions
based upon objective human nature, realism argues that while power may change over time,
power motivates all international relations and that states will respect each other only when they
acknowledge that each state is acting merely to protect its own power and interests.25 Crucial to
all of this is the conviction that a state should not allow moral issues to interfere in any way with
or hinder the advancement of the national interest. It is this contention that has led many to assert
that realism is an amoral ideology; this assumption perhaps more than any other component of

22

For more, see Joe Devaney and Josh Harris, The National Security Council: National Security at the
Centre of Government (London: Institute for Government, 2014), accessed August 9, 2019,
https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/publications/national-security-council
23
See E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years Crisis, 1919–1939 (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016; the original
edition was published in 1939); Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace
(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1948); and Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: AddisonWesley, 1979).
24
Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, 1–2.
25
Michael Sheehan, Balance of Power: History and Theory (London: Routledge, 1996), 7.

9

realism, has framed the contours of the intense scholarly debate between the competing notions
of realism and liberal internationalism.26
Power is certainly regarded as a central motivator for all realist thought. Carr, in his The
Twenty Years’ Crisis is among the first to posit that power considerations are pivotal for
understanding the context, citing the Weimar Republic and turmoil of the post-World War I
geopolitical landscape as evidence.27 It was Morgenthau, however, who really began to explain
the conception of power. He defined power as “anything that establishes and maintains the
control of man over man.”28 When applied to the national and international stage, these ideas are
only magnified. Thus, Morgenthau identifies nine elements of national power—those things that
motivate and affect the power perception of a nation. They are broken down into two categories,
those that are relatively stable and those that are constantly changing.29 In the former category
are geography, natural resources (namely food and raw materials), and industrial capacity. In the
latter category, he first highlights military preparedness, which he perceives to be the “much too
obvious” lynchpin of power, arguing that military preparedness is “what gives the factors of
geography, natural resources, and industrial capacity their actual importance for the power of a
nation.”30 Beyond military preparation and more material concerns, Morgenthau turns to the
more fluid human elements of power—population, national character, national morale, the
quality of diplomacy, and the quality of government. While the latter four elements of national
power certainly bring ideological concerns into the power equation, the overwhelming focus of

26

For more on realism, see John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton,
2001); Michael C. Williams, ed., Realism Reconsidered: The Legacy of Hans Morgenthau in International Relations
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); Michael Smith, Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger (Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State University Press, 1986); Daniel Bessner & Nicolas Guilhot, “How Realism Waltzed Off: Liberalism
and Decision-making in Kenneth Waltz’s Neorealism,” International Security 40, no. 2 (Fall 2015): 87–118.
27
Mearsheimer, 18; Smith, “E.H. Carr: Realism as Relativism,” Realist Thought, 68–98.
28
Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, 9.
29
Morgenthau, “Elements of National Power,” Politics among Nations, 127–69.
30
Ibid. 139.
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realism remains within the amoral constraints of economic and natural resources, the military,
and geography. Furthermore, in this competition between states for power, it becomes vitally
important for states to maintain peace by maintaining the balance of power. In the constant
struggle to keep the power at a global equilibrium among great powers, realism introduces the
security dilemma, or the notion that “states [are] perpetually competing, conflicting, and fighting
over issues of national security.”31 Thus, the struggle to maintain power, and therefore survive,
results inevitably in a focus on national security.32

Toward a New Definition of National Security
When Morgenthau’s definitions of realism and power and the inherent security dilemma
of realism are set alongside the aforementioned definition of national security--the protection of
the political, geostrategic, and economic interests of a state and its power on the global stage—
then one easily sees the natural commonalities between realism and national security. As an
ideology, national security becomes the product of realism. This should be of little wonder,
however, given the time period in which national security emerged as a clear guiding principle
for foreign policy and the ideological predilections of those setting foreign policy. George
Kennan, for instance, was an avowed realist, a contemporary political theorist of Morgenthau
and others, and one of the leading policy planners in the creation of the national security state.33
That a realist would create a system of international politics based upon his own way of viewing
and understanding the interactions between states is to be expected. All of this only serves to

31

Sheehan, Balance of Power, 8.
The security focus of realism has been part of a new subset of realist thought known as structural realism,
or neorealism. Kenneth Waltz’s Theory of International Politics remains the classic neorealist text.
33
For more on Kennan and realism, see “George Kennan: Diplomacy and Moderation,” in Smith, Realist
Thought, 165–91.
32
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reiterate the extent to which the traditional definition of national security was grounded in realist
notions of power politics and the centrality of geostrategic, economic, and military interests to
the projection of power.
Yet, if national security is indeed a realist notion based solely upon threats to power as
seen in the traditional definition, then one must wonder how countries can justify intervention in
the name of national security in the broad ways and variety of places that they do. For some
practitioners and political theorists, like Arnold Wolfers, this flexible use and manipulation of
the term has led them to question the utility of the term on the whole. Most notably, as early as
1952, Wolfers began to question how effective national security could be as an explanatory
paradigm in his classic article, “‘National Security’ as an Ambiguous Symbol.” While Wolfers
acknowledged that there was certainly something concrete in meaning when an individual
mentioned national security, he argued that the security is subjective by nature, in that what
makes something secure depends upon the individual answering the question. Given this
subjective quality of security, he concluded that the idea of national security was even more
problematic since more individuals were attempting to define this idea.34 While Wolfers went on
to challenge the premise that there are normative experiences within international politics—a
contention this author disagrees with—his acknowledgment that national security can be an
ambiguous term is nevertheless valid.
It is this component of national security that this work seeks most directly to address.
Having established that national security as an ideology is grounded in realist understandings of
power and security in state-to-state interactions, the American and British interactions and policy
decisions in Chile, Argentina, and the Falkland Islands from 1969–1982 cannot be appropriately

34

Arnold Wolfers, “‘National Security’ as an Ambiguous Symbol,” Political Science Quarterly 67 no. 4
(December 1952), 481–502.
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described as threats to national security. Being outside of regions of geostrategic importance, and
having varying degrees of economic impact upon the two western powers, political
developments in Latin America’s Southern Cone should not have been elevated to point of
national security crises, at least through the prevailing definition of national security. That these
events in Chile and Argentina were deemed to be national security crises and concerns indicated
that the transatlantic allies were operating under a new definition of national security. The role of
alliance politics within the U.S. and Britain, the historical backgrounds with the Latin American
states, and ideological considerations—whether it be over human rights or with regard to
communism—took precedence over the actual threat to national security. Even still, the term
national security continued to be used to justify these interventions and forays into Latin
America by both the U.S. and United Kingdom (UK). As a result national security was stripped
of its connections to realism, and reduced to an amorphous term that justifies intervention that at
worst reflects a militaristic liberal internationalism, or perhaps more accurately, “liberal
imperialism,” or at best was a case of lying hypocrisy.35

Organization of the Work
The study begins by briefly tracing the history of Anglo-Latin American and U.S.-Latin
American relations from 1820–1968. Chapter one examines the nature of economic ties,
historical connections between Latin America and the U.S. and Britain respectively, and the
broader Cold War context that lays the foundation for the case studies under examination in the
larger work. This chapter argues that both the United States and Britain had a long history of
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interest in Latin America that affected the way each nation perceived national security with
regard to the region, while highlighting the way that the traditional notions of realist thought on
national security had influenced policy in the pre-1968 era.
From there, the work moves into the three central examples mentioned above—Chile,
Argentina, and the Falklands War. Chapter two examines the United States’ and Great Britain’s
official policies and actions in regard to Chile, the 1970 election of socialist president, Salvador
Allende, and the 1973 coup that removed Allende from power. This chapter argues that contrary
to claims of Allende’s Chile posing a national security threat to the United States, the Nixon’s
administration’s opposition to Allende and the related actions against his government were
primarily motivated by a monolithic fear of communism and socialism, and compounded by its
historical conception of a special relationship with Latin America. In allowing their ideological
fears over leftist ideas to drive American policy, the Nixon-Kissinger team redefined national
security along ideological grounds, stripping the notion of its realist foundations—an ironic
action given Kissinger’s reputation as a practitioner of realpolitik. Britain’s policy toward Chile,
meanwhile, reflected a far more tempered view of the socialist government than that of the
United States. Endowed with a more historically nuanced understanding of socialism, Britain
saw the new government not as a threat, but as an opportunity to advance its own economic place
in the hemisphere. Furthermore, many within Britain were even sympathetic to Allende’s
experiment. As a result of these opposing positions, new tensions developed within the special
relationship as the US actively prodded their British counterparts to address what Washington
perceived as the Cold War geo-political implications of Allende’s Chile in a significant way.
In the fall of 1974, both the United States and Great Britain underwent leadership
changes following the resignation of Richard Nixon and Ted Heath’s electoral defeat. These
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changes also roughly corresponded to subsequent government changes and dramatic upheavals
in both Chile and Argentina. The September 1973 coup had placed Chile in the hands of the
oppressive dictator Augusto Pinochet, while the Argentine military government was engaged in a
prolonged period of state sponsored terrorism—the Dirty Wars—against the people of Argentina
from 1974–1983. Despite coming into the presidency proclaiming a “new dialogue” with regard
to Latin America, the Ford Administration at best ignored, and at worst praised, the governments
of Argentina and Chile. The Labour government of Harold Wilson in Britain, however, almost
immediately changed direction with regard to Chile and Argentina, breaking diplomatic relations
and ending support of the dictatorial regimes. Britain’s antagonism toward Argentina in
particular was further compounded by the longstanding dispute over the sovereignty of the
Falkland Islands. Ultimately, this chapter argues that Anglo-American responses to human
rights violations in Argentina and Chile differed sharply as a result of the United States’
privileging its special relationship with Latin America, and an incongruence between the two
nations over the importance of human rights and its place in formulating national security.
From the adoption of the Helsinki Final Accords and its contentious third basket onward,
human rights assumed a prominent place in the conduct of American foreign policy, particularly
in regard to Latin America—a region ripe with human rights’ violations. Such an emphasis on
human rights was one of the hallmarks of Jimmy Carter’s foreign policy, and was a point of great
connection in the transatlantic dialog regarding Latin America (namely Chile and Argentina).
Chapter four examines the intersection of human rights policy and Latin America policy for both
the United States and Great Britain during the administrations of Jimmy Carter and James
Callaghan, while also arguing that the official inclusion of human rights in such a prominent way
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required changes to the definition of national security and its theoretical foundation in notions of
foreign policy realism.
Chapter five discusses the last situation under consideration in this study—the 1982
Falklands War. The war between Great Britain and Argentina was a noteworthy conflict in Latin
America for its significance as an overt military struggle and as a test of the Anglo-American
relationship. That Britain went to war over a territory that it had long exerted colonial control
over complicated matters for the United States. Furthermore, the national security implications
for both nations were called into question, as the conflict seemed to most observers as nothing
more than Britain flexing its nationalistic muscle to maintain a vestige of its empire. Britain,
however, had long been concerned with the Falklands and its strategic place within Latin
America. Furthermore, the potential threat to the human rights of the islanders at the hands of the
military junta in Argentina became a significant consideration for Thatcher’s government as the
conflict accelerated. Yet, the United States found itself in a moment of disagreement with its
closest ally over the war and American support for British intervention. While the Reagan and
Thatcher governments saw the human rights issue differently, even the Reagan administration
found the threat to the islanders too great to ignore. After a month of failed mediation at the
hands of Secretary of State Al Haig, the Falklands War forced the United States to choose
between two special relationships—Latin America or the United Kingdom—and two aspects of
its national security—strengthening alliances or maintaining its security concerns in Latin
America. Throughout the ten-week conflict, British decisions in response to the Argentine
invasion strained the Thatcher government’s relationship with the United States. While the strain
was ultimately resolved, the Falklands crisis nevertheless represents a significant moment for the
special relationship itself, as the British began to redefine the nature of the alliance and the
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United States chose the alliance over its broader national security interests in Latin America.
Furthermore, ideological commonalities – between Reagan and Thatcher, as much as had
occurred between the Carter administration and the Labour leadership in the UK – helped invoke
and cement the long-standing cultural and political bonds between the two nations, whose
cooperation seemed to provide again a basic foundation to their specific and, in their view,
global national security. Surviving strong disagreements, the transatlantic special relationship
proved its centrality in the global politics of Washington and London.
While the narrative of this work has its largest sections dedicated to events in Latin
America, the ultimate purpose of this study is to highlight the evolving conceptions of national
security, the role of ideology in foreign policy, and the challenges of competing and at times
conflicting alliances. The final chapter will draw conclusions from the different responses to
Chile, Argentina, and the Falklands to show that Anglo-American relations during the 1970s and
1980s must be seen in terms of changing ideas about national security, different places for the
role of ideology in setting foreign policy, and the nature of “special relationships.” The lessons
learned from how the British and Americans respond to events in the Southern Cone are not
exclusively limited to a Latin American context, but are applicable to broader global concerns in
out of area Cold War conflicts within alliance politics.
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Chapter 1
A Complicated Past: The United States, Great Britain, and Latin America since 1820

That Latin America held a special place within the foreign policy of both the United
States and Great Britain was not a new development by1969. Long before Salvador Allende in
Chile or the Dirty Wars in Argentina, the United States and Great Britain were interested in the
political and economic significance of South and Central America for their own development as
imperial powers. From the moment of Latin American independence in the 1820s onward, both
the US and Great Britain sought to chart their own courses in the region, leaving an indelible
imprint upon the countries in which they intervened. This motivation to advance imperial
desires, primarily through manifestations of neocolonialism, would have a profound impact upon
the trajectory of Anglo-American policy toward Latin America. In this regard, Latin America, by
virtue of being perceived as a as a region of weaker nations to be dominated by the great powers,
would become a zone of imperial competition between the US and Great Britain, as each nation
sought to gain greater influence within the region. As new tensions emerged throughout the
decades, particularly with the rise of fascism in the 1920s and communism after the Second
World War, Latin America became even more significant as a zone of conflict and competition.
Thus, understanding the historical experience of both the United States and Great Britain and
their perceptions of Latin American countries within their respective spheres of influence is
fundamental to interpret the way leaders of both countries approached Latin America policy
during the Cold War.

18

Anglo-American Designs for an Independent Latin America
In the early decades of the nineteenth century, the Spanish colonies in Central and South
America began to assert their independence from the Spanish crown in the midst of the power
struggle in Europe created by Napoleon’s defeat of the Spanish monarch in 1808. In the years
following, local leaders like Simon Bolivar, Bernardo O’Higgins, José de San Martín, and
Augustín Iturbide had seized control of the former Spanish colonies and proclaimed their
independence from their Spanish overlords.36 In such a context, the United States was placed in a
unique situation with regard to its role in the Western Hemisphere and its diplomatic relationship
with Europe. By 1822, the attitude of the US was changing with regard to its responsibilities
within the hemisphere. President Monroe, Secretary Adams, members of Congress, most
famously led by Henry Clay, and others were increasingly convinced that America had a
responsibility to promote its commercial and political interests within the region. The
combination of these factors resulted in America being the first international power to recognize
the newly formed states of Latin America. In so doing, the United States, as one historian has
observed, “acted as the sponsor for the rising nations of Hispanic America.”37
Yet, nothing illustrates the extent to which American attitudes were changing about its
place in the Western Hemisphere quite like the 1823 Monroe Doctrine. For John Quincy Adams,
the preservation of the newly independent Latin American republics was indeed one of the major
foreign policy issues of the day, and the significance of an American policy addressing the issue
through the lens of hemispheric security was not lost on Adams.38 In this vein, then, maintaining
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the independence of Latin America was something that the United States must take the lead on.
There was to be no transfer of any territory in the western hemisphere to a European power.39 It
is this very notion of what John Logan has called the “no transfer policy” that undergirded the
text of the Monroe Doctrine itself.40 Underlying the idea of no transfer was a clear conviction
that the western hemisphere was no longer to be a realm of colonization. The Americas may
have been born out of colonization, but they would not remain colonies.41 In articulating these
ideas, the United States was clearly positioning itself as the leading power of the hemisphere,
and would do justify this special relationship between the US and Latin America on the grounds
of geographical proximity and shared experiences as colonies who shed the bonds of imperialism
through revolution and created in their aftermath independent republics.42
In light of such an American position toward the hemisphere, it is of little wonder that
when the premise of the Monroe Doctrine was first presented to the administration by Great
Britain as a possible joint Anglo-American declaration upholding in principle the freedom of the
newly independent Latin American republics, Secretary Adams outright rejected any form of
cooperation with the British. After all, the British were a large, powerful empire with a colonial
project spanning the globe.43 Yet while Adams and Monroe were certainly leery of Britain, it is
worth noting that the British seemingly had no desire to bring the independent countries of Latin
America under direct British control. That is not to say that they had no interest in the countries.
On the contrary, Britain desired to develop close political and commercial relations with the
newly formed republics. Furthermore, they saw the possibility of monarchy within the former
39
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colonies, particularly Mexico and Brazil, as a desirable and even preferable outcome.44 The issue
of monarchy, however, constituted a fundamental divide between the United States and Britain.
The United States, both in the Monroe Doctrine and long before, had drawn a clear distinction
between the old and new worlds, based upon a distinct social order and an avoidance of
European style politics.45 As early as 1820, John Quincy Adams declared that “the European and
American political systems should be kept as separate and distinct from each other as
possible.”46 There was to be no confusion as to American views about the threat posed by
Europe. The United States wanted the hemisphere to be as free from European politics as
possible, and that was a well-known fact to the British. In December 1823, after the
announcement of the Monroe Doctrine, Foreign Minister Canning wrote, “The United States,
naturally enough, aims at this division [America versus Europe], and cherish the democracy
which leads to it.”47 Thus, antagonism between the United States and Europe would undergird
the American approach to hemispheric security. Beyond reflecting diverging interests between
the two sides, it became also a matter of identity for the young American nation.
Having identified a division of the world between the hemispheres and committed to the
principle that territory in the western hemisphere would not be transferred to any non-American
power, the Monroe Doctrine became the quintessential pronouncement of American foreign
policy with regard to both Europe and Latin America. President Monroe’s famous proclamation
to Congress outlined two core ideas—the principle of non-colonization and the principle of noninterference. In doing so, the United States sent a message to the rest of the world, particularly
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Britain and the Holy Alliance, that the United States would not tolerate efforts to thwart the
independence of Latin America or re-subjugate the former colonies, whether at the hands of
Spain or another European power. This foreign policy declaration would become the bedrock of
inter-American relations.48
With both the United States and Great Britain interested in the independent fortunes of
Latin America, it is of little surprise that conflict and competition soon developed between the
two powers as each was competing for commercial influence in the region. Yet this economic
rivalry between the two English-speaking countries began even before the Monroe Doctrine was
delivered. After Bernard O’Higgins proclaimed Chilean independence in 1817, open trade was
initiated with foreign merchants, and American companies sent ships laden with cargo to Chilean
ports. Hundreds of thousands of dollars’ worth of goods were sold by American companies in
1817 alone.49 Chile became an important port for entry into the trans-Pacific trade networks, with
some estimates of trade from the region being valued at more than $6 million annually.50 Despite
the American hopes for commercial success, from 1818–1819, the British quickly overtook the
United States as the leading outside power trading in Chile. Britain’s stronger commercial
ventures, Chilean frustration with America’s lack of support for its independence, and greater
threat of attack from Spanish ships on American vessels sailing southward all but undercut the
American position entirely. By 1820, only one American ship annually landed in Chile.51 The
experience in Chile would become typical of most commercial competition in the region. A
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similar situation played out in Buenos Aires, as Britain had already established the city as one of
its primary centers of commercial control in South America.
While the British government stayed out of the colonial wars for independence, British
merchants did not, aiding the revolutionary movements and further cementing British economic
influence.52 Despite successful efforts to increase American trade with the new Argentine
government, American officials felt that they would never replace the British as the leading
economic power in Argentina, even though the United States had been the first to recognize
Argentina’s independence.53 As a result of such antagonism, the US Ambassador to Argentina,
John M. Forbes actively sought to advance the interest of the US in such a way that would be
detrimental to British influence through commercial treaties and propaganda campaigns.54
Ultimately a war between Argentina and Brazil would bring the US and Great Britain to more
equal influence in Argentina, but the extent of the antagonism should not be dismissed.55 In a
region in which Britain had invested more than 20,000,000 pounds sterling in 1824–1825 alone,
there would be no denying that the United States and Great Britain would come into conflict
through commercial and political rivalry in Latin America.56

The Rise of Neocolonialism
Despite initial competition between the US and Britain in the region, Britain soon
established its dominance within Latin America in the latter-half of the nineteenth century.
Neocolonialism became the name of the game, and the British, who had early on shown their
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desires to corner the independent, Latin American markets, were the masters of the neocolonial
system. Latin America became critical to the British imperial economy, as they averaged more
than £20 million annually in both exports and imports with Latin America from 1865 to 1895
and had an enormous sum of £552 million of investment in the region by 1895—a nearly 700%
increase from 1865.57 Such heavy economic investment inevitably affected the nature of the
Anglo-Latin American relationship, which was particularly evident in countries with the highest
level of British investment.
Chile was one such country. From 1844 onward, British imports to Chile were greater
than that of the United States, France, and Germany combined, while the UK also had substantial
investments in Chilean copper, nitrates, railroads, and agriculture.58 Chile was indeed sought
after by British investors as it was one of the most profitable Latin American countries for
British investment through well into the twentieth century.59 Given the prominent role that Chile
played in Britain’s Latin American policy, it is of little wonder that the British would be at least
mildly interested in Chilean politics. When war broke out between Peru and Chile in the War of
the Pacific (1879–83), the British unofficially threw their support behind the Chileans, as it was
an economically profitable venture for British investment in the nitrate industry. Similarly, when
a revolution broke out in Chile in 1891, many of the English citizens and investors in Chile
backed the revolutionary movement out of fear that the president was intent upon expropriating
foreign capital. While the British government was officially neutral, when the revolution was
successful, it was celebrated by the British community in Chile as a victory for the safety and
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future of British investment in the country.60 In this regard, then, Chile has long occupied a more
prominent role in Britain’s Latin-American policy.
Yet despite the prominence of Latin America from an economic perspective, and despite
some interest in political matters tacitly or from local ex-pats, Britain did not see much reason to
be concerned with Latin America from a diplomatic perspective. “As far as Britain was
concerned, Latin America lacked strategic and political importance. . . . Latin American
questions did not involve questions of imperial security.”61 This is not to say, however, that
Britain was completely unconcerned. There can be no denying that British diplomacy was
interested in the protection of British investments and economic interests in the region. The
British navy had ships stationed in the region, and would send a warship to the nearest port when
a revolution or war broke out in a Latin American country. Yet, beyond sending ships, Britain
often sought neutrality and caution when navigating the political and diplomatic contours of a
war or revolution.62 Additionally, British diplomats had little to no expertise in Latin American
affairs, and viewed the inhabitants of the region through extremely condescending and racially
derogatory lenses. Thomas Sanders, while serving as permanent Under-secretary of state for
foreign affairs, famously stated that the people of Central America were “semi-savage.”63
Ultimately then, what is clear is that Britain held the lion share of economic power in Latin
America in the late-nineteenth century, but had little interest in affecting the political realities of
the region.
With Britain only fully interested in economic control, the door was left open for an
American expansion in the region. By the latter-half of the nineteenth century, “the Monroe
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Doctrine . . . had become true national dogma, endorsed by all parties, and awakening an
instantaneous response in the breasts of patriotic Americans.”64 Under the administrations of
Presidents Johnson and Grant in the immediate aftermath of the American Civil War, the United
States reiterated its commitments to the Monroe Doctrine in strong terms, particularly over the
dealings of the cession of the Danish West Indies and the attempted annexation of the Dominican
Republic.65 Indeed, some historians have even asserted that it is during this period after the Civil
War that the “no transfer policy” and the doctrine of non-colonization became most inextricably
connected to the Monroe Doctrine.66
Throughout the 19th Century, the United States and Britain clashed over influence in
Latin America. Through situations like the Venezuela boundary dispute of 1895, the United
States often created imagined conflicts in which they perceived false British interest. In reality,
the British determined that showdowns with the United States in Latin America were not worth
the effort.67 The British had long demonstrated that Latin America was a politically and
strategically expendable region. They would not have backed down over the boundary dispute so
easily had the colony maintained any substantial geostrategic importance for the empire. Any
belief on the part of the Americans that Britain was actively trying to provoke a showdown was
largely imagined.68 Nevertheless, disputes like this one represent the extent to which the United
States was further committing itself to the Monroe Doctrine and its core principles of
hemispheric security. The Americans desired preeminence in the region, and would soon achieve
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these goals in the early decades of the twentieth century, as there was a changing of the guard in
which the United States assumed the place of prominence formerly held by the British.69

A Changing of the Guard in Latin America
No individual did more in the early twentieth century to expand the Monroe Doctrine and
American hegemony in Latin America than Theodore Roosevelt, the Assistant Secretary of the
Navy turned President. During his time as assistant secretary of the navy, Roosevelt had become
convinced that the United States needed to back up its diplomacy with force—a phrase
foreshadowing his famous “big stick policy”70 Once he became president, Roosevelt soon
realized that those countries he believed to be “wretched republics” that caused him “a great deal
of trouble” were indeed significant to American national security and control of its region and
hemisphere.71 In his annual messages of 1904 and 1905, Roosevelt articulated what has since
come to be known as the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. In his statement, he
authorized American policing of the region, particularly with regard to the seizure of foreign
customs houses and treasuries in order to institute American-backed financial control of Latin
American republics.72 In so doing, Roosevelt publicly outlined one of the clearest definitions of
the western hemisphere as an American sphere of influence in history. Yet Roosevelt had gone
well beyond just interpreting the Monroe Doctrine. As Walter LaFeber has observed:
When these three criteria of the Roosevelt ‘Corollary’. . . were applied by Roosevelt in
Santo Domingo, and then by presidents William Howard Taft, Woodrow Wilson, Warren
G. Harding, and Calvin Coolidge in a half-dozen other nations over the next quarter
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century, it becomes clear that Roosevelt did not add a mere “corollary.” He transformed
the meaning of the Monroe Doctrine.73
From the Roosevelt Corollary on, the United States was determined not just to keep European
countries out of the hemisphere, but to keep the entire hemisphere under the “persuasion” of the
United States, and firmly situated within the American orbit.
Such an expansion of American control over the western hemisphere occurred alongside
a corresponding withdrawal of European involvement in Latin America. Following the 1895
Venezuela border dispute, the European powers had gotten the American message regarding the
spheres of influence. Moving forward, they would be more diplomatic in their interactions with
the US, careful to play by the Americans’ rules.74 Furthermore, from 1898–1903, the United
States and Great Britain in particular embarked upon several complex diplomatic negotiations
that led to not only a period of détente, but a genuine trust and closeness between the two nations
that has proved lasting. Through an agreement upon the Canadian-Alaskan border in 1903 and
the ratification of the 1901 Hay-Pauncefote Treaty to end the decades-long dispute between the
two powers over an isthmian canal in Central America, the major issues between the US and
Britain had been effectively resolved. Any remaining disputes between the English-speaking
states were over minor issues that could be settled easily via arbitration.75
Following this denouement, the British embarked upon a strategic withdrawal from the
Western Hemisphere, particularly in Canada and the Caribbean. From 1904–1906, Great Britain,
under both Conservative and Liberal Party governments, found itself needing to make cuts to its
defense spending. The primary targets of these cuts were identified to be in Canada and the West
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Indies, two of Britain’s most fortified locations in the Western Hemisphere. By reducing the
number of imperial garrisons and naval squadrons deployed abroad, the British would not only
reduce its expenditures, it would be freed up to focus on more pressing security concerns,
particularly with regard to Germany, Russia, and Japan.76 While some within the government
objected to such withdrawal, particularly in Canada, these fears were largely overshadowed by
the convictions of key decision makers. Contrary to the estimates of some within the Committee
of Imperial Defence, the First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir John Fisher, and Lord of the Admiralty,
Arthur Lee, were convinced by their personal experience that there was no reason to fear an
American attack upon Canada.77 Facing pressure from multiple fronts, “the assurance of
American friendship allowed [Great Britain] to entrust its strategic interests in the western
hemisphere to American protection” from 1906 onward.78 Latin America had long been a
strategically expendable region for the British. When they saw an opportunity to advance their
own interests and those of the United States by withdrawing from the western hemisphere and
acknowledging the United States’ status as a great power with its own sphere of influence, they
took advantage of the opportunity. Such an approach demonstrates Britain’s approach to national
security. While understood within the confines of its imperial possessions across the globe,
Britain fully recognized the balance of power that guided realist assumptions of foreign policy.
As such, they actively worked toward calibrating surrender and advantages in such a way that
would maintain not only their power within the world, but also that of a new, great ally. In doing
so, the door was opened for a new period in the relations between the US, Great Britain, and
Latin America.
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Being Good Neighbors
Another crucial component of the United States’ attempts to increase its prominence in
the region was the United States’ focus on Pan-Americanism. Pan-Americanism was an effort to
promote cooperation and interaction throughout the western hemisphere through international
meetings and agreements—an idea that was first put forward by Simon Bolivar in the era of
Latin American revolutions. In 1889, however, the First International American Conference was
held in Washington, DC under the leadership of Secretary of State James G. Blaine.79 Despite
Blaine’s attempts to serve as an arbiter for several Latin American territorial disputes, the
continued presence of Great Britain in the region allowed several of the largest states in South
America, namely Chile and Argentina, to rebuff the United States’ efforts at hemispheric
leadership.80 Nevertheless, the meeting did establish the Pan-American Union (later the
Organization of American States) and laid a foundation for further meetings, with conferences
occurring at Mexico City in 1901, Rio de Janeiro in 1906, and Buenos Aires in 1910. The
common spirit running through the three subsequent meetings, however, was not one of
international cooperation, but rather general opposition by the Latin American states toward the
United States’ heavy-handed imperial policies, especially the Roosevelt Corollary. 81 The efforts
toward Pan-Americanism only intensified under President Woodrow Wilson, who during World
War I, proposed the Pan-American Treaty, which would create a regional collective security
mechanism with a commitment to mandatory arbitration and the multilateralization of the
Monroe Doctrine. The irony in Wilson suggesting such grandiose ideas for inter-American
cooperation, however, is that he simultaneously supported frequent intervention throughout the
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region and rejected efforts by Argentina to mediate the dispute between the US and Mexico in
1916.82 Thus, despite the efforts by the United States to promote cooperation within the
hemisphere, Pan-Americanism failed to bring about a significant reduction in tension between
the eagle of the north and Latin America.
In this context of continued hostility, the 1930s-40s brought a change in tone for the
nature of inter-American relations as Herbert Hoover and Franklin Roosevelt ushered in a new
Good Neighbor Policy. The Hoover administration quickly realized the mess it had inherited
with regard to hemispheric affairs. By 1930, the US State Department had publicly denounced
the Roosevelt Corollary, even while still claiming the right to protect its interests under
international law.83 Regardless of the caveat, this decision did indeed mark the beginning of a
period of rapprochement within the Americas. Hoover and Roosevelt alike began to retreat from
the interventionist policies of the previous three decades. When Roosevelt officially inaugurated
his new Good Neighbor policy, it was founded upon a commitment “to create an integrated
hemispheric system” based upon cooperation in political, economic, and military affairs.84 As
such, Roosevelt was willing to, at least publicly, cast aside the policing nature of American
action in favor of hemispheric solidarity. The notions of cooperation rather than antagonism
permeated bilateral conversations between American diplomats and their Latin American
counterparts, and established the tone for the Pan-American conferences of 1933, 1936, 1938,
and 1940. Through multilateral commitments to nonintervention and the use of commercial
agreements, the United States was indeed able to improve relations in the 1930s.85 In doing so,
the United States showed that its conception of national security was connected to a balance of
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power politics that required an equilibrium in Latin America. Through hemispheric cooperation,
whether by imposition or consensus, the US was able to keep the balance intact in its sphere of
influence.
Yet for all of the talk about improved relations and cooperation, the United States had not
forgotten that it held the power within the region and threatened to take more direct action when
a state appeared to be jeopardizing the balance of power. This desire to maintain order and
balance while appearing to respect the ideas of nonintervention manifested itself in several ways.
Under Hoover, the United States began a policy of supporting right wing authoritarianism
throughout the region. With the Great Depression further destabilizing the tumultuous region,
and believing that the need for order was of the utmost importance but that intervention to
impose order would only breed resentment, these nationalist, far-right dictators were the easiest
solution for the United States. The Hoover administration was responsible for putting Anastasio
Somoza in charge of the National Guard in Nicaragua, giving legitimacy to the government of
Maximillian Martinez in El Salvador, and allowing Rafael Trujillo to come to power in the
Dominican Republic.86 Roosevelt would not only support Hoover’s policy decisions in these
matters, but continue them, throwing American support behind Fulgencio Batista in Cuba.87 By
1933, fifteen of the twenty countries of Latin America were ruled by authoritarian leaders, and
American officials considered this simply being a good neighbor.88 Furthermore, the recognition
of dictatorships was only one way in which the United States could project its power within the
region. The other way was through economic and commercial agreements. “Washington policy
makers used currency, commodity, and customs regulations to tie Latin Americans closer to
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them, and—while praising free trade and reciprocity—moved to build a cartel trading system of
the their own.”89 The trade agreements were often used as ways to support and secure the loyalty
of the newly established dictatorships of the region.90 The combined effect of the creation of a
more integrated bloc of economic influence and the support of authoritarian governments on the
political front was that by the time World War II broke out, the United States had even more
fully cemented its hemispheric hegemony. By controlling the hemisphere so totally, the United
States protected its own national security by ensuring that threats did not emerge from within the
Americas, and that their power was uncontested in the region.
World War II would prove to be a significant moment for inter-American, AngloAmerican, and international relations. While the Pan-American conference in 1938 and 1940 had
committed the states of the hemisphere to notions of continental solidarity and neutrality, the
bombing of Pearl Harbor jolted the United States and the rest of the Americas out of their false
sense of security and into a new reality. With almost a unanimous voice, Latin America rallied to
support the United States, declaring war against Japan and severing relations with the Axis
powers. There were, however, two notable exceptions to this support—Chile and Argentina.
Chile, for its part, seemed fearful that its position on the western coast of South America might
make it vulnerable to Japanese aerial attacks, and thus, chose not to provoke the tiger.91
Argentina, on the other hand, opted for neutrality—a policy that greatly angered the United
States. As Randall Woods has argued, Argentina’s refusal to go along with the American war
effort fundamentally undermined the policy objectives of the Good Neighbor Policy. 92 Further

89

LaFeber, “The Evolution of the Monroe Doctrine,” 134.
Gilderhus, The Second Century, 79–91.
91
Ibid., 96–97.
92
Randall B. Woods, The Roosevelt Foreign Policy Establishment and the “Good Neighbor:” The United
States and Argentina, 1941–45 (Lawrence: The Regents Press of Kansas, 1979), xii, 7–8.
90

33

adding strain to the situation was Great Britain’s refusal to support the United States in the
forced coercion of Argentina to abandon neutrality. The United States believed that Britain
would naturally receive support against the Argentines by levying sanctions against them and
freezing the assets of the country’s largest banks in order to prevent the Latin American state
from aiding the Axis. Britain, however, saw this American ploy for what it was—an attempt to
restore American hegemony and retaliate against Argentina for not falling in line. When Britain
chose to support its own interests by maintaining cordial relations with Argentina, and even
sided with the Argentinians in opposition to the United States’ economic leveraging, strain
developed within the Anglo-American relationship and the rivalry between the two powers in
Latin America once again was a central issue.93 While reconciliation was eventually reached
between the US and Argentina in 1944, the issues between the US, Britain, and Argentina from
1941–1943 would only foreshadow future conflict.
The turmoil and challenges of World War II were foundational to the development of
inter-American relations. The war convinced many American nations of the need for further
cooperation to address hemispheric security concerns, and in a meeting in Mexico City in early
1945, it was decided that the only way forward was through the creation of new inter-American
system modeled upon the newly created United Nations.94 In 1947, the states of Latin America
gathered at Rio de Janeiro to begin to bring this new vision for the hemisphere into existence. It
was at the Rio meeting that the states of the region permanently extended their wartime
commitment to mutual defense and collective security in the event of an attack or act of
aggression against any power in the hemisphere. The Rio Treaty represented an important step in
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the process of creating the OAS. Yet, it will not be until the next year, at the Ninth International
Conference of American States in Bogota, that the OAS charter would be approved. The OAS
Charter represented, according to Acting Secretary of State Robert Lovett, an effort to
“Coordinate and strengthen the inter-American system in the interest of greater efficiency and to
meet the demands of changing conditions.”95 By cementing the OAS into a more formal vehicle
for cooperation in Latin America, the United States had solidified its hegemonic influence in
Latin America.

The Early Cold War in Latin America
The newly created OAS would be a critical tool for the United States moving forward,
particularly as the Cold War soon found its way to Latin America. Despite having been a conflict
between the United States and the Soviet Union, the Cold War manifested itself in regions and
on continents around the world. The struggle between capitalism and communism was
particularly pronounced in Central and South America, where outside interference had long been
forbidden by the United States. 96 In this context, the Monroe Doctrine and the preservation of
American interests in Latin America as the sphere of American control free of outside
intervention was a fundamental component of how the United States conceived the Cold War.
The commitment to the enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine became a feature of foreign policy
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under every Cold War president. Likewise, the perceived Soviet threat to the region brought the
Monroe Doctrine to a place of returned prominence in policy following the general
rapprochement of the Good Neighbor Policy. Furthermore, new terms were applied to the
Monroe Doctrine in the form of covert war and counterinsurgency, as policy makers sought to
bring the 1823 doctrine into the new, post-war reality.97
Nowhere would the significance of the United States’ return to the aggressive
manifestations of the Monroe Doctrine be more evident than in Guatemala in 1954. As Greg
Grandin has shown so effectively, Guatemala became a “staging ground for the continental Cold
War” in Latin America—a test case and training ground where techniques would be tested and
perfected before being used elsewhere in the region.98 The United States’ activity in Guatemala
was targeted at diminishing the impact of the Guatemalan left and instituting a redefinition of
democracy that was based upon “the astringent terms of personal freedom.”99 After the American
involvement in the coup of 1954, widespread disillusionment with politics as a vehicle of
legitimate change became a defining reality for many within Guatemala. 1954 had taught them
that the political system was broken, and the United States would play a large role in the affairs
of the hemisphere. From 1954–1966, the United States trained Guatemala’s undemocratic
government and its military in methods of counterinsurgent warfare, while promoting increased
government violence against the Left, and the Communist Party in particular. In practicing these
techniques of counterrevolutionary support and terror in Guatemala, the United States was
developing a model that would be applied in other countries, like Chile, Nicaragua, and
Argentina.
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The study of the relations between Latin America and the United States and Great
Britain, respectively, shows a long and complicated history of cooperation, conflict, and
competition between the two major powers over control and influence in the region. From the
moment of independence onward, the United States had seen Latin America as a region in which
it could exercise its expansionist and imperialist impulses at the expense of Europe. Britain, also
motivated by competition with continental Europe, saw Latin America as a region in which to
advance its own economic agenda and neo-colonial control of markets and governments. At
times, these similar goals brought the United States and Great Britain into conflict with one
another. While Anglo-American competition over control of Latin America eased somewhat in
the aftermath of World War II, it did not fully disappear. Thus, when seen in the long duree, it
should be of little wonder that from 1969–1982, Latin America figured prominently within the
context of the Anglo-American special relationship. With both nations having such a long and
turbulent history of action in the region, conflict over the nature of policy was sure to emerge. In
Chile, Argentina, and the Falkland Islands, in particular, the historical experiences of the United
States and Great Britain would be foundational for how the two states approached the challenges
of the Cold War in Latin America.
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CHAPTER 2
The Socialist Wedge: The United States, Great Britain, and Allende’s Chile, 1969-1973

Few events in the Western Hemisphere during the twentieth century provoked as much
concern within United States foreign policy as the Chilean election of a socialist president,
Salvador Allende, in 1970. Allende’s message of “la via Chilena” sent shockwaves through
American foreign policy circles, as it represented an expansion of socialism within Latin
America, which was perceived as an outgrowth of Soviet-Cuban involvement in the traditionally
American sphere of influence. From the view of the Nixon Administration (1969–74), the
expansion of socialism in Latin America was unacceptable, and the United States pumped
millions of dollars into preventing Allende’s election, and, once unsuccessful, ultimately
removing him from power through a CIA-sponsored coup in 1973. Such a view, however, was
not completely shared on both sides of the Atlantic, particularly within the confines of the special
relationship between the United States and Great Britain. For the United States, a monolithic fear
of communism and socialism primarily motivated its opposition to Allende. Chile’s location
within the western hemisphere, the concern of Soviet-Cuban involvement in Latin America, and
large economic consequences resulting from the nationalization of the Chilean copper industry
only compounded America’s exaggerated threat perception. Britain’s policy on Allende’s Chile
reflected a far more tempered view of the socialist government than that of the United States.
Endowed with a more historically nuanced understanding of socialism, Britain held a different
view of Allende’s Chile. Indeed, many within Britain were sympathetic to Allende’s experiment.
As a result of these opposing positions, new tensions developed within the special relationship as
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the US actively prodded their British counterparts to address the Cold War geo-political
implications of Allende’s Chile in a significant way.

The United States and the Fear of Communism, 1964–1970
American concern with the situation in Chile was not a new phenomenon in 1970. After
Fidel Castro’s successful Cuban Revolution, the United States’ concern over the spread of
communism in Latin America reached new heights. Committed to having “no more Cubas,” the
United States increased its involvement in the region to even higher levels. Chile became
particularly alarming to the United States in the aftermath of Cuba because of the ties between
Castro and one of the leading socialists in Chile, Senator Salvador Allende. Just three months
after Castro seized power, Allende went to Havana to meet the revolutionary leader and his
comrades—most notably Che Guevara. It was during that trip that Allende became impressed
with the revolutionary spirit in Cuba and was more convinced of the common struggle shared by
the Cubans and Chileans.100 Not only did Allende believe that Chile needed the same kind of
liberation that Cuba had experienced, he believed that such liberation meant breaking the
country’s economic dependence upon the United States, which controlled more than eighty
percent of all Chilean industry, particularly Copper.101 The close relationship between Castro and
Allende would only be strengthened throughout the 1960s, as the Chilean socialist visited Cuba
on several more occasions.102 These ties were more than enough to concern American policy
makers who were adamantly opposed to the expansion of communism in Latin America.
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Witnessing Cuban efforts to influence and bring about revolution in Chile, the Kennedy
administration considered the Latin American state as a prime target for the new Alliance for
Progress, and as a result, funneled more than $740 million to the country through Alliance aid in
the 1960s.103 Offering the country economic aid, however, was far from the only way the United
States attempted to sway the internal political dynamic in Chile. By 1962, the Kennedy
administration had thrown its support behind Eduardo Frei, the Christian Democrat who was
contesting the 1964 Chilean presidential election. While Frei was proposing measures of seminationalization of Copper and other industries, his overall plan was moderate enough for the
United States to support him. From 1962 to 1964, the United States, working covertly through
the CIA, spent more than $4 million to influence the outcome of the election in favor of the
Christian Democrats through polling and campaign advertisements in multiple media platforms.
To put that in perspective, “On a per capita basis, the CIA spent more money on the 2.4 million
registered Chilean voters than did Lyndon Johnson and his opponent, Senator Barry Goldwater
(R-AZ), in the 1964 U.S. presidential election.”104 On top of the money spent by the CIA, the
American embassy in Santiago spent tens of millions of dollars annually on what it called
“impact projects.” These projects were designed to help rural areas of the country in order to
help connect the Christian Democrats with the Alliance for Progress, which was billed as a
program to help poor Chileans.105 Yet such aid was not motivated by pure, humanitarian
motives. The greater concern for the Kennedy, and then Johnson, administrations was the
growing popularity of Frei’s primary challenger, the socialist Salvador Allende. The
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administrations were convinced that the election of Allende would be fatal to the existence of
democracy in Chile and seriously endanger US interests in the country. The CIA ramped up its
efforts to undermine Chilean democracy through a series of psychological warfare campaigns to
spread disinformation and promote fear among the electorate, particularly women.106 In the end,
the United States succeeded in keeping Allende out of office and ending the immediate threat of
a socialist Chile, as Frei cruised to victory on the back of American funding. Nevertheless,
Allende and the popularity of socialism in Chile would not disappear forever. The next time
Allende emerged, however, a new man was sitting in the White House, one who would be even
more adamantly opposed than his predecessors to the expansion of socialism in Latin America.
The election of Richard Nixon in 1968 set the tone for how the United States would wage
the Cold War in regard to the ideological struggle against communism. The administration’s
rhetoric, from the start, showed an ardent anti-communism. No one in the administration,
however, had been as vocally and adamantly opposed to the spread of communism than the
President himself. In fact, Nixon had long staked his reputation to being a tireless crusader of
communism. As a freshman congressman in 1947, Nixon had been appointed to the House
Committee on Un-American Activities (HUAC). This was an appointment that Nixon was
pleased to have landed, having staked much of his congressional campaign on a promise to fight
the “Red subversion.”107 While on the committee, Nixon made a name for himself as a rabid
anti-communist, causing him to make a number of enemies on both sides of the aisle. While
lesser known than Joseph McCarthy, Nixon in many ways was a forerunner of McCarthy, in that
he was one of the first congressmen to use such intense, bullying tactics to deal with political
enemies in order to score points with the electorate. In fact, Nixon was determined to make
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HUAC a more respectable committee than it had been in the past, shedding the committee’s
reputation of making unverifiable claims.108 Nixon’s time to shine came in 1948 with the Alger
Hiss Hearings before the committee. With the help of Robert Stripling, the HUAC investigator,
Nixon uncovered the crucial evidence of communist collusion necessary to indict and convict
Hiss of perjury. The fame and notoriety that Nixon gained throughout the Hiss hearings proved
vital to his election to the US Senate in 1950.109
Yet, Nixon’s first real formative experience with communism came not during HUAC
hearings, but while in Europe serving as a member of the Herter Mission. The Herter Mission
was a 1947 European tour led by Representative Christian Herter whose purpose was to
investigate the conditions of Europe and the threat posed by communism and provide an
assessment to Congress before they voted upon the Marshall Plan. While in Europe, Nixon was
deeply affected by his personal experience with communism on the ground. In Trieste, on the
border between Yugoslavia and Italy, Nixon witnessed communist tactics for himself in the form
of a group of Yugoslav communists marching through the city like a band of marauders. One
communist threw a grenade into a group of protestors just down the road from Nixon, killing five
people. In Trieste, more than anywhere else on his mission, Nixon became convinced that these
threats must be checked before Europe was lost to communism.110 Upon returning home from
Europe in October, Nixon quickly set out to argue that the Marshall Plan was the only way to
stop communism, which he believed was “spreading like a cancer thru [sic] the life blood of
Europe.”111 Nixon’s experience with the brutality of the communists in Europe in 1947 had
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convinced him and placed him firmly within the camp of an America actively involved in
stopping communism globally.
Nixon’s virulent anti-communism and the reputation he had earned through the Hiss
hearings ultimately played a crucial role in his nomination for the vice presidency in 1952 on the
Republican ticket. As Eisenhower’s attack dog, Nixon tackled the issue of communism on the
campaign trail as aggressively as ever.112 That spirit would not soon go away once he and Ike
were in office. One particularly significant region of communist involvement that concerned
Nixon as Vice President was Latin America. During his eight years as vice president, Nixon
made two trips to the region—one in 1955 and a second, more eventful trip in 1958. In 1955,
while publicly billed as a goodwill tour, Nixon had been sent to Mexico, Central America, and
Brazil to build support for the ouster of communist influence in all governments throughout the
region, and to promote the stabilization of the newly established government in Guatemala, after
the US-sanctioned coup—a decision Nixon had overwhelmingly supported.113 After touring the
region, in March 1955 Nixon reported that the communist threat was real in Latin America and,
while on the decline, could not be ignored because of the regions susceptibility to
totalitarianism.114 The 1958 trip only confirmed these views, since it was on that trip that Nixon
and his party were violently attacked by a mob in Venezuela, threatening the physical safety and
well-being of the vice president and his security detail. This trip, more vividly than the first, had
convinced Nixon that the communists were winning the propaganda battle in Latin America. He
told the National Security Council (NSC) that, “The threat of Communism to Latin America was
greater today than ever before in history,” particularly since many within Latin America feared
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dictatorship more than communism.115 All of this reinforced within Nixon the strong conviction
that Latin America and the threat of communism in the region was crucial for America’s waging
of the Cold War. Thus, these experiences in Congress and the Vice Presidency during Nixon’s
formative years in political life fundamentally colored the way he perceived communism and the
threat it posed to the United States and the world, particularly in Latin America.

The United States and the Election of 1970
By the time Nixon entered the White House, the CIA was already keeping a close eye on
the forthcoming 1970 elections in Chile, particularly once the political tide began to turn toward
the possibility of a socialist being elected as the next president of Chile. Noting with interest a
split within the country’s Christian Democratic Party over possible cooperation with the
socialists and communists, a CIA report on Latin America’s forthcoming elections noted that the
Chilean socialists and communists were most likely to support and run “pro-Castro Socialist
Senator Salvador Allende” or someone even more radical.116 Allende made no attempts to
disguise his distrust for the United States and the radical nature of his movement. In an interview
with a Canadian reporter on the morning of the 1970 election, Allende again reiterated that the
imperialism and neo-colonialism of the United States was one of the primary causes of
underdevelopment in Latin America. He noted that “the people of Latin America cannot live
indefinitely in their current state of misery and poverty while at the same time financing the
richest and most powerful country in the world.”117 Allende also saw his movement as an
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opportunity to do something historic and radical by bringing a revolutionary party to political
power through the traditional electoral process. Allende saw this as the key to ultimately create a
lasting socialist society.118 Such public rhetoric only enflamed American fears about Allende.
Yet, more than just a return of Allende to the political stage, the 1970 election in Chile
was seen as crucial because of the loss of support experienced by the Christian Democrats. After
1964, many within the US had hoped that the Christian Democrats would be the solution to Latin
America’s struggle with communism. After all, the Christian Democrats were a center-left party
that shared with communism a desire to address the social and economic issues of the country,
but through less radical means. Yet, despite the party’s overwhelming victory in 1964 with the
aid of American funding, the Christian Democrats’ vote totals in the 1967 and 1969 Chilean
municipal elections dropped.119 In many ways, the party’s declining numbers could be seen as a
natural result. Having been a relatively new party in 1964, and disproportionately aided by the
United States, the Christian Democrats had not fully developed their organization before taking
power, leaving the center-left group internally divided and lacking the strong leaders necessary
to govern effectively. Such issues, however, led the American intelligence community to
conclude that the Christian Democrats had “virtually hit bottom.”120 While holding out hope that
the party’s nominee, Radomiro Tomic, could combine his energy with the popular desire for
non-communist social reform, the CIA still concluded that the best Tomic could do was produce
a “virtual three-way tie, in which Congress will select the president.”121
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Beyond concerns over the ability of the Christian Democrats to effectively challenge the
increasing support for Allende were heightened American fears of a “rising anti-American
nationalism, self-assertiveness, and growing social and political complexity” in Latin America
that the US believed to be responsible for inhibiting its “ability directly to control and channel
developments in Latin America.”122 The same policy study that discussed these fears went on to
conclude that this “anti-US nationalism, especially where compounded by Communist
subversion, [was] now a growing threat to US security in the hemisphere.”123 From the United
States’ perspective, anti-American nationalism allowed the Soviets the greatest amount of space
to expand their influence and seize upon unrest to subvert democracy in the region. In this vein,
then, the United States categorized communist-influenced, anti-American nationalism as a threat
to the United States’ national security and drew the lines for a future conflict. Challenges to
national security would not be tolerated, and in this case, the United States’ desire to maintain its
neocolonial control over Latin America left no room for the continent’s nationalist movements,
and certainly not Marxist, nationalist movements.
As the possibility of an Allende victory increased, in late-July 1970, Nixon and Kissinger
ordered National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM) 97, which set out to create a
contingency plan in the event that Allende won the election. Worked on by staff members of
various agencies related to national security, NSSM 97 concluded that the only possible way to
prevent an Allende election was a military coup, which was generally deemed to be
unfeasible.124 Experiencing such realities, the group determined that the US should attempt to
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limit the damage caused by Allende, given that he could reasonably be expected “to move
gradually and cautiously toward the establishment of an authoritarian Marxist state. To this end,
it would seek to destroy, neutralize, or obtain the support of the various groups and institutions
which might block its progress.”125 The report also expressed its convictions that the Allende
administration would stand by its campaign statements on foreign policy, with every intention
“to ‘denounce’ the OAS, to intensify relations with socialist countries, and to establish close ties
with Cuba.”126 From a foreign policy perspective, it is clear that the Nixon administration, on the
eve of the 1970 Chilean election, saw the election of Allende as a hellish scene—a revolutionary
party taking office to bring about socialism through democratic means, while destroying
democracy in the country and moving ever closer to Cuba and the Soviet Union.
The United States’ worst case scenario became reality, when the Popular Unity coalition
of socialist, communist, and radical party members succeeded in electing Salvador Allende as
the president of Chile on September 4, 1970, albeit without a clear majority. Having already
established that such Marxist inspired movements were unacceptable, it is little wonder that the
Nixon administration saw Allende’s Chile as a foreign policy crisis. The NSC quickly went to
work formulating policy options that would potentially prevent Allende’s victory from being
certified by the Chilean Congress and, if that was not possible, to plan for a future that involved a
Marxist government in Chile. In the short term, the United States’ immediate attention was
turned toward the possibility of a military coup in the intervening period between the election
and the Congressional certification of the election results. Primarily discussed by the members of
the 40 Committee—a specially convened NSC committee formed in 1970 and tasked with
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reviewing and examining covert operations—a military coup allowed the US to achieve all of its
goals, in that it would prevent Allende from taking power while reinstating the American-backed
incumbent, Eduardo Frei. Bringing about a coup, however, required more than policymakers in
Washington, D.C. drafting papers and memos; on the ground, the US Ambassador to Chile,
Edward Korry, was busy at work cultivating his connections with members of the Chilean
military. If such a coup were to be successful, the United States offered its assurances to the
Chilean military that it would not only continue its military aid, but that the Chileans could be
promised “stepped-up, post-coup military support, material, hardware and funds, and as a
minimum, strong moral support for the kind of action which must be taken” should they choose
on their own accord to move forward with a coup.127 Such an option, however, was quickly ruled
out as feasible. By late-September, the 40 Committee has determined that a coup was unlikely
since President Frei seemed to be unwilling to take the responsibility of spurring the military to
action.128 Within just a few days, Ambassador Korry informed Kissinger that the “the odds are
overwhelmingly against a successful coup without the complicity of Frei. . . . The military will
not carry out a coup to Viaux in power.”129 Such assessments were sufficient to put to rest the
idea that the United States could prevent Allende from assuming the presidency.
Once Allende was in office, however, the NSC discussions moved from possible to coups
to more tangible, concrete plans for how to ultimately subvert and destroy the Allende
government. Just because the US had been unable prevent him from taking office, it did not
mean that the Nixon Administration had made its peace with Allende’s new role. In fact, Henry

127

Memorandum from Al Haig to Henry A. Kissinger, September 24, 1970, Pinochet Files, Remote
Archives Capture Program, RMN Library.
128
Minutes of the Meeting of the 40 Committee, September 29, 1970, Pinochet Files, Remote Archives
Capture Program, RMN Library.
129
Telegram from Edward Korry to Henry Kissinger, October 9, 1970, Pinochet Files, Remote Archives
Capture Program, RMN Library.

48

Kissinger saw the Allende election as “one of the most serious challenges ever faced in this
hemisphere.”130 As far as the national security adviser was concerned, the events that unfolded in
Chile in the upcoming year would have an effect on the whole of Latin America, the developing
world, American influence in the Western Hemisphere, and the Cold War broadly conceived.
This led him to believe that “the dangers of doing nothing are greater than the risks we run in
trying to do something.”131 Kissinger was not alone, however, in such an opinion. The NSC’s
Senior Review Group (SRG), which Kissinger chaired, saw as its greatest fear a Soviet/Cubanstyle dictatorship in Chile, and therefore, their chief goal was “the prevention of the
establishment by the Allende government of an authoritarian Marxist regime.”132 This goal
guided their conclusions that the best course of action was to secretly create friction within the
governing coalition, while mobilizing the non-Marxist portions of the country, particularly
within the military. Throughout the latter months of 1970, the SRG diligently worked to craft a
series of options for President Nixon to consider moving forward. The range of actions put forth
varied in style and substance, ranging from a modus vivendi with Chile to actively promoting a
coup. Nixon and Kissinger, however, would not accept any option that allowed the US
government to seem as if Allende’s leadership of Chile was acceptable. Prior to an NSC meeting
on November 6, 1970, Kissinger instructed the president that:
Contrary to your usual practice of not making a decision at NSC meetings, it is essential
that you make it crystal clear where you stand on this issue at today's meeting. If all
concerned do not understand that you want Allende opposed as strongly as we can, the
result will be a steady drift toward the modus vivendi approach.133
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With the message received loud and clear that acceptance was not an option, the US government
ultimately arrived at the conclusion that the US should take a middle road between modus
vivendi and outright hostility, one characterized by a clear opposition to the Allende government,
economic sanctions and the suspension aid, and differentiated levels of internal subversion
tactics, all of course depending on how severely the threat was perceived at the moment.134 Such
policy actions would remain the name of the game for the US in regard to Chile throughout the
Allende administration. The US would “maintain an outwardly correct position” while privately
seeking to undermine and destabilize the democratically elected government.135

Great Britain and the Election of 1970
The United States’ extreme alarm over Allende’s Chile may seem to be the logical,
democratic-capitalist response to the election of a socialist in the midst of a global struggle
against communism. Yet, such concern over Allende did not resonate universally throughout the
West. This is particularly seen when comparing the actions taken by the United States’ with
those of its closest ally, Great Britain. The implications of an Allende victory in 1970 was not
lost on the British. The head of the American Department of the British Foreign &
Commonwealth Office (FCO) wrote to the British Ambassador to Chile that, “Allende has at
least this to his credit. He has put Latin America on the Whitehall map as nobody has since
Castro, matters such as Falkland incidents and Bobby Moore’s arrest excepted!”136 There was no
denying that Allende was certainly on Whitehall’s map. From 1969 onward, the British Foreign
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& Commonwealth Office (FCO) was receiving regular election reports with current polling data
from its ambassador in Chile, Toby Hildyard. These reports, particularly from mid-1970 onward,
tracked the gradual progression of Allende’s popular support, yet Ambassador Hildyard and the
other members of the British Embassy staff remained hesitant to make any predictions about the
outcome of the election, even just a week out.137 What was more interesting to the British
diplomats, however, was the support each candidate had in the Chilean legislature. Once it
became clear that it was unlikely for any one candidate to maintain a majority, legislative support
became crucial to determining the outcome of the election. Unlike their American counterparts,
however, the British never believed that the election of Allende was likely. On the eve of the
election, Hildyard reported to Whitehall that, while certainly not impossible, “an Allende victory
does not seem probable.”138 Ultimately, the events of September 4 would prove the British
estimates wrong. Allende did in fact win the election, and that would shift the nature of the
conversation.
There is no denying that the British would have preferred for Allende not to win the
election, but their estimates of the implications were far less dire than those of the United States.
Just three weeks out from the election, Hildyard told the Foreign and Commonwealth Office that
while “an Allende is generally regarded as meaning the end of democracy in Chile, and a disaster
for business,” he was “not so sure, however, that is not a great oversimplification.”139 The staff at
the American Department called this assessment “an excellent report.”140 Hildyard repeated this
opinion in his reports to the FCO on several more occasions prior to the election, noting that
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“Chile is not Cuba. . . . Chile has a long democratic tradition and strongly rooted institutions.”141
Even the night before the election, Hildyard noted that the Americans would likely attempt to put
in place sanctions and reduce its commitments to Chile, but that the British, as long as there were
not major hits, should continue to maintain reasonable relations with Chile, and keep British
companies from making rash decisions.142 While the United States had begun its worst-case
contingency planning in July and August 1970, the British continued to maintain a calm,
relatively measured appraisal of the threats posed by Allende.
This position did not change even after Allende won the election. Hildyard reported to
the FCO in November 1970 that Anglo-Chilean relations could be expected to remain close, as
Allende himself was interested in maintaining close relations with the British. In fact, the British
even anticipated a welcome increase in exports to Chile in response to Chilean rejection of
American influence.143 Perhaps, however, the most telling assessment of general British opinion
on the election of Allende was from the board of the Bank of London and South America. In
their letter to the FCO, the Bank’s Board began:
“The brusque reactions of the US Government to Dr. Salvador Allende's impeccably
democratic electoral victory and the crudely stupid treatment of the subject in the US
press, which has in turn contaminated the London press, have combined to distort the
picture. The notion that Chile is about to become "another Cuba" is too absurd to require
comment, but it is current in the USA, even in Washington."144
What emerges, then, from the initial assessments by those closest to the situation in Chile is that
Britain perceived the election of Allende as far from a crisis of national security. In fact, at least
some influential figures believed that the American reaction was a generally overblown response
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to a democratic process that was far from devastating. Such positions on the part of the British
stood in stark contrast to the heavy-handed nature of US policy.

The Election of Allende and Transatlantic Tension
This fundamental difference of policy and perception of the Chilean situation between the
US and Great Britain became a source of tension within the special relationship, as Allende
drove a socialist wedge between the two close allies from the very beginning of his arrival onto
the political scene. From the immediate post-election period onward, Nixon began to be
concerned about what he perceived as a British acceptance of the Allende government. In lateSeptember, Kissinger conveyed to the British Ambassador to the US, John Freeman, that “the
president had been somewhat distressed by H.M.G.’s apparent attitude towards the election of
Allende in Chile.”145 Particularly of concern to Nixon were statements made by Ambassador
Hildyard that seemed to “favour accommodations with Allende” and were “encouraging
Chileans to believe that the U.K. regards Allende’s arrival with equanimity.”146 Kissinger hoped
that such a position was not actually representative of Her Majesty’s Government, but
nevertheless, he was clear that such a position of accommodation was not in accordance with the
United States’ policy toward Chile and that the topic should be discussed by the British at once.
Part of the urgency in this conversation, however, was the upcoming summit between President
Nixon and the newly elected Prime Minister Ted Heath at Chequers in October, 1970.
Knowing how seriously the US viewed the situation in Chile, and having been warned by
Kissinger that the topic could come up at Chequers, the British were prepared for the issue
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when, as the meeting was drawing to a close, Nixon added one final topic to the conversation
before wrapping up—Chile. Nixon was concerned that the British had not, as of yet, made any
type of public condemnation of the socialist regime. He warned them that, “Chile is not yet down
the pike,” and asked the British “to give no encouragement to the idea that this government
might prove acceptable.”147 While noting that they shared all of the same concerns the US had
toward Chile, the British were far more pragmatic in that they acknowledged their limited ability
to do anything to influence the direction that Chile was going, and expressed their concerns that
a Western boycott of Allende’s government might only strengthen his position internally and
internationally. Furthermore, the more ideologically minded British believed that there remained
a chance that “his regime, however extreme and however tiresome, [would] not be Marxist in the
strict sense of the term.”148 Such a reaffirmation of shared concerns paired with more optimistic
assessments, however, were not sufficient for the Nixon administration, who still believed that
the British were being “soft on communism in Chile or elsewhere in Latin America.”149
Additionally, the British had private skepticism towards the United States’ assertion at Chequers
that it was not actively attempting to undermine and depose Allende. As the above discussions of
American policy showed, the British clearly had good reason to be skeptical.150
Nevertheless, the disparity between American policy and British policy with regard to the
election of Allende left Nixon incredibly concerned with the situation and frustrated with his
counterpart in Britain for not being more committed to opposing the expansion of socialism.
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The United States and Allende’s Chile, 1971–72
These disagreements were not going to dissipate anytime soon, as the Nixon
administration came to realize. Reckoning that the future of relations with Chile brought great
uncertainty, on November 9, 1970, Nixon and his team issued National Security Decision
Memorandum (NSDM) 93, which formally outline US policy toward Allende’s Chile. Having
weighed various options, the president, in conjunction with Kissinger and other advisors,
committed the United States to a cool, but not hostile public response toward Chile that privately
pressured the government, vigorously conveyed to other Latin American countries the United
States’ opposition to the creation of a communist state in Chile, and cooperated with the military
governments in Brazil and Argentina to oppose any Chilean efforts that hurt American interests.
Coupled with this policy was the implementation of bi-weekly status reports on the situation in
Chile that allowed the government to continually monitor and tweak its pressure on the Chilean
government.151 What became clear in the immediate aftermath of Allende’s inauguration is that
the United States’ fears about the threat of a socialist president in Chile would not be easily
assuaged.
Throughout his campaign, Allende had pledged to adopt a policy that promoted the
nationalization of all foreign-owned industries, particularly those held by American companies,
which the Chilean president saw as the stranglehold of imperialism. American policy makers
naturally feared those initiatives. Even before nationalization began to occur, Allende indicated
that partially foreign-owned mining companies would be the first targets of nationalization, and
within weeks of taking office, the Chilean government took over two small, American
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companies.152 Yet, this alone was not enough to send American companies into panic. In a
conversation between Lewis Girdler, the Officer in Charge of Chilean Political Affairs for the
State Department, and the press attaché at the Hungarian embassy, Girdler noted that as of
December 11, 1970, the US government had received “no pressure at all,” and that it was useless
to be concerned about until it became clear how Allende would enact his plans for
expropriation.153 That attitude, however, would soon change, as within just a few short weeks,
nationalization was in full swing.
On December 21, 1970, Allende submitted a measure to the Chilean legislature for
debate and approval that would officially amend the Chilean constitution to include a mechanism
for the nationalization of foreign owned Copper mines in Chile.154 By early-1971, the Nixon
administration had mobilized into dealing with the potential ramifications of such actions,
especially once the nationalization bill began to be debated. In January 1971, Ambassador Korry
reported that after a round of talks between Allende and senior leaders within the Chilean
Christian Democrats, the nationalization amendment had become even more punitive for the
American businesses operating copper mines, even threatening to change the existing
nationalization deals that had been made under the Frei administration with Kennecott and
Anaconda.155 Regardless of American anxiety over the implications of nationalization, Chile
firmly saw these policies as completely within their purview as a nation, particularly with regard
to copper. In a speech to the Communist Party of Italy, Luis Corvalan, Chilean Senator and
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Secretary General of the Chilean Communist Party (CHCP) commented, “We are in our own
right and we think it is part of our national sovereignty to carry out these programs which are in
the best interest of the Chilean people. . . . We want copper nationalized not in order to make
trouble for the US but for the welfare of our people.”156 The Chilean legislature officially ratified
the bill, and seized all US copper companies when the constitutional amendment went into effect
on July 16. The measure stated that compensation would be set at a depreciated book value that
would be determined by Chilean Comptroller General, minus deductions for old equipment and
an additional excess profit tax levied by Allende. The measure was clearly punitive for American
companies.157
Once the copper companies were nationalized in July, the United States government
immediately went to work to seek what it believed to be equitable compensation for the seizure
of American assets. Matters were only worsened by the increasingly hardline stances taken by
the communists and socialists, who by September 1971, had officially decided to offer no
compensation to the Kennecott Corporation and only nominal compensation to Anaconda,
regardless of the terms of the original agreements. American officials became convinced that,
“Despite the comptroller and his technical commissions, despite the special court of appeal and
its loaded nominees, there can be no doubt that the prices set for Anacondas, and Kennecott will
be political sums.” 158 Ambassador Korry went so far as to inform the Secretary of State, “Aside
from acts of God, I can envisage no significant change in the Chilean economic, political, or
social sectors that would favorably affect copper negations.”159 Matters only further deteriorated
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throughout September. On September 28, Allende ruled—through the mechanisms set in place
by the constitutional amendment—that Kennecott and Anaconda had earned $774 million in
excess profits that would be subject to the excess profit tax. When these were figures were taken
together with the estimated value determined by the Chilean Controller, the net result of
“Allende’s decision setting an extraordinarily high figure for excess profits indicate[d] not only
that no compensation [would] be paid, but that the companies [might] well wind up owing the
government.”160
The final blow to the copper companies, however, came on October 11, when the
Controller General announced that with two minor exceptions, no compensation would be paid
to any of the companies that were expropriated under the constitutional amendment. The US
protested such a decision, calling it a violation of international law, and ultimately demanded that
the Government of Chile should give more consideration to the matter.161 Such a determination
infuriated the president. Following the announcement, he instructed Kissinger to get him a
“Strong statement knocking their brains out” and “kicking Chile in the ass” that would “really
blast their butts,” and he wanted it immediately.162 Nixon was also particularly upset by the way
the entire matter of compensation had been handled by the State Department. He wanted them
left out of the process of responding, and he intended to “over-act” as the confiscation of
American property would not be tolerated.163 The problem, however, with strong action against
Chile, was that by all American estimates, it would only serve to strengthen the position of
Allende within Chile and Latin America more broadly.164 Thus, the United States would not push
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the issue too strongly, particularly once it became clear that Allende lacked the necessary
economic strength to be able to propose a solution the American companies would find
acceptable.165 As a result, the United States had all but given up on seeing equitable
compensation actually come to fruition by December 1971, regardless of the ongoing legal
appeal to the Special Tribunal established to adjudicate the matter between the two states.166
Nevertheless, the US continued its calls to allow the matter to be settled through international
arbitration in an effort to gain a more just level of compensation for the expropriated
companies.167
Nationalization, however, was only one of the issues at work between the US and Chile
that affected the American posture toward the nation. As part of the decision reached in
NSDM93, the United States had sought to subtly undermine the Allende regime through a
system of economic warfare. The primary objective of American policy in Chile was to weaken
the Allende regime in such a way that did not “contribute to its consolidation of power or its
ability to rally external support” against the United States.168 As previously noted, any overtly
punitive efforts to exert force against the Chileans over the copper issue only threatened to give
Allende more power. As the Chilean economy deteriorated throughout 1971-1972, this concern
only became that much stronger. From the American perspective, “Allende could use a foreign
scapegoat to take Chileans' minds off their internal problems and to rally them to his side. The
question is not whether in our actions toward Chile we take a "hard" line or a "soft" line but
rather whether we take the necessary measures quietly or contribute to a strident
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confrontation.”169 All American calculations had to be considered within the overall goal of the
administration’s policy.
This policy, though, was more widespread than just in regard to copper nationalization.
Sowing unrest within Chile and undermining Allende’s government took many different forms.
As part of NSDM93, the US committed to cutting off loans to Chile via the Export-Import Bank,
the Inter-American Development Bank, the World Bank, and other sources of international
finance.170 This policy was particularly effective with regard to Inter-American Development
Bank, where all the loans to Chile were handled from a special operations fund that required US
approval. Thus, when the NSC’s Senior Review Group chose to require its approval on any
loans, it effectively instituted a complete veto of all funds to the Chilean government.171 Similar
efforts were easily undertaken with the World Bank and the Export-Import Bank. After
conversations between senior members of the State Department and the leaders of each bank,
both agreed to cooperate with the American request to discontinue new loans, choosing to work
out the technicalities and implications for existing loans as they encountered them.172 The
cumulative effect of such policies is that Chile’s economy was cut off from its largest sources of
exterior funding at the same time that the price of copper began to drop and the economy
underwent a rapid decline. By December 1971, the United States observed that their task was
even easier than first believed, noting that “while our economic pressures can exacerbate the
difficulties of the Chilean economy, the present downward course of the Chilean economy is so
well defined that the economic pressures available to us will add only marginally to its
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deterioration.”173 The US was involved in a means of stonewalling the Chilean economy, all
while the domestic economic issues provided cover to the effects of American subversion.
The US also sought to undermine the Allende regime through secret funding for
opposition politicians and attempts to divide the various groups within the UP coalition. As early
as December 1970, the CIA was able to report to Kissinger that actions were progressing in
Chile that were “designed to exacerbate relations between groups and individuals in the UP
coalition and between UP elements and Allende.”174 These efforts to undermine Allende’s
political support were only made that much more significant during times of election. In January
1971, the 40 Committee approved $1.2 million dollars in funding for the National Party,
Christian Democratic Party, and the Democratic Radical Party in Chile (all of whom were
opposition parties). These funds were used to purchase media outlets that would allow for greater
dissemination of opposing political views—a move the 40 Committee members believed would
slow down Allende’s plans to implement a complete Marxist society. 175 As the election neared,
the US urgently increased its funding for these parties.176 These efforts seemed to be vindicated
in the minds of the 40 Committee members. The election results led them to conclude that the aid
from the United States helped “to deny Allende the clear popular majority he sought” and helped
“the political opposition to successfully challenge the UP,” all without leading the Allende
government to suspect American interference.177
The successful use of under the table funding to prevent Allende and the UP from making
gains in Chile encouraged the expansion of this practice, whether in the form of financing special
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elections, funding the Chilean newspaper El Mercurio, preparing for and funding opposition
parties during the 1973 congressional elections, or working with companies and individuals
within the private sector to undermine the Allende regime.178 The stealth nature of these
operations seemed to vindicate the strategies adopted by the 40 Committee and its covert allies in
the CIA. Working through back channels had, after all, proven effective in several other
instances of US global interventions. When taken on the whole, the US policy toward the
Allende government remained one of active and intentional destabilization. Conflicts emerged
between the two countries over nationalization, but even in the face of directly negative actions,
the US largely refrained from overt tension with the Chileans, instead preferring to continue its
policy of covert subversion, which, according to all reports from Chile, was the only way to
“avoid playing into Allende’s hands.”179

Great Britain and Allende’s Chile, 1971–72
While the United States was operating with a mindset of hyper-concern over
nationalization and covert subversion of the Chilean government, the British approach remained
one of consistent non-concern throughout the duration of the Allende administration. That an
American-Chilean conflict over nationalization could occur with little to no notice was not lost
on the British. They realized that nationalization posed a major threat to the Americans. The
Heath administration almost immediately reached out to American businesses in Chile to convey
what they perceived as the grim future for American investments in that country. Yet, even in the
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face of the nationalization of British assets, the British maintained the right of the Chilean
government to nationalize property within their sovereign boundaries without the necessary
caveats about just compensation that the United States often placed on such remarks.180 This
difference of opinion and policy between the US and UK was not insignificant. When the US
Ambassador to Great Britain, Walter Annenberg, brought up the issue of compensation in the
face of nationalization, he found Her Majesty’s Government very noncommittal to any type of
policy on just compensation.181 This should come as no surprise, however, as the US had far
more businesses seized than the British. Regardless, such a position was obviously not what the
Americans were expecting to find in their closest ally. As with the case of British reluctance to
condemn the possibility of Allende’s election, the US expected Britain to support its positions on
the issue, rather than chart an independent policy of neutrality or worse, perceived support and
acceptance.
Furthermore, the British were far more amenable to maintaining good and warm relations
with the Chileans than their transatlantic ally. In the run up to the Allende election, AngloChilean relations had reached historically high levels of cooperation and friendship under Frei.182
When Allende took power, he made it clear that he intended to not only maintain close relations
with Britain, but that he hoped for “the maximum of cooperation.”183 As mentioned previously,
the initial British estimates also indicated a potential strengthening of Anglo-Chilean trade
relations in light of Chile’s rejection of the United States’ neocolonial control of the Chilean
economy. This issue, too, however, became a source of tension within the special relationship.
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When an article was published in the Financial Times in December 1970 suggesting that Britain
would have increasing trade opportunities with Chile as the US was pushed out of the country,
the staff at the American embassy in London raised the question with the FCO. The American
Department denied that this represented the thinking of Her Majesty’s Government, and
attempted to assuage the concern of an already skeptical ally.184 Of course, the same individual
who denied these allegations to the US in December recommended the next March that “It is in
HMG's interests to encourage the Chilean Government to avoid a confrontation with Western
Governments (particularly the United States) and to assure them that we are ready to be friendly
with Governments who want to be friendly with us (particularly so in the case of Chile where we
have traditional ties).”185 By August, Ambassador Hildyard, in recounting to the FCO a
conversation with the Chilean Foreign Minister, noted that the Chileans were impressed with
trade and support that the British had done with Cuba, and were interested in a similar
relationship. Hildyard optimistically hoped that the Chilean opinions would benefit AngloChilean trade accordingly. 186 By January 1972, it was certainly clear that British trade was
indeed benefitting from the splintering of relations between the US and Chile, as British exports
to Chile increased by £2 million in 1971 alone.187 Despite what the British told their American
counterparts about not taking advantage of the economic window opened by Allende’s
repudiation of the US, their actions certainly indicated otherwise.
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Additionally, in contrast to the American restriction of loans and credit to the Chilean
government, the British continued to approve loans and offer credit throughout the Allende
administration. Even after some British companies began to be nationalized, the British Export
Credits Guarantee Department—the branch of the UK government that provides credit and loans
for commercial ventures—was “freely insuring short term credit in Chile.”188 The British also
continued to offer technical aid to the Chilean government as part of its broad program for aid to
Latin America, offering them nearly £300,000 in aid in 1972 alone, particularly in the areas of
technical education, agriculture and training.189 These policies continued well into 1973, showing
that throughout the Allende administration, the British continued to be willing to work with the
Allende administration. This was not, however, done in ignorance of the American position and
desires. President Nixon had raised the issue of bank loans with Prime Minister Heath
immediately following Allende’s 1970 election, asking the British about existing loans and
encouraging the halt of future loans. This issue was later discussed with the State Department, in
which the British were discouraged from lending to Chile on the basis of both fiscal
responsibility and ideological opposition.190 That such prodding was not adopted wholesale by
the British shows the independence with which they operated in their foreign policy with Chile,
regardless of American leanings.

American Support for a Coup
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Nevertheless, internal matters within Chile only continued to worsen for Allende as the
1970s progressed. The Chilean economy underwent rapid decline, particularly after
nationalization, political division intensified, and a perceived foreign scapegoat failed to
materialize. All of these challenges put Allende in a difficult position with regard to the longterm viability of la Via Chilena.191 In such a climate, it was quite alarming for Santiago that the
United States did not sever its connection to the Chilean military. From the outset of the Allende
regime, the United States realized the military would likely serve as a stabilizing force in Chile—
a counterbalance—that would keep Allende from radicalizing at too rapid a rate.192 In light of
such a prominent role for the military, the US concluded that cutting military ties could be a
dangerous course of action, undermining its efforts to prevent the creation of another Cuba. The
role of American support for the Chilean military first came to a head as the Nixon
administration had to make its determinations about the continuation of plans to offer Chile $7
million in foreign military spending credits in 1971, namely through delivery of already
promised M-41 tanks. Ultimately, the US opted to move forward on the tanks and approve a
reduced credit of $3.5 million for the Chilean armed forces. While less than the original amount,
the continuation of credit and the delivery of the reconditioned tanks represented an important
step in ensuring that the Chilean military stayed dependent upon the US for supplies, while
keeping the communist countries (i.e. Cuba, China, and the Soviet Union) form having an
opening within the military.193 From an American perspective, the best possible scenario to
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defeat Allende from within was to ensure that the military was less loyal to the Chilean
commander-in-chief, and more loyal to their American supplier.
The loyalty of the Chilean military would soon come to the forefront as Allende’s support
eroded throughout his presidency. The United States had been closely monitoring the possibility
of a coup in Chile both as a response to Chilean domestic tensions and as a means to oust
Allende and replace him with a more favorable leader. In June 1973, members of the Chilean
military attempted an unsuccessful coup, one that lacked the support of the Chilean senior
command staff. While that coup appeared premature and poorly planned, it sparked hope of an
eventually successful coup in the minds of Nixon and Kissinger. The CIA concluded that “that a
military government would provide additional political and social stability,” causing the United
States to begin looking closer into the possibility of a coup.194 Nevertheless, the US remained
convinced that short of a dramatic change within the military, the possibility of a coup was
unlikely unless substantial change occurred within the country’s political or military situation.195
In August 1973, however, Allende attempted to shore up his control of his government by
appointing several high ranking military officials to positions within the cabinet. This was
exactly the kind of change that the US determined to be necessary in order for a coup to occur.196
By late August, the US had developed a full blown contingency plan for a coup in Chile. The
contingency plan examined the possibility of Allende’s moderation, a constitutional coup with
elections, and a more traditional military coup, before concluding that regardless of which
outcome happened, the United States believed that a new government would be in the best
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interest of the US, and that the US should seek close, cordial relations with the new Chilean
government.197 The Nixon administration had received notice through the CIA that General
Augusto Pinochet was prepared to lead a military coup in conjunction with the Navy and Air
Force as early as September 10, or at least within that week.198 A coup was clearly on the
horizon, and at the least, the US knew it and was excited about the possibility that a new
government posed for US-Chilean relations moving forward.
The British, however, knew that a coup would lead to a particularly strong reaction from
the Americans. In November 1972, the American desk of the FCO began to examine the
possibility of American and Soviet reactions to a coup in Chile. Realizing that the contours of the
global Cold War would shape the situation, the British knew that it was necessary to at least plan
for a coup at some point during the Allende administration. They believed that the US would be
cautious throughout, not willing to directly intervene in such a situation, but certainly interested
in the outcome of a coup. Both the US and the British were aware that as matters worsened in
Chile, a coup would have a dramatic effect on world politics.
On September 11, Augusto Pinochet and the Chilean military seized control of the
government, rounding up communists within Santiago, and surrounding Allende within the
palace. Facing no alternatives, Allende committed suicide within the presidential palace. By midafternoon, the coup had succeeded, and the four-man military junta, led by Pinochet, proclaimed
that Chile’s liberation from Marxism was complete.199 After the coup, the United States publicly
denied any prior knowledge of its happening. Careful to distinguish between reports that a coup
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could happen and reports that it was going to happen when it did, the US categorically denied
any involvement in the coup whatsoever.200 Yet, as would be made known in the following
months and years, the United States had indeed been involved in subverting the Allende
administration and in eventually supporting the coup itself.201 In light of such involvement, it is
only logical that the US government would be inclined to assist and support the new Chilean
government from the get go. However, there was also concern that immediate recognition would
be suspicious. This support but public caution was conveyed to Pinochet via Ambassador Davis
on September 13, just two short days after the coup. Through private, unofficial communication,
the Nixon administration offered its assistance to the junta to the extent that Pinochet and the
generals desired.202 The NSC continued to monitor the situation closely, paying particular
attention to the public optics of recognition. In a September 20 meeting, it was recommended
that the United States move forward on recognition of the junta, since more than a week had
passed since the new Chilean government had come to power and other countries from both
Latin American and Europe had already recognized the military regime. Since the Chilean
government was beginning to wonder what was taking the US so long, Kissinger and his staff
felt that it was time to “reassure” Pinochet of American support for the new regime.203 While
some concern was noted over the possibility of human rights violations at the hands of the junta,
these were largely disregarded as unsubstantiated claims, and the US officially recognized the
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new Chilean government the next Monday, September 24, immediately reinstituting its aid
program to the nation.204 The short term aid included humanitarian aid in terms of medical
supplies and disaster relief funding, military equipment, credits to purchase American wheat, and
the reinstatement of IMF loans.205 The writing on the wall was clear—the US would aid the
Pinochet regime and maintain friendly relations throughout. Thus, by late-September, the United
States had gone from actively opposing a democratic government to aiding and abetting an
authoritarian military junta.
The irony in all of this—aside from the inherent hypocrisy of opposing a democratic
government while supporting a dictator—is that American actions toward Allende’s Chile, from
before the 1970 election to the coup that toppled Allende, were all in direct contrast to stated
policy and avowed commitments to the governments of Latin America. In preparation for
Nixon’s 1972 foreign policy achievements speech, Deputy Assistant for National Security Al
Haig listed an avoidance of “the paternalistic attitudes of the past and [giving] greater
recognition to the independence and individual identities of the Latin American nations” among
the administration’s achievements in Latin America in 1971. He went on to state that the United
States’ new relationship with Latin America aimed “To treat governments as they are and refrain
from trying to make over our Latin neighbors in our own image.”206 These ideas were echoed
again in 1973. In April of that year, Nixon kicked off a meeting of the OAS by declaring an end
to paternalism, a statement that was heralded by presses throughout Latin America.207 It seemed
that areal and meaningful change had dawned in inter-American relations. The administration’s
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May 1973 Latin America policy, drafted in response to NSSM 173, noted that the US had failed
to significantly improve relations with Latin America since 1969, and determined that “if we
confine ourselves to reacting when a U.S. interest is in jeopardy, if we respond to each challenge
to our interests with sharpness and force, political alienation will grow and conflicts and disputes
will spread.”208 It went on to call for more tolerance and room for Latin American countries to
answer the demands of nationalism. Meanwhile, just four short months later, the United States
was involved in an inter-American coup that finally succeeded in overthrowing the Allende
government.209 Any lip service the administration paid to allowing Latin America the freedom to
remove itself from the orbit of America’s hegemonic control of the region was clearly just for
show.

Great Britain and the Coup
Meanwhile, in Britain the coup posed quite the issue for Her Majesty’s Government, as
new questions emerged surrounding recognition of the new junta government. Public opinion,
American actions, and strong statements from the opposition Labour Party, placed the
government in a tough situation politically. From the perspective of the British Ambassador in
Chile, R.L. Seconde, the coup was hardly surprising, even though the embassy had no advance
notice of it. Furthermore, the coup was not even unconstitutional from a British perspective,
given the small level of parliamentary support and repeated defeats that the Allende government
faced with Congress. Seconde noted that such a record in Britain would have forced the
government to resign or face a vote of no confidence. In such an environment, he clearly saw the
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coup, the threat of Allende, and the implications of the change in leadership much differently
than his predecessor saw matters in 1970.210 This perspective inevitably influenced the way that
Heath and the British government saw the coup.
Like with the US, the biggest issue in the immediate aftermath of the junta’s takeover
was recognition. From a traditional perspective of recognizing new governments, the Chilean
case was rather quick and easy. Within a week, the junta had met all of Britain’s normal criteria
for recognition, yet several outside factors complicated Her Majesty’s Government’s decision to
recognize the new Chilean government.211 On one hand, there was public opinion to be dealt
with. In the immediate aftermath of the coup, there was massive outrage and condemnation of
the military coup that took out Allende from throughout the country. That outrage could only be
expected to increase with the subsequent recognition of the junta by Her Majesty’s Government.
Labor unions, local socialist and communist parties, and the opposition Labour Party expressed
public and vocal condemnation of the overthrow of the socialist government.212 This reality was
not lost on the British government, but its primary containment to members of the opposition
largely left them feeling okay with their decision to move forward on recognition.213 Public
opinion was not the only issue for the British to consider however; it had to consider its relations
with its allies, primarily the US and its now fellow members of the European Economic
Community (EEC).
The British knew that the US was in a precarious position with regard to Chile. Rumors
were swirling right and left about American complicity in the coup, and while the Heath
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government accepted American denials and espoused those denials to opposition members who
questioned the US’ role, it nevertheless made matters more difficult. Ultimately, though, the
British concluded that these allegations might cause the US to delay its recognition, and
therefore, they should not tie their policy decision to that of the Americans.214 The relationship
within the nine remained the lone complicating factor, one that was made far more difficult by
the Italians. Just as the British were moving toward a quick, early recognition, the Italian charge
d’affaires approached the British about the possibility of joining in a statement by the nine
condemning the violence and brutality of the new Chilean government.215 Such a statement
would have been in keeping with the already public statements of both Germany and the
Netherlands in response to the coup.216 The British attempted to dissuade the Italians from a
concerted statement, and instead tried to move them to adopting the British policy of holding
recognition for another week or so, and officially offering recognition around the same time as
other European states.217 In fact, the British absolutely refused to join a statement that called on
moderation of the junta government as a prerequisite for recognition.218 Ultimately, the Italian
proposal went nowhere within the EEC, and the British were able to move forward with
recognition. Among the company of democratic states in Latin America and fellow members of
the EEC, the British government officially offered recognition on September 22, two days before
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the United States.219 With that, the British and Americans alike had finally washed their hands of
Allende’s Chile.

Allende’s Chile—A Socialist Wedge
When taken on the whole, the divergent approaches taken by the United States and Great
Britain raise some fundamental questions about the motivations of each nation when setting
policy. Why do these two otherwise-coordinated countries pursue the policies they do in regard
to Chile? Both nations held strong economic ties with the region and lacked significant
geostrategic concerns. If these states with roughly equal reasons for concern pursued their own
unique courses of action, then what was motivating the policymakers in Washington and
London? One answer to this question can be found in the role of ideology and the understanding
of communism and socialism in their various manifestations. American policymakers,
particularly Nixon and Kissinger, styled themselves as reincarnations of nineteenth century
realist politicians, operating out of an amoral conception of foreign policy that was concerned
only about the interests of the state in a balance of power world. In this regard, they were
disciples of George Kennan and other Cold War architects who had posited realism as the name
of the game. Yet, what Kennan, Kissinger, and Nixon fundamentally denied in such black and
white portrayals of the national interest was the role of ideology. Regardless of what may have
been claimed about the absence of ideology from American diplomacy—a point that Kennan
makes strongly in his book American Diplomacy—Nixon and Kissinger were deeply motivated
by the role of ideology in their policy determinations with regard to Chile.220 The simple fact of
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the matter is that ideologies “serve as a fount for an instructive and reassuring sense of historical
place, as an indispensable guide to an infinitely complex and otherwise bewildering present, and
as a basis for moral action intended to shape a better future.”221 In Chile, the ideological belief in
the supremacy of democratic capitalism served as the basis for what was justified as moral action
against an immoral socialism. If socialism, Marxism, and communism were not ideological
concerns, then there would have been little reason to intervene in the ways that the US did in
Chile from 1970–73. Yet, as was seen earlier, Nixon brought with him strong ideological
convictions about communism that would serve as “the intellectual capital [he would] consume
as long as [he continued] in office.”222 Thus, what emerges is a much larger ideological focus on
the danger of communism within American diplomacy, while simultaneously denying the place
of ideology in the foreign policy conversation.
In contrast to America’s great fear of democratically elected socialism and an outsize role
for ideology in American foreign policy is Britain’s historical and political experience with
socialism and Marxism. The United Kingdom’s century of exposure to socialism had shown
them that, unlike in the United States, Allende’s political bent (and its selection through
democratic means) was not a monolithic beast to be feared. Ambassador Hildyard had
understood this early on, writing to Whitehall that, “Allende may be a Marxist, he is certainly a
socialist, but he is not a communist.”223 The ability of the British ambassador to be able to
distinguish so clearly between Marxists, socialists, and communists clearly demonstrates a
familiarity with the unique variety found within the three related, but distinct ideologies.
Socialism, and even communism, had a long history in Britain. Karl Marx was living in London
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when he first developed the ideas that would bear his name, and London was the model city
wherein he believed this proletariat revolution would first occur. The British Labour Party, itself
affiliated with the international socialist movement at its founding, is case in point of the extent
to which socialism was a politically mainstream idea in Britain in ways that it was never going to
be accepted within the United States.224 Nevertheless, such willingness to distinguish between
adherents of revolutionary socialism as opposed to the more gradual change of evolutionary
socialists was inherently going to be a source of tension between the United States and Great
Britain. In fact, a 1970 analysis of the special relationship highlighted “differing attitudes to
relations with the Communists generally,” as a causal factor in the deterioration of the AngloAmerican relationship from 1965-1970.225 While this is primarily an observation about the
difference of relations with the Soviet Union and its satellites, it nevertheless remains instructive
as to the distinct ways that each power perceived the threat of the communist world.
Yet, even more crucial than ideology and historical experience was the idea of national
security. The entirety of America’s policy toward Allende’s Chile was built upon the premise
that it was a crisis of national security. Despite the administration classifying the Allende
government as threat to US security, the Allende election and his subsequent administration
should not have actually been elevated to the level of a national security concern. In fact, the
CIA concluded shortly after the election that “The U.S. has no vital national interests within
Chile” and that “the world military balance of power would not be significantly altered by an
Allende government.”226 While highlighting potential economic losses for American businesses
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and challenges to the unity of the OAS, the CIA’s most significant negative consequence from
Allende’s election was “a definite psychological set-back to the U.S. and a definite psychological
advance for the Marxist idea.”227 These conclusions by the Unites States’ foremost intelligence
experts, who were well aware of and closely monitoring the situation as it played out in Chile
highlight a crucial point in understanding American policy—the way the United States defined
“national security” was stripped of its traditional notions of realism and geo-strategic concerns.
For the highest levels of American foreign policy makers, “national security” became nothing
more than a catch-all term that would justify otherwise non-critical interference in the rest of the
world in the name of protecting America’s hegemonic and imperialistic control of Latin America
that extended all the way back to the days of the Monroe Doctrine.
The British were always hesitant of how American policy might adversely affect them. In
their initial assessment of the situation in Chile, Charles Wiggin noted that Ambassador
Hildyard’s evaluation did not appropriately take into consideration the extent to which America’s
response to Chile could lead to British interests “inevitably suffer[ing] very much in the
process.”228 This was after Hildyard concluded, “If the US . . . believes that President Allende’s
Chile is falling under communist influence or constitutes a serious threat to them, we could be in
a difficult position politically and economically.”229 The British were aware that the US was
going to act in its own interest regardless of the ramifications on their allies, and that was
something that they must be prepared for.
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Thus, when the redefining of national security led to the notion being stripped of any ties
holding it to realism, which was coupled with Britain’s lesser degree of concern about
democratically elected socialism and clear concern over the way America would act without
regard for how US policies would impact their closest ally, then it is amply clear that the British
government had little to no reason to perceive the Chilean situation as a crisis of national
security. If anything, these factors, when paired with American frustration over the British
refusal to follow the American line in Chile, proved to place an additional strain on the special
relationship in the early 1970s. Repeated confrontations over Chile, distinct conceptions of
interest, British refusal to toe the line of American policy, and general distrust between the
allies—particularly on the part of the British—all resulted in strain within the special
relationship. While not the only factors contributing to weakening relations during the years
1970–73, the issue of Chile certainly cannot be ignored. The fact of the matter is that the election
of socialist Salvador Allende in Chile proved to drive a wedge in the special relationship because
of different policy approaches—policies that were influenced by and the result of competing
notions of national security and the historical experience with socialism.
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Chapter 3
A “New Dialogue” and the Same-Old, Same-Old: Gerald Ford, Labour, and Latin
America, 1974–1976

1974 was a year of political change on both sides of the Atlantic. In both the United
States and Great Britain, political power would change hands—in the case of Britain from one
party to another, and in the case of the United States, from one president to another in the midst
of the dramatic upheaval over Watergate. Meanwhile in Latin America, Chile was still reeling
from the coup that ousted Salvador Allende and replaced him with the oppressive and violent
military government headed by Augusto Pinochet in September 1973. In neighboring Argentina,
the popular president Juan Perón died in 1974, and was subsequently replaced by his vice
president and wife, Isabel Perón. Yet the political situation in Argentina would only deteriorate
as the government undertook a prolonged period of fascist, state sponsored terrorism—the Dirty
Wars—against the people of Argentina, which only intensified after a military coup toppled the
Perón government in 1976. It is in this context that, despite coming into the presidency
proclaiming a “new dialogue” with Latin America, the Ford Administration at best ignored, and
at worst praised, the governments of Argentina and Chile. The Labour government of Harold
Wilson in Britain, however, almost immediately changed direction with regard to Chile and
Argentina, breaking diplomatic relations with one and ending support for the dictatorial regimes
in the other. Britain’s antagonism toward Argentina in particular was further compounded by the
longstanding dispute over the sovereignty of the Falkland Islands. Ultimately, as this chapter will
show, Anglo-American responses to human rights violations in Argentina and Chile were
reflections of ideological fear, economic concern, and an incongruence between the universally
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regarded importance of protecting human rights human rights and the Ford and Wilson
governments’ respective views regarding the conduct of international relations and national
security. The Ford Administration’s commitment to realism and its hesitance to allow human
rights policies, especially Congressionally directed human rights policies, to enter into its
considerations of national security represented an attempt to maintain the traditional notion of
national security at a time when Britain was redefining the term to incorporate the protection of
human rights as an essential component of national security.

New Governments and New Policies
The conservative Heath Administration saw no reason to abandon its foreign policy
approaches to Latin America following the September 11 Coup in Chile that led to the institution
of a right-wing military dictatorship guilty of gross human rights atrocities against its citizens.
The Labour Party, however, condemned the policy of Her Majesty’s Government and its support
of military dictatorships from the beginning, instead calling for suspension of aid programs and
sanctions.230 It is of little wonder, then, that a new policy would soon be underway following the
Conservative Party’s inability to form a coalition in the wake of the February 1974 election. The
minority government of the now-returned Prime Minister Harold Wilson, and his Foreign
Secretary Jim Callaghan, brought with it clearly defined ideas about the importance of human
rights and a disdain for the types of right-wing governments that were emerging in Latin
America. 231 Yet, for all that the Labour government hoped to achieve, this principled approach
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to foreign relations would also be tempered by a much more conservative foreign policy
establishment in Whitehall. Hugh Carless, the FCO’s head of the American department in 1974,
was one of those conservative voices. Frequently, Carless cautioned against hardline stances
against Chile and Argentina in the name of advancing other British interests. While sympathetic
to the policy positions of the new government, the Foreign Office understood the unique
challenges of diplomacy and the importance of not completely alienating a state unnecessarily. In
this regard, realism, rather than ideological sympathies, dictated much of the conservatives’
suggested caution.232 Nevertheless, the Labour Government eventually embarked upon a
markedly different foreign policy agenda in Latin America that would include new concerns and
issues.
Yet, the British were not the only ones changing their policy approach toward Latin
America in 1974. Even before the resignation of President Nixon in August 1974, the United
States had begun to reevaluate its Latin America policy in light of growing resentment within the
Western Hemisphere. The new approach, known as the New Dialogue, would attempt to change
all of that, but Nixon would not see it come about. When Gerald Ford took office in August, he
inherited the plan of Henry Kissinger and his foreign policy team, and soon brought in Nelson
Rockefeller, one of the leading Latin American policy voices outside of the government, as his
Vice President. Together, this team attempted to reemphasize the place of Latin America in its
foreign policy. The New Dialogue acknowledged many of the failures of the United States’
policy initiatives in the hemisphere—clandestine CIA activity in the region, a lack of
technological cooperation, the United States’ enduring outcasting of Cuba, and the United
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States’ practice of regular interference in the affairs of the Latin American states.233 In contrast,
the New Dialogue, at least on paper, called for renewed efforts toward dispute resolution, an
active avoidance of new disputes, closer cooperation and consultation on major international
issues, a new focus on regional development with regard to technology, and a restructure of the
OAS.234 This was part of the Ford Administration’s efforts to create a more “conciliatory
America” that consolidate relations with its allies.235 The goal of the New Dialogue was to
“establish a sense of common purpose which could motivate us and the Latin Americans to
cooperate in the task of meeting the great problems on the global agenda.”236 Nevertheless, Latin
America remained deeply skeptical of American initiatives and pretenses toward cooperation, as
was rightfully expected, given the United States track record in the region and its stated desire to
transform Latin America into a “base of support for our efforts to achieve a more stable and
cooperative world order.”237
Latin American suspicions of American motives were only one component of their
hesitance to embrace the New Dialogue. As was noted in a December 1975 intelligence estimate,
“A Latin preference for a ‘special relationship’ with the US lingers on but is no longer the
motivating force behind the formulation of foreign policy.”238 The report went on to observe that
“the Latins have detected a long series of affronts, slights, and damage to their well-being
emanating from US policy. Tallying these has caused a re-awakening of the ever present but
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usually latent sense of victimization of Latin America by the US.”239 As Latin American
increasingly saw itself as a region capable of acting independently, continued American attempts
at paternalistic policies only further alienated the US and the rest of the hemisphere. One
particularly strong point of disagreement came over the issue of communism, as the United
States did not consult with the Latin Americans in any sense before adopting the policy of
détente, even though many Latin American states had long taken a more relaxed position on the
issue of communism. From the American perspective, détente was a way to control the global
Cold War, and in relaxing tensions with the Soviet Union, the United States angered the rightwing governments in Latin America, who were attempting similar moves of their own.240 Given
these extreme frustrations, Latin America correctly predicted the New Dialogue’s failure to bring
about a new era in inter-American relations. After a failed meeting of the OAS foreign ministers
in Buenos Aires in March 1975, there seemed to be a clear indication that the New Dialogue
would not bring about an improvement in relations.241 Additionally, new issues emerged in Latin
America, particularly over Human Rights and the United States’ position on human rights
violations, which seemed to confirm that American policy toward Latin America was often more
of the same old, same old, rather than a New Dialogue. While the New Dialogue would be
aborted within Latin America by early 1976, its short-lived existence set precedents that would
continue to shape Ford’s Latin American policy through the remainder of the Administration.242
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These new policy approaches by the Ford and Wilson governments became first evident
in the two administrations’ respective approaches to Chile and its military dictatorship headed by
General Augusto Pinochet. From the perspective of the Ford administration, and especially
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, there was no denying that the Pinochet government was a
welcome change from the socialist government of Allende. In fact, in a meeting between
Kissinger and Pinochet in June 1976, the American statesman went so far as to remark to the
general, “You did a great service to the west in overthrowing Allende,” which the US
“welcomed.”243 The secretary further reiterated that in light of its favorable view of the military
coup, the United States government was “not out to weaken” the position of the Pinochet
regime.244 From the perspective of the administration, there were indeed troubling liabilities with
the Pinochet government—namely human rights—but these liabilities were not as significant to
Ford, Kissinger, and their closest advisors, as they were to many others in the Washington
foreign policy and Congressional establishments. The military regime was seen as a stabilizing
force in an unstable region and country. American intelligence officers believed that as the
economy improved within Chile, the military government would “loosen its authoritarian
controls” and “move toward less repressive rule.”245 Beyond this hope for a more democratic
future, the desire of Chile to maintain good, close relations with the US was seen as a significant
step forward in improving the damaged relations between the US and Latin America on the
whole.246 As such, the administration actively sought “to support the Chilean Government in its
attempts to get is economy under control and defend itself against the possibility of Peruvian
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aggression from the North.”247 On multiple occasions, Kissinger and Ford personally expressed
their support to Chilean Ambassador Manuel Trucco and others for the efforts of the Pinochet
government in undoing the damage done by the Allende administration.248
Such an attitude of support for a dictatorial abuser of human rights, however, was not
warmly regarded by all within the American government, most notably Congress. In response to
the Pinochet administration’s flagrant violations of the human rights of the people of Chile in the
first year after seizing power, the Democrat-controlled Congress took measures to curtail
military aid to the repressive Chilean government. The Foreign Military Assistance Act of 1974
(FMAA) explicitly forbade all sales of American military equipment to the Chileans.249 Known
as the Kennedy Amendment, since the section pertaining to Chile was introduced by Senator Ted
Kennedy, Section 25 of the FMAA was a sweeping prohibition of aid. While it enumerated
specific types of military aid, Kennedy was clear in his shepherding of the amendment through
Congress that the bill’s intent was to prohibit all forms of military aid, not just those explicitly
forbidden by the wording of the legislation.250 This bill, passed in December 1974, came just
weeks after the US delegation had abstained from a United Nations’ vote condemning the human
rights violations in Chile.251 While President Ford signed the bill into law, he nevertheless
expressed his disapproval of the Congressional measure as a poor and ineffective means of
responding to or addressing the real concerns over human rights in Chile.252 Congress would not
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soon stop there, however. They also forbade the sale of any equipment authorized as part of a
continuing resolution for the 1975 fiscal year, even though the resolution was passed prior to the
FMAA.253 For all that the FMAA did, however, it did not restrict all aid to Chile, much to the
chagrin of some members of Congress. In August 1975, Representative John Burton of
California, sent a letter of protest to President Ford and Secretary Kissinger, expressing his
outrage over continued economic assistance to Chile and the “the channeling of funds under the
guise of the Food for Peace program.”254 While the administration defended its actions and its
refusal to cut off aid designed to assist the poorest members of Chilean society, the protest by
Burton nevertheless shows the extent to which human rights was taking center stage in the
foreign policy debate. All of these initiatives by Congress demonstrate “the depth of feeling on
the human rights issue and of the limitations which it impose[d]” on American actions.255
The efforts of Congress to constrain the executive branch’s efforts toward Chile were not
lost on or well received by either the Ford administration or Chile. Inside the White House, the
prevailing view was that arms sales to Chile had become a “highly emotional issue” for
Congress—one that the administration was affected by but did not support.256 The NSC staff
believed that sanctions failed to achieve positive results in regard to changing the Chileans’
actions, instead favoring to act through international organizations such as the UN Human Rights
Commission (UNHRC) and the Inter-American Human Rights Commission (IAHRC).257
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Furthermore, both Ford and Kissinger believed that the Congressional effort to link any
discussion of human rights to a state’s eligibility for military aid would be “a very bad
precedent” in that “it could be applied almost anyplace.”258 From their perspective, the United
States’ national security and its ability to conduct foreign policy on the basis of the national
interest was negatively impacted and could be severely constrained in the future if human rights
protections were made a precondition for military aid. As such, Kissinger believed that it was in
the national interest to immediately resume arms sales to Chile in July 1975, on the basis that the
FMAA’s stipulations had expired for the current fiscal year.259 The Chileans, for their part,
desperately desired to see a resumption of aid. In a meeting between Pinochet and the American
Ambassador to Chile, David Popper, the general made it abundantly clear that he thought Chile
“is and has been a greater friend of the US than the US is of Chile.”260 From the perspective of a
military junta, the American restrictions upon military aid were particularly stinging, producing a
considerable amount of resentment toward the United States by members of the junta. Given that
Chile was unable to obtain military aid from other countries as well, these restrictions seemed
even more grievous.261
The Congressional restrictions were far from the only thing affecting relations between
the US and Chile however. While the Ford administration was opposed to making human rights a
condition of foreign aid, it would be incorrect to state that the administration was not concerned
by the atrocities being committed by Pinochet and the junta. When Chile refused to allow the
UNHRC delegates into the country for an inspection in 1975, the United States voted in support
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of the 1975 UN resolution condemning human rights violations in Chile, having abstained in a
similar vote in 1974 and again in 1976.262 Just a few days later, the State department sent an
official protest letter to the Chilean foreign minister, registering American discontent with the
human rights situation.263 These actions represented a much more hardline stance by the
executive branch than had previously been shown and were expected to place additional strain on
the relationship. Nevertheless, the Ford Administration’s approach to Chile was one of friendship
and close relations, where the government was less concerned about the human rights violations
than it was that Pinochet’s government had overthrown a socialist regime. The notion of national
security could not be so broadly defined, at least according to Ford and Kissinger, as to include
the issue of human rights. It was the political character of the Chilean government that would set
the tone for American national security policy, even if it had to be enacted despite Congress’
efforts to stop it.
Across the Atlantic, however, the British saw all things pertaining to Pinochet’s Chile
quite differently. As just noted, the Labour party adamantly opposed the violent overthrow of
Allende and sought to place human rights at the center of a new “ethical foreign policy” in which
Chile would play a critical role.264 From the outset, there was tension within the Wilson cabinet
and government as to how hard of a line should be taken against Chile. Nevertheless, there was
near universal agreement that the new administration would not maintain the close relations with
the Chileans that characterized the Heath government. Just two days after taking office, Minister
for Overseas Development Judith Hart asked Wilson to include in the Queen’s speech a
statement announcing the suspension of all aid to Chile—a policy statement that the Latin
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America specialists in the Foreign Office and the Foreign Minister himself opposed.265 From the
perspective of both Whitehall and the British embassy in Santiago, announcing publicly such a
harsh position would negatively impact British interests at a time that it appeared poised to gain a
greater share of influence economically in Chile.266 As a result of potential setbacks, the
suggestion to cut off all aid was tabled, but this decision did not mean that things would continue
along the same lines with regard to Chile.
Hart’s suggestion and Labour Party concerns over the 1973 coup prompted Chile to
quickly become a priority for the new government. Just two weeks after taking office, Callaghan
gave his personal approval to a new white paper entitled “Policy Towards Chile,” which, among
other things, noted that Chilean copper and access to Chilean naval bases were of considerable
strategic and economic interest to the British, and as such, should not be compromised.
Nevertheless, the new policy approach condemned the human rights violations of the Chilean
junta, suspended several forms of capital aid, cancelled an upcoming naval visit by the Chilean
navy, announced an increased approval of refugee requests from Chile, and cut off all future
supplies of arms.267 Callaghan and Wilson stopped short, however, of cancelling already agreed
upon sales of warships and other equipment in hopes of maintaining British interests in the
country.268 In announcing this new policy so quickly into the new administration, the Wilson
government signaled some noticeable shifts. In one aspect, human rights were being elevated to
the concern of a security interest for British policymakers. While human rights had long been a
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concern of many on both sides of the Atlantic, in the mid-1970s it began to take on a new
prominence as a precondition of aid and consideration of diplomatic relations.269 In a brief for
Callaghan prepared in November 1974, Hugh Carless informed the secretary that Ambassador
Seconde had been instructed “to make clear to the Chilean authorities—as soon as possible after
his return to Santiago—that we cannot expect relations between Chile and Britain to return to
their traditional pattern of friendship until the Chilean authorities institute more humane
treatment of political prisoners.”270 In this regard, the British were serious in their efforts to see
human rights respected by the Chilean government. They made repeated petitions to the Chilean
government on behalf of political prisoners, sponsored UN resolutions urging Chile to restore
human rights, and donated over £150,000 in 1974 alone to the UN Human Rights Commission
and International Red Cross to support their efforts in addressing human rights violations.271
Clearly the inclusion of human rights was representing a significant turn in the conduct of
foreign policy. Beyond just what it signaled for human rights, though, this new policy also
represented a marked departure from not only the Heath administration, but a departure from the
Ford administration in the United States. In fact, the resolution in the United Nations that Britain
had co-sponsored in 1974 was the very same resolution that the United States ultimately
abstained from in the vote, so as not to publicly condemn its Chilean ally.272 The two allies
perceived the situation in Chile in diametrically opposite terms, which would only become
clearer as the decade progressed.
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Throughout 1975, Britain continued its course toward emphasizing human rights as the
central component of all relations with Chile, refusing to engage in talks about debt rescheduling
or other issues until improvements were made in the area of human rights.273 This again was a
pivotal decision in the Wilson government’s distinct approach compared to that of the United
States. The United States and Britain were Chile’s two leading creditors. As such, when Britain
crossed the United States and acted unilaterally by refusing to engage in any talks of debt
rescheduling in 1975 until Chile cleaned up its human rights abuses, it drew great displeasure
from the Ford administration.274 Likewise, Britain increased its contributions to the UNHCR for
investigations into Chilean crimes and made “a vigorous and sustained effort in the human rights
field—receiving many hundreds of refugees, making numerous representations on behalf of
political prisoners, sponsoring resolutions in the UN and financing a scheme to place some 200
Chilean academics and students in British universities.”275 Meanwhile, this move away from
American policy was coupled with a move toward the rest of the Nine. In February 1975, the
British delegation at the UN was instructed to vote with its fellow EEC partners against a Soviet
version of a draft resolution on human rights in Chile.276 Similarly, the decision to continue its
increased pressure for changes to human rights as part of the government’s 1976 policy review
was justified on the grounds in keeping with the actions of the Nine.277 Anglo-Chilean relations
reached their nadir, however, in December 1975. Following reports that a British doctor being
held by the Chilean government was tortured, the British withdrew their ambassador in protest
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and submitted the doctor’s testimony and evidence of torture to UNHCR.278 Human rights
violations had long been the lens through which British policy in Chile was set, and when a
British citizen became a victim of those abuses, matters reached a decisive turning point. Thus,
what becomes clear from British policy toward Chile under the Labour government is that it was
a fundamental shift from earlier approaches. Human rights were elevated to the pinnacle of
British interests, while the Wilson government found itself more interested in aligning itself with
the policy of the EEC rather than the United States.
The differing Anglo-American approaches to human rights represent two distinct
definitions of national security. The Ford administration had largely chosen to operate in Chile
under the traditional notions of national security and realism that emphasized power and
interests. Yet even this realism was tempered by an ideological fear of communism that led the
United States to support an antidemocratic government in the name of anticommunism. The
British, on the other hand, elevated ideology, namely the protection of human rights, to the level
of a national security concern. In doing so, they emphasized the basic rights of individuals (at
least in certain places) as a moral responsibility of all states. Yet, even in this regard, the British
were playing fast and loose with the idea of national security. Their lack of concern for human
rights in places like South Africa indicated that their national security policies were also affected
by ideological and historical interactions. Furthermore, this embrace of human rights occurred in
conjunction with Britain’s entry into the European Community in 1973 as most of the European
Countries were veering left. In such a climate, the Labour government in Britain easily found a
common ideological disposition and shared purpose with its new community. In this regard, the
UK’s redefinition of national security in the mid-1970s represented not only a retreat from
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realism on the basis of human rights, but also, the creation of a national security policy
manipulated by the localized interests of the party leadership and the historical experience
between Britain and Chile—none of which are part of the realist foundations of national security.
Thus, the extent to which the two special allies were defining national security differently was
brought into sharp focus.
While it would be incorrect to say that the United States was not concerned about human
rights violations in Chile, the Ford administration’s position on the issue can better be seen as
nothing more than empty double talk to pacify the mood of the world. In June 1976, Kissinger
chaired the American delegation at the OAS meeting in Santiago and used the opportunity to
make one of his seemingly most significant speeches as secretary of state, and certainly his most
significant speech on inter-American relations. Facing immense pressure at home to increase the
administration’s focus on human rights in Latin America, Kissinger’s speech solidly condemned
human rights violations across the world, while acknowledging the finding of the OAS
Commission on Human Rights with regard to Chile and calling for improvements by the Chilean
government.279 Many around the world saw this speech as a welcome change in American policy
and a signal that perhaps human rights would finally figure more prominently into American
foreign policy. Yet for those within the administration, it was nothing more than a smoke screen.
The State Department’s Inter-American Bureau believed that the speech would relieve the
pressure on them to address human rights.280 Kissinger always intended to use the speech to keep
Congress from interfering in foreign policy by providing evidence of executive action on the
human rights front.281
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In light of its utilitarian purpose, it should then be no surprise that it was merely hollow
rhetoric. Before delivering the speech at the OAS, Kissinger met that morning with General
Pinochet, Foreign Minister Carvajal, the Chilean Ambassador to the US, and the Chilean
coordinator of the OAS conference. In that meeting, Kissinger gave the Chilean’s advance
warning of the remarks he was planning to deliver on the issue of human rights. Kissinger
assured them explicitly that, “The speech is not aimed at Chile,” and went so far as to indicate
that from his perspective, the Pinochet government was “a victim of all left-wing groups around
the world,” whose “greatest sin was that you overthrew a government which was going
Communist.”282 In the politically charged environment of the 1970s, Kissinger’s rhetoric of
improving human rights across the globe in speeches at the OAS meeting, Helsinki, and
elsewhere sounded good, but that was all it was ever intended to do.
In light of the emptiness of the United States’ commitments to human rights, the policy
disputes between the British and the Americans over Chile are even clearer. In a meeting
between Wilson and American Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger in September 1975, the
prime minister dismissed attempts by Schlesinger to downplay the differences between the US
and UK on the Chile question, noting that from the coup onward, the British took a different
view on Chile.283 Additionally, the British were well aware that their emphasis on human rights
improvements as a prerequisite for aid was a continual source of dispute with their transatlantic
allies. The Prime Minister himself acknowledged that if pushed to discuss the issue of Chilean
debt, the British insistence on human rights would “risk the renewed American displeasure at our
activity,” an indication that this event in April 1975 was far from the first time the United States
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had shown its frustration with the British.284 At the end of the day, however, the British would
not violate their principles in the name of towing the American line. In advance of the 1974 UN
vote on human rights in Chile, the British aim was “not to isolate the US,” but the delegation was
instructed to nevertheless vote for even the most condemning version of the resolution if forced
to choose between condemning human rights violations or not.285 The Americans, however,
found themselves in a similar place, forced to choose between its special relationships. With the
British and Americans choosing different policy approaches, the United States was forced to
choose between its special relationship with the UK and its special relationship with Latin
America. Despite many within the State Department opposing Kissinger’s belief in a special
relationship with Latin America, it was that very approach that won the day.286 When push came
to shove, the United States chose relations with Chile over its relations with Britain in the contest
between special allies. The United States knew that it could afford to alienate Britain over the
human rights issue without the complete disintegration of the special relationship; the same
could not be so easily said for Chile. Washington’s decision to abandon Chile would have cost
the US government a strong ally in the Cold War struggle against communism in Latin America.
Thus, these disagreements over Chile caused strain and tension within the Anglo-American
relationship, illustrating not only the ways each side defined national security, but also the way
each side prioritized alliances and issues.
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The Political Crisis in Argentina, 1974–1976
Chile was not the only Southern Cone country to experience political instability in the
mid-1970s. In the face of increasing opposition and growing public unrest, the military junta that
had led Argentina since 1966 returned the country to civilian rule in March 1973, which
ultimately resulted in the October 1973 election of former president Juan Perón for a third term,
with his second wife, Isabel, serving as his vice president. Yet, just nine months later, the largerthan-life Perón was dead, catapulting his less dynamic wife into the presidency.287 Once
assuming office, Isabel Perón experienced a highly tumultuous situation in the country
characterized by pro-Marxist terrorist attacks throughout the country and vocal opposition from
within the traditional political parties.288 Things were so turbulent that within just six weeks of
assuming the presidency, the entire cabinet resigned to allow the president to reshuffle her
cabinet and rid it of politically contentious ministers.289 Further challenges came from leftist
labor groups who sought more radical labor changes than that of the Perónists, further
undermining the Perón government’s position.290 As if these multi-faceted challenges to the
government were not enough to cause instability, there were also questions about Perón’s
physical and mental health, as she frequently suffered from “nervous attacks.”291 In the face of
the terrorist activities and rising unrest, in October 1974, Perón declared a “state of siege,”
prompting a military-led counter-terrorism campaign that would also contribute to violations of
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human rights.292 Following the crack down on terrorism, Perón’s government was fairly stable
heading into 1975 with the only threats coming from the left. Barring a loss of public support,
American intelligence officials saw little reason to suspect an overthrow of the government.293
Throughout the remainder of the year, however, the unrest escalated as labor unions
became increasingly dissatisfied with policies put in place by Minister for Social Welfare Jose
Lopez Rega, who was also the president’s personal advisor and mentor. Sensing the mood in the
country, Perón replaced Lopez Rega in the summer of 1975 and began to develop a loyal
contingent within the military in hopes of staving off any future attempts at a coup, which was
again rumored by August 1975.294 When President Perón announced a leave of absence,
accompanied by the wives of the top ranking military officials, in September 1975, speculation
ran rampant as to the future of the Perónist government.295 Even though Perón surprisingly
returned to the presidency a short time later, a clear shift had occurred with regard to public
opinion and the mood within the government itself. Throughout the remainder of the year, the
power of the military steadily increased within the government, as economic woes worsened, and
terrorism continued. For her part, the president remained aloof and inaccessible, indicating her
ineffectiveness as a leader.296 By January, the leaders of the military had determined that a coup,
led by Army Chief of Staff Jorge Videla, was necessary to remove Perón after she refused to
resign.297 While Perón attempted last ditch efforts to prevent a coup, the military continued its

292

Briefing Paper, January 17, 1975, NSA NSC Latin American Affairs Staff, Box 1, Folder “Argentina—
Political, Military,” Ford Library.
293
Ibid.
294
Whitaker, The United States and the Southern Cone, 336–37.
295
Whitaker, 337–38; Presidential Daily Briefing, September 13, 1975, NSA White House Situation Room,
Presidential Daily Briefings 1974–1977, Box 9, Folder “Presidential Daily Briefing, 9/13/75,” Ford Library.
296
Presidential Daily Briefing, December 6, 1975, NSA White House Situation Room, Presidential Daily
Briefings 1974–1977, Box 11, Folder “Presidential Daily Briefing, 9/6/75,” Ford Library.
297
Presidential Daily Briefing, January 3, 1976, NSA White House Situation Room, Presidential Daily
Briefings 1974–1977, Box 11, Folder “Presidential Daily Briefing, 1/3/76,” Ford Library.

97

preparations to again seize power, before finally staging a successful in coup on March 23, 1976.
Videla easily seized control, experiencing almost no push back and with near universal
support.298 Under the military junta, political parties and labor unions were banned, the
legislature was dissolved, the Supreme Court was closed, and a military cabinet was
appointed.299 Argentina had now undergone its second military coup in ten years.
As this political crisis played out in Argentina, the United States and Great Britain
closely followed the situation. From the United States’ perspective, it was certainly in the
national interest to maintain close and cordial relations with Argentina, given the economic
investment by the US and American firms within Argentina, as well as Argentina’s role and
place within South American politics. Beyond just normal relations, however, the United States
had begun a “special relationship” with the Argentine government under Juan Perón—a
relationship that carried over into the administration of Isabel Perón.300 From the American
perspective, Argentina was a highly regarded ally because of their disposition toward
pragmatism when discussing issues within the Argentine-American relationship.301 Nevertheless,
when the coup took out the Perónist government in March 1976, it was no surprise to the US,
who had been expecting the coup for months.302 In fact, the coup seemed to resolve many issues
within the country, and the leaders of the military junta had a favorable disposition toward the
United States. While acknowledging a security concern for Americans within Argentina
following the coup, the US believed that the coup presented an opportunity for American
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investment to increase within the country.303 As a result, the United States quickly recognized the
junta, just three days after it seized control.304
A similar situation played out across the pond as the British assessed their policy with
regard to Argentina. It was no secret that there was no love lost between the British and Juan
Perón. In a response to Lord Aberdare, Foreign Minister Alec Douglas Home described Perón as
a “wicked old rogue.”305 This prevailing attitude did not abate with either the death of Perón or
with the transition to the Labour government of Harold Wilson. In fact, many Labour leaders
“regarded the populist, semi-authoritarian Peronist movement as dangerously close to fascism.306
Furthermore, the British saw the chaos of Isabel Perón’s administration as a threat to their
interests in Argentina and an impediment to positive relations. Yet, the British lacked a strongly
defined policy toward Argentina for much of this period, as it attempted to navigate the complex
bilateral issues within their relationship. There was a substantial Anglo-Argentine community in
the country, the UK had large investments in the country, and the dispute over the
Falklands/Malvinas remained a major concern for both countries.307 Given these significant
interests, the maintenance of good relations was a paramount goal for British policy toward
Argentina.308 Nevertheless, the British also acknowledged that their inability to figure out the
best approach for maintaining good relations while not giving up ground in the Falklands debate
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had left Her Majesty’s ambassador in Buenos Aires “with a hand of very low clubs” while being
unable to “provide better cards” quickly.309
When the coup occurred, however, the British quickly moved toward recognition. With
the Falklands dispute being of such great concern for the British, they could ill afford to start
their relationship with the junta on the wrong foot by having been seen as hesitant to recognize
the government. Knowing that their recognition of Argentina had to be done within the confines
of their membership in the EEC, the British took the lead in initiating the conversation between
the Nine. Citing the strained relations between the UK and Argentina over the Falklands dispute,
the Wilson government asked for a quick response since “an important British interest is
involved.”310 With backing from the Nine and in the wake of American recognition, the British
recognized the junta on March 26, 1976, desiring close and friendly relations with the junta.311
This recognition of the new government would be a turning point in British foreign policy
toward Argentina, in that it marked the first time that the British set its policy with regard to
Argentina based solely upon its interest in the Falklands. Yet, it would be far from the last
time.312

The Dirty Wars in Anglo-American Relations
The new military government was welcomed on both sides of the Atlantic as a refreshing
change from the Peronist government. The British effectively summed up the prevailing attitude
of both themselves and the United States when an FCO official declared, “No one could possibly
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run Argentina worse than the Peronist regime.”313 Yet, such perceptions of the situation in
Argentina were so wrapped up in the negative perceptions of Peronism that they underestimated
the capacity of the military junta for violence and brutality. Under the military government, the
terrorist attacks continued at the hands of right-wing extremist groups within the country, but
such actions, especially from the right, could not have occurred without, at the very least, support
from the military units within the government, or at the worst, from the government itself.314
Under the military government with its fascist ideological convictions, thousands of Argentine
citizens were disappeared at the hands of the state, having been tortured to death, before their
bodies were dumped into unmarked, mass groves, or thrown into the ocean.315 Before it was all
said and done, the Argentine Dirty Wars, as they came to be known, were responsible for the
disappearance of nearly 9,000 people.316 Despite such heinous violations of basic human rights,
neither the British nor the Americans initially altered their policy, choosing to maintain relations
with the Argentine government and supply them with necessary arms and other military
equipment.
Within the White House and State Departments, Argentina’s move to the right brought
with it an opening for “enhanced predispositions to cooperate with the United States,” an
especially welcome move from a country that had long been one of the United States’ most vocal
critics within the hemisphere.317 These enhanced predispositions were the result of the new
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regime ensuring that there would be no leftist government emerging within Argentina, which the
State Department saw as an opportunity to potentially “magnify disproportionately Argentina’s
importance for the US.”318 Yet, such a prominent place for Argentina within American foreign
policy was complicated by one overarching issue—human rights. As was seen in the case of
Chile, by 1976, human rights had indeed become most the controversial and difficult issue for
American policy makers with regard to Latin America, and Argentina was seen as “the new
storm center,” of the brewing crisis.319
From the administration’s perspective, the human rights violations occurring at the hand
of the junta were nothing new. In an October 1976 report prepared for Congress on human rights
in Argentina, the NSC staff was careful to note that the current era of terrorism had begun under
the Perón administration with its November 1974 declaration of the state of siege. While not
sugar coating the 1,000 deaths in the first six months of the junta, the report also presented such
figures alongside the 2,000 deaths that had occurred under the Perónist government and noted
that rightist terrorism had been on the decline in the months following the coup.320 The United
States also downplayed to Congress the number of prisoners being held under the State of Siege,
dismissing as too high the Amnesty International report of 4,000 prisoners, while accepting the
Argentine foreign minister’s claim that the government was only holding 1,000 prisoners.321
Furthermore, in an effort to convince Congress not to interfere in foreign policy through legal
sanctions and limitations of executive power, the White House also played up its efforts to
discuss the human rights issue with the Argentine government, which it claimed had been the
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most significant topic of conversation between the US and the new Argentine government. In
meetings between the ambassadors, ministers, and military officials, the United States expressed
its “deep concern over reports of officially-tolerated mass murders, and the indiscriminate
killings of political refugees,” and called upon the Argentine government to make changes before
it affected relations with the United States government.322 For their part, the Argentines assured
their American counterparts that these current problems were temporary, and asked for patience
as they were still unable to completely curtail the “present atmosphere of terrorism” within the
country.323
Such assurances on the part of the Argentine government were deemed sufficient for
those within the White House and State Department, particularly given their already evident
disdain for what was seen as Congressional meddling in foreign policy through its dangerous
precedent to link any means of security measures to human rights issues. Thus, upon completing
its assessment of the human rights for Congress, the Ford administration argued that security
assistance should be continued for Argentina into 1977, particularly since the money was not
going to the police, and that the Argentine military could be strong allies within South America
for dealing with issues that emerged. Ultimately, the State Department concluded that “at this
time it is in the national interest of the United States to provide continued security assistance to
Argentina,” noting that the failure to do so would damage the prospects for “constructive overall
relations with Argentina.”324 Any American concern for human rights in Argentina had thus been
easily assuaged by hollow reassurances from a military dictatorship in the name of advancing
American balance of power politics.
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In this regard, the situation in Argentina offered the Ford administration a unique
opportunity to assess the nature of its national security and its foundation of balance of power
politics. Congressional interference in foreign policy over how human rights represented a
hindrance to balance of power in American foreign policy. When foreign policy remained firmly
under the control of the executive, it was possible to maintain a realist dimension within human
rights policy, should the US choose to mobilize the idea as a manifestation of power. Under
Congress, however, human rights became a largely moral, politicized dimension of policy
making, in which even sanctions voted upon by congress, when contradicted by the executive,
showed the lack of direction and priorities of a divided government. A divided government and
frequent disputes between the two branches over the nature of American national security could
actually weaken the United States’ power abroad and undercut its policy objectives. Thus, from
the perspective of the Ford Administration, the protection of national security required that the
management of foreign policy—including its “soft power” and most diffuse dimensions (i.e.
American values)—had to be under solid control by the executive.
Further complicating the human rights questions within US-Argentine relations was the
issue of Operation Condor. By the summer of 1976, reports had begun coming into the State
Department indicating that the right-wing governments of South America were in conversation
with one another to subvert terrorism in their countries and to identify and eliminate exiled
leftists in Europe. The State Department dismissed such information as not credible, but soon
discovered that it had been incorrect in that assessment.325 As reports of inter-regional security
cooperation arrived from both Buenos Aires and the State Department, the Ford administration
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gained a fuller understanding of the political developments in the southern cone. Perceiving
threats from both the international Marxist left and its radical terrorist agitations as well as the
democracies of many countries who dismissed the threat of radical Marxism, the countries of the
Southern Cone (Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay), aided by Brazil, Bolivia, and Paraguay, formed
a counter-terrorist network known as Operation Condor. In addition to coordinating intelligence
efforts and supporting each other in joint efforts to silence political opponents, Condor set out “to
find and kill terrorists of the ‘Revolutionary Coordinating Committee’ in their own countries and
in Europe.”326 Most noteworthy in this, however, was the reality that, at least in the Southern
Cone, the overwhelming majority of the Marxist left had already been destroyed by government
efforts. Furthermore, the efforts by the Condor countries to hunt out subversion had turned into
politically motivated killings of anyone who opposed the government and its policies.327 Beyond
just the physical security elements, Condor also focused on psychological warfare designed to
shield each other from being named as the source of propaganda.328
From the American point of view, Condor, and especially its international dimensions,
were alarming. That Latin American countries would interfere in European countries by
assassinating Latin American leftists living in Europe indicated a troubling pattern of
interventionism, one that the US Ambassadors in the Condor states were instructed to express
their concern over. On the flip side, however, the American ambassadors in the six Condor states
were also instructed to make sure that the host governments knew that “the U.S. takes no issue
with ‘Condor’ plans to collect and coordinate information to counter regional terrorism in the
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southern cone area.”329 The Americans supported the Condor belief that there was indeed a threat
posed by the left, even if it was exaggerated by the Condor states.330 From that premise, they
were hesitant to completely condemn the operation, especially in light of the way the United
States’ perception of the threat was affecting its “reliability” as an ally of the Condor
countries.331 The United States also acknowledged that it benefited from this situation, and
would indeed benefit in some regards from the formation of a cohesive right-wing political bloc
in South America, though this closeness would simultaneously create problems with its
European allies. To mitigate the effects of this possible clash of interests, it opted to merely
depoliticize human rights, while emphasizing the difference between each of the six states so as
not to alarm Congress.332 Thus, what emerges over Operation Condor is an American policy that
attempts merely to moderate rather than condemn a coordinated, state-sponsored campaign of
regional terrorism against political opponents.
Meanwhile, across the Atlantic, one might expect the British to take a hard-line stance
against the Argentine government in light of its response to the military coup and subsequent
human rights violations by the dictatorial government of Chile. Yet, such was not to be the case.
As previously discussed, the Argentine situation was indeed complicated by the question of the
Falklands Islands and the longstanding dispute over the territory between the UK and Argentina.
Beyond just the Falklands, however, there was also a lesser sense of outrage within Britain
among Labour Party members and the public at large over the coup in Argentina. Chile had
sparked massive public outcry because it was a democratically elected socialist government that
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was overthrown, but the removal of the highly disliked Perónist government went over without
so much as even a mention in the writings of any major Labour Party leader.333 This general
indifference toward the coup and the earnest desire to maintain positive relations with Argentina
over the Falklands would manifest itself into every major facet of Anglo-Argentine Relations in
the aftermath of the military takeover.
By April 1976, Britain had a new prime minister, the now-former foreign minister, James
Callaghan, who had won the premiership following a surprising announcement that Harold
Wilson was retiring. Under Callaghan, however, the official policy stances of the government
changed very little. On the human rights front, the degree to which Britain dwelt on the atrocities
being committed as part of the Dirty Wars was remarkably lower than their focus on human
rights elsewhere across the globe, at least initially. In frequent, official reports from both the
chargé d’affaires, John Shakespeare, and the FCO, the coup was hailed as a bloodless coup with
no opposition. Any violence that did occur was generally attributed to the right- and left-wing
terrorist groups that were operating within the country well before the junta seized power.334
Similarly, most assessments coming out of the British Embassy in Buenos Aires in 1976 were
tinged with sympathy toward the plight of the junta in dealing with the challenges of restoring
law and order in the country following the unrest brought about by the Perón government. In
June 1976, Shakespeare recommended that any policy considerations be made in light of an
understanding of the sheer difficulty posed by the problems facing the regime.335 Even once the
year had drawn to a close, Shakespeare’s annual review of the situation in Chile concluded that it
was “perhaps inevitable that the nature of this ruthless struggle should have fundamentally

333

Livingstone, Britain and the Dictatorships, 121.
Ibid., 130.
335
Shakespeare to FCO in Ibid., 131.
334

107

undermined the rule of law, corrupting those who should up-hold it and submerging precisely
those human and Christian values that the regime publicly pledged to uphold.”336 Shakespeare
went on to report that by the end of the year, the junta had realized the error of its ways in its
human rights violations and made substantive and meaningful changes.337 It would be nearly a
year later, however, before the British government finally became aware of the full nature of the
crimes being committed and the degree to which the government had been orchestrating the
violence.338 Thus, in its early relations with the junta, human rights played a minimal role, as the
British were either misled or willfully ignorant of the atrocities being committed by the
government.
In light of its failure to condemn human rights, it should be of little wonder that the
British government also approved arms sales to the Argentine military. The policy toward
Argentina recommended by Hugh Carless and the Latin America staff at the FCO called for
massive economic and commercial connections with the Argentines. Thus, having long been one
of Argentina’s leading arms suppliers, the UK continued its close relationship between the
Anglo-Argentine military establishments. Arms sales represented one of the largest commercial
agreements between the US and Argentina, to the point that in March 1976, the threat of
Argentina cancelling its contracts for British arms were called a “lesser but still harmful option”
that Argentina could use, should it choose not to invade the Falklands.339 The British delivered
its first of two existing contracted missile destroyers to Argentina in 1977, which would
ironically enough later be used against the British in the Falklands War.340 While the use of the
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destroyer against Britain highlights the ironic nature of selling arms to a country that London
simultaneously saw as a threat to British territory, that the conversation happened at all
represents a significant component of British foreign policy. Clearly the human rights
considerations that had excluded all arms sales to Chile were not in play with Argentina.
Nevertheless, it was the Falklands Islands that overshadowed all other bilateral relations.
Nothing makes this clearer, perhaps, than Shakespeare’s assertion in his 1976 annual review that,
“1976 was the worst year ever for Anglo-Argentine relations,” before going on to enumerate the
litany of problems that had emerged over the Falklands.341 The problems of 1976 began even
before the coup. From 1968 onward, the UK and Argentina had been engaged in a series of off
and on bilateral conversations about the future of the Falklands Islands, in response to a UN
resolution calling upon the two to negotiate a peaceful settlement of the more than century-old
dispute. In January 1976, the Argentines evicted the British Ambassador from Buenos Aires and
recalled their ambassador from London following receipt of a dispatch informing them of
Britain’s refusal to negotiate any further regarding the Falklands dispute.342 The issue was
exacerbated by the arrival of a British mission to the Falklands on the exact anniversary of the
British seizure of the islands from Argentina in 1833—a coincidence that the Argentines
perceived as a deliberate slight.343 While there was talk within the Wilson administration of
attempting to reinstate a British ambassador in Argentina after the military government seized
control, the post was left vacant throughout the remainder of the Labour government’s tenure in
office.344 Matters further deteriorated in February 1976, when an Argentine destroyer attempted
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to arrest a British ship, the RRS Shackleton, and fired a warning shot across its bow. The British
ship had been less than 100 miles from the Falklands but was accused of conducting
unauthorized scientific research in Argentine waters. Eventually matters calmed down, but not
without considerable diplomatic maneuvering by the FCO. 345
When the junta came to power in March, there was a general optimism that things would
improve with regard to the Falklands situation. Shakespeare, who was the ranking official in the
embassy following the removal of the ambassador, noted that the military regime made it easier
for the British to do business and engage in conversation with the Argentines on every issue, the
Falklands questions included.346 Nevertheless, the military also saw itself as the defenders of
national heritage and prestige. By 1976, the Falklands had long been an issue of national prestige
for the Argentines, and it was far from certain that the junta would easily give up territory that it
believed to be its own. This assessment was evident even in the immediate aftermath of the coup,
as the British noted that there was no reason to think that the junta would be any less hardline
than the Perónists.347 Despite such predictions, by the end of the year, matters over the Falklands
seemed less dire, as the Labour government expressed slightly more optimism for a mutually
acceptable solution.348 Nevertheless, by the start of 1977, the Falklands were far from a settled
issue, and it continued to dominate Anglo-Argentine relations.
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National Security and Special Relationships
When considered on the whole, the years 1974 to 1976 represent a significant period in
the approach to Anglo-American relations and Latin American relations by both the United
States and Great Britain. This is particularly evident in regard to the relationship between human
rights and national security, and in how the demands of the special relationship were balanced in
light of divergent approaches toward Latin America. On the human rights front, at least in Chile,
the difference between the two countries cannot be overstated. For Britain, the issue of human
rights was at the center of its new ethical foreign policy, an elevation to a new place of
prominence within conversations about national security and the conduct of foreign policy. In
Wilson’s first speech to Parliament as Prime Minister, he discussed “nations whose internal
repression of their citizens we deplore,” and noted that “more than ever we are part of one world
in’ terms of human rights.”349 Two weeks later, the FCO produced a follow up report from that
speech on the UK’s relations with what were deemed “politically sensitive countries.” The report
attempted to set a clear policy that Her Majesty’s Government could use as its basic guidelines
for action. While it stated that recognition of a state should not be tied to human rights violations,
it did establish as British policy the frequent expression of concern over human rights, the
avoidance of any goodwill gestures toward those countries engaged in human rights violations,
and an embargo upon arms sales that could be used to further commit violence against its
citizens.350 In doing so, the British government established a clear linkage between the
promotion of human rights, and the conduct of policy designed to protect national security. What
this means is that from 1974 onward, national security was redefined by the British to include the
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status of human rights as a significant consideration in discussions regarding the protection of
political, geostrategic, and economic interests across the globe.
Such a redefinition of national security stands in stark contrast to the actions of the
United States during the same period. While Britain was making human rights more political, in
response to the growing cooperation between the right-wing government of the Southern Cone,
Kissinger was advised by the Inter-American Affairs staff to shift the narrative on human rights
by getting the “the politics and ideology out of human rights.”351 As part of its discussion of how
to do this, Kissinger was praised for the approach he had taken in his speech at the Santiago OAS
summit—the same speech that just hours before he delivered it, he explicitly dismissed in a
private meeting with Pinochet.352 In fact, in a testimony before Congress in 1973, one expert
called human rights “the stepchildren of United States foreign policy.”353 Not only was the US
trying to depoliticize human rights abroad, it was also trying to rein in what it perceived to be an
activist, interfering Congress that had increasingly become concerned over human rights. From
the perspective of the state department, “the executive, not Congress, should set policy on human
rights,” since Congress had seemingly lost sight of the reality that the United States has
“important national interests to promote in addition to human rights.”354 From the perspective of
the White House, these efforts by Congress were threatening to constrain all relations with Latin
America by what the administration saw as an “unenforceable standard” of human rights
protections, given the United States’ inability to directly control the actions of Latin American
governments.355 To the arch-realists within the State Department, Congress’ lack of “political
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realism toward Latin America” was a threat to the conduct of American foreign policy.356 Thus,
what emerges are two different definitions of national security between the US and Great Britain.
Britain introduced human rights as an interest under consideration by national security, while
those within the foreign policy establishment of the United States fought ardently to keep human
rights out of national security. Yet this difference over human rights was only one area of
disagreement in the relationship.
Seen from both sides of the Atlantic, the Anglo-American special relationship was in
flux, as new governments brought with them new priorities and attempted to balance the
demands of the Anglo-American alliance with their other respective alliances and relationships.
During the premiership of Ted Heath, Anglo-American relations indeed reached a low point as
the UK moved away from the United States and toward Europe through membership in the EEC.
This placed a significant amount of strain upon relations, enough so that in a briefing for the new
president Ford in advance of a meeting with Heath, Kissinger stated that Heath’s success in
bringing Britain into the EEC represented the “end of the US-UK ‘special relationship.’”357 This
assessment was not lost on the British, who actively sought to improve their relations with the
US under the new Labour government. In a December 1974 meeting with the Labour Party’s
Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee, Callaghan stated, “It is more important to us than ever
that we should work for close cooperation with the US,” before going on to discuss the steps the
government had taken in the preceding nine months to achieve this aim.358 Surely the most
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important US foreign policy maker, Henry Kissinger, ostensibly shared these sentiments,
describing the state of the special relationship as “excellent” in late-September.359
Despite the return to close relations, the special relationship continued to manifest
problems over political issues and other alliances. Recognizing the place it found itself in regard
to relations with the Nine and relations with the US, Callaghan struck the line, “The Atlantic
Alliance is the cornerstone of Her Majesty’s Government’s foreign policy,” from a draft reply
written for him to a parliamentary question on Anglo-American relations.360 Similarly, Lord
Gordon Lennox, head of the FCO’s North America Department, expressed concern for the way
the government’s policy regarding human rights and politically sensitive countries was
developing. Lennox went so far as to remark:
“At some stage, I think the Sub-Committee should recognise the need to look at any
changes in our relations with politically sensitive countries in the light of the effect of
such changes on our relationships with third countries, particularly the United States. If
we judged that the latter was likely to be at all affected, there would be strong grounds for
consultation with the United States before any policy changes were put into effect.”361
Despite Lennox’s caution, it can certainly be seen that, at least in the case of Chile, the UK was
more interested in pursuing its own policies on the issue of human rights than in considering
what its disagreement with the United States might mean for the bilateral relationship.
The United States also found itself in a similar position, forced to choose between
alliances—or in this case, special relationships. As late as 1976, the State Department concluded
that, despite the inclination of some to deny the United States’ special relationship with Latin
America and claim that it was a harmful concept, there was no denying that it continued to

359

Henry Kissinger to Gerald Ford, “Meeting with James Callaghan,” September 24, 1974, NSA
Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada, Box 15, Folder “United Kingdom (1),” Ford Library.
360
“Draft Reply to Parliamentary Question,” March 27, 1974, FCO Files, Series 82, Folder 432, British
National Archives, Kew, UK.
361
Lord Gordon Lennox, “Relations with Politically Sensitive Countries,” April 1, 1974, FCO Files, Series
82, Folder 433, British National Archives, Kew, UK.

114

exist.362 In fact, the most outspoken proponent of advancing the special relationship language
with Latin America was the secretary of state himself. Kissinger’s preference to characterize
inter-American affairs through a special relationship lens provided the contours for his approach
in Santiago in 1976 and guided his bilateral conversations with the countries he visited while on
his Latin America trip. From Kissinger’s perspective, the OAS General Assembly had been a
resounding success for the special relationship with Latin America, which he regarded as the
high-water mark of US-Latin American affairs in the previous four years.363 This resurgence of
the United States’ special relationship with Latin America was not lost on the British, either. The
British Ambassador to the US reported of this preference for a special relationship with Latin
America, while noting that it had seemingly “paid dividends” for US-Latin American
relations.364 When policy toward Latin America is compared with policy toward Great Britain,
then, it seems that the US chose to pursue matters that emphasized and strengthened the special
relationship with Latin America, while ignoring British interests on human rights with no desire
to bring relations in harmony over the matter. In this case, Kissinger showed his most realist
colors: his balance of power politics led him to conclude that alienating the Condor nations and
their ardent anti-communism over something he deemed as irrelevant to national security as
human rights would have been reckless.
Yet for all of the talk about new dialogues and new policy directions, the actions of both
the United States and Great Britain also continued to reinforce existing ideas and practices. As
Grace Livingstone has observed, while Britain took a hardline stance against the military junta in
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Chile and its abuses of human rights, it was “business as usual” with regard to Argentina. The
British government downplayed the role of the Argentine government in human rights violations
and continued to ship military aid to the junta, all in hopes of achieving an amicable resolution to
the Anglo-Argentine Falklands/Malvinas dispute. For all that had been said about a new ethical
foreign policy, it appeared that at best an ethical approach was selectively applied, and at worst,
Britain had not changed its approach at all.365 A similar observation could be made about the
United States. The United States would frequently claim to believe that human rights protections
were important, but behind closed doors, it would continue to offer its support for dictatorial
regimes in the name of improving relations with Latin America and advancing the continued
defense of the hemisphere from communist subversion. Thus, the decisions made by both
countries set new precedents and created new tension, while simultaneously reinforcing
contradictory patterns of action in the name of national security.
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Chapter 4
The Convergence and Divergence on Human Rights in Latin America, 1977–1980

From the adoption of the Helsinki Final Accords and its well-known third basket onward,
human rights assumed a prominent place in the conduct of American foreign policy, particularly
in regard to Latin America—a region ripe with human rights’ violations. Such an emphasis on
human rights was one of the hallmarks of Jimmy Carter’s foreign policy, and was a point of great
connection in the transatlantic dialog regarding Latin America (namely toward Chile and
Argentina). The Carter Administration’s move toward human rights was seen as a welcome
convergence of foreign policy priorities for the already human rights-focused Labour Party
government of James Callaghan in Britain. The intersection of human rights policy and Latin
America policy for both the United States and Great Britain during the administrations of Carter
and Callaghan reoriented decades-old conversations about national security and the conduct of
international relations in the Southern Cone region. Yet, the inclusion of human rights in such a
prominent way required changes to the very definition of national security and its theoretical
foundation in notions of foreign policy realism. Yet for all that the Carter and Callaghan did to
bring Anglo-American Latin America policy into sync, the fall of the Labour Government and
the rise of Margaret Thatcher indicated that divergence over the role of human rights and the
approach to Latin America would once again characterize the Anglo-American dialogue and
change the definition of national security.
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Jimmy Carter, Human Rights, and Latin America
Throughout the 1976 United States’ presidential election campaign, the issue of human
rights emerged as one of the most controversial and debated components of foreign policy.
Human rights was not a new issue in American foreign policy, though. As we noted, throughout
the Ford administration, congress actively constrained the actions of the executive in foreign and
defense policy when it deemed human rights were being violated.366 Yet even the reluctant
Kissinger paid at least lip-service to human rights.367 The 1975 Helsinki Final Act of the
Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) famously included its third basket,
which committed all the signatories to the promotion and protection of the human rights of its
citizens.368 Additionally, Kissinger’s 1976 OAS speech featured a prominent discussion of
human rights, albeit one that was privately undercut by the secretary himself—indicating the
shallow nature of the Ford Administration’s concern and commitment to human rights. Yet, it
was Jimmy Carter, the peanut farmer turned governor of Georgia, who truly brought human
rights to the forefront of the presidential campaign. In his now famous “human rights speech” in
September 1976, Carter declared that the lack of moral principles guiding the Ford
administration’s foreign policy had led it to ignore the cause of those who were facing torture
and abuse by their own governments.369 Carter’s thoughts on human rights became more
articulate as he faced off with President Ford in a series of televised debates in October,
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specifically mentioning human rights violations in Chile as a failure of the Nixon-Ford era.370
Notably, Carter received an incendiary letter from the Chilean Embassy, in which Ambassador
Trucco went line by line in “correcting” Carter’s statements about the situation in Chile.371
Nevertheless, Carter’s emphasis on human rights and his commitment to a moralistic foreign
policy set the stage for a seismic shift in American foreign policy when he entered the Oval
Office in January 1977.
Almost immediately after taking office, Carter and his respective teams at State and the
NSC began a comprehensive effort to outline the administration’s policy on human rights. In its
first official guidelines on the role of human rights in foreign policy, the State Department was
informed that “protection and promotion of human rights are fundamental to the formulation and
execution of US foreign policy.”372 At the very heart of this new emphasis on human rights was a
belief that such an approach was morally right, legally justified under international law, and
politically advantageous to American interests.373 All parties involved agreed, however, that any
approach to human rights could not be a one-size-fits-all model, but that each case would need to
be considered through its own evaluation. In doing so, one of the critical considerations was the
interrelationship between human rights, the national interest, and, even more directly, the
potential of “an internal or external threat to national security.”374 From the perspective of the
Carter administration, failure to act on the front of human rights was not an acceptable
alternative. Continuing to ignore the gross abuses of human rights would only weaken America’s
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position in the ideological struggle against totalitarianism, and increase the likelihood of a
“preponderance of nations in the world that do not share our values,” which would in turn create
“danger to our own values at home if we fail to oppose this trend.”375 By connecting threats to
national security and the abuses of human rights, and by articulating the perceived threat posed
by continual inaction in moral and ideological terms of a battle between good and evil, the Carter
administration effectively redefined national security in the opening weeks of its administration.
At least under Carter, national security would involve more than protecting the geostrategic
power of the state in realist terms. It would now be necessary to ensure that American security
was not infringed upon through ideological hostility over human rights.
Human Rights was not the only area of foreign policy that Carter intended to
fundamentally change. Under the new administration, the longstanding special relationship
between the US and Latin America—a relationship that Kissinger had emphasized as the basic
tenet of improved hemispheric relations—would soon be questioned and dismissed as a
paternalistic approach to a diverse bloc of countries. As a region, Latin America quickly drew
the focus of the new president and his foreign policy staff. Knowing that he was expected to
address the OAS on Pan-American Day in April, and having identified the return of the Panama
Canal to the Panamanians as his first foreign policy priority, Carter commissioned a
comprehensive review of Latin America policy just six days after taking office.376 The result of
that study was a document known as Presidential Review Memorandum (PRM) 17, which
became the basic foundation for the administration’s policy toward Latin America for its
duration. At the heart of PRM 17 was a fundamental question about the utility of maintaining a
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special relationship with Latin America. The region’s special relationship had long existed on the
basis of four key ideas: “preferential economic treatment for Latin America; an inter-American
system of political, cultural, and security links based on the OAS and the Rio Treaty; our
historical hegemony and its freight of paternalism; and the accompanying rhetoric about shared
values.”377 Commenting upon the state of the special relationship, however, the report went on to
conclude, “We find it increasingly difficult to deliver on the first, useful to retain the second, and
undesirable to prolong the third. And whether or not we ‘share values’ there is little doubt that
we expect more from Latin America and they from us.”378 The resulting conclusions were that by
and large, any value a special relationship with Latin America might provide for the United
States was limited at best, or obsolete and paternalistic at worst. Nevertheless, the study did
conclude that doing away with the special relationship completely could compromise a useful
means of affecting hemispheric security.379
The intense study of Latin America policy in the weeks after Carter took office
culminated in his first major speech on Latin America on April 14, 1977. The Pan-American Day
speech was the embodiment of everything Carter had hoped to achieve. It highlighted the role of
human rights and America’s commitment to human rights across the globe, but especially in
Latin America, and expressed a desire for collaboration and consultation between the US and its
southern neighbors on major issues facing the region and the globe. Carter highlighted the role of
Latin America culture and peoples within the United States, and vowed to address major issues
such as the Panama Canal, relations with Cuba, and the growing drug trade. Yet, the thing most
diligently attended to by Carter’s speech writers was the effort to strike a tone that was “fresh
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and more open” while avoiding any talk of a special relationship, instead stressing global
economic cooperation.380 This speech was just the beginning of the Carter administration’s new
approach to Latin America. At American urging, human rights took center stage at the OAS
General Assembly (OASGA) in Grenada in June 1977—a meeting the CIA called “a
battleground for the US human rights policy.”381 While the meeting failed to achieve the
unanimity on the issue of human rights that the American delegation would have liked, it was,
nevertheless, a watershed moment in inter-American affairs. The report back to Washington on
the OASGA concluded, “In the final analysis, the Grenada meeting of the OAS may be
remembered in the future as the beginning of a new era of understanding between the US and
Latin America, or it may go down as the final dissolution of the special relationship most Latin
American countries have long assumed they have with Washington.”382 Further highlighting this
distinction, when former Ford administration foreign policy expert Bill Rogers wrote to National
Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, commenting upon the ways in which the Ford
administration began many of the approaches to Latin America that Carter was undertaking,
Brzezinski and Bob Pastor, the NSC’s lone Latin American specialist, noted that they
remembered the Kissinger approach differently than the way Rogers did. Pointing out the ways
in which Kissinger had favored the special relationship with Latin America as a key distinction
in policy between the two, their response to Rogers used a tone that they believed “reflects the
necessary balance between sarcasm and praise.”383 By the summer of 1977, it was clear that the
Carter Administration was charting a new course in US foreign policy.
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In the Southern Cone, however, both of these policy changes would come together in a
perfect storm. The far-right military dictatorships of Argentina and Chile were among the
grossest human rights offenders across the globe. The administration realized that Latin
America’s human rights problems posed a unique challenge, in that the region had more than 150
years of historical precedent to turn them against American intervention in their internal affairs.
Additionally, the political and ideological orientations of the governments in Argentina and
Chile, and the American perception of the regimes as bulwarks against the specter of
communism, put the United States in a delicate position with regard to condemning human rights
violations.384 In this regard, Bob Pastor expressed his opinion in a memo to Brzezinski, that,
“While the human rights policy may be a good instrument of ideological diplomacy in other
areas, I don’t think that ought to be one of our purposes in this hemisphere.”385 From Pastor’s
perspective, the policy approach did not have the potential to sufficiently improve long-term
relations between the US and its neighbors to the South.386 Yet despite Pastor’s objections, in
Chile and Argentina, human rights would remain the overarching issue affecting relations with
the US, as well as relations with the United States’ other special ally—Great Britain.

Human Rights in Chile, 1977–79
The human rights situation in Santiago remained dire in 1977, as the Chilean government
continued its attacks upon “subversives” throughout the country. From the American
perspective, relations with Chile were due for a complete reversal under Carter, whose
commitment to human rights stood in stark contrast to Kissinger’s meeting with Pinochet to
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reassure him that the United States’ condemnations of human rights violations were not directed
at Chile. Within two months of Carter taking office, the CIA reported that American-Chilean
relations had reached their nadir and attributed the rapid deterioration to “the US emphasis on the
human rights issue,” completely destroying all leverage Washington might have previously had
with the Chilean government.387 Not only did the human rights emphasis immediately hurt
relations, the push toward human rights further reinforced the belief held by many in Santiago
that the US was the antagonist, a view that was common throughout the entire Southern Cone
region.388 One of the biggest sources of tension over the United States’ move toward human
rights was the perceived inequalities and inconsistencies in its application. Ambassador David
Popper, in one of his last telegrams from Santiago, noted that for the majority of Chileans human
rights violations in places like the Soviet Union and Uganda were chastised but not acted upon,
while the Southern Cone bore the brunt of sanctions and aid reduction. El Mercurio, Santiago’s
leading newspaper, went so far as to call it “’the human rights imperialism’ of the United
States.”389 Clearly human rights was a controversial issue within American-Chilean relations,
and one that affected far more than the tenor of conversation between the heads of state and
ambassadors.
This rapid collapse of cordial relations with a longtime Latin American ally prompted the
administration to evaluate and study its relations with Chile. In May, the President ordered a
policy review on Chile that would assess the next eighteen months of policy goals. Yet, just
because policy was under consideration, it did not change the overall approach. The instructions
for the policy review made it very clear that while all American interests in Chile were to be
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considered, “none can take precedence over human rights concerns.”390 Furthermore,
bureaucratic infighting and disagreements between the American Affairs staff at the State
Department and the Latin American specialist at the NSC resulted in a policy logjam. With state
trying to keep the NSC out of policymaking and deliberating over two contradictory and
competing policies, the United States’ approach to Chile could best be described as “a series of
uncoordinated, ad hoc decisions.”391 Such disarray within the foreign policy establishment was
certainly not helping matters in an already strained relationship.
In an attempt to repair the relationship with Chile and make more meaningful progress
toward improving the country’s human rights record, Carter sat down with Pinochet for a
bilateral conversation when the general was in Washington in September 1977 for the Panama
Canal Treaty Signing. After discussing less contentious issues in the early part of the meeting,
Carter turned the conversation to human rights, which he described as “the only major bilateral
problem.”392 As Carter probed Pinochet about the status of human rights in Chile, he listened
intently to the general repeating much of what had become Chile’s standard response, listing off
the human rights violations of the Marxist government, highlighting the legal means by which
they were acting, and claiming to be victims of leftist, propaganda smear campaign.
Nevertheless, Carter understood that the Pinochet government had indeed made progress in
reducing the number of political prisoners that were being held, even if that was a far cry from
resolving all of the country’s human rights issues. Carter’s advocacy for an independent review
attempted to play to Pinochet’s arguments, noting that the world needed to be able to see that
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things were as the dictator had said with regard to human rights, but Pinochet refused to believe
that the UN could do such an audit without a partisan slant.393 Ultimately, the conversation ended
without any real resolution of the issue, but it nevertheless represented an attempt to restore the
friendliness of US-Chilean relations.
Warm cordial relations, however, were not soon to return to the US-Chilean bilateral, as
the United States’ delegation to the UN became the leading and strongest critic of human rights
in Chile. After years of abstaining from votes on the human rights abuses in Chile, the US
delegation not only voted in support of the resolution accepting the working committee’s report,
but they co-sponsored it, going so far as to offer a draft bill that was more condemnatory than
any other body or delegation had suggested.394 From the perspective of both the Chilean people
and the American embassy in Chile, the American draft recognized none of the progress that had
indeed been made in releasing prisoners and threatened to derail the further release of prisoners
by the Chilean junta.395 The embassy were not the only ones to feel that the actions of the
delegation in New York were dangerous to American efforts to enact change. Tom Thornton at
the NSC noted that, “The Embassy is right!! USUN is out of control.”396 Concern over the
American tone did not stop with Washington, however. Ambassadors to Chile from the EC
countries expressed their concern over the American position, while Pinochet sent a personal
letter to Carter, delivered by hand, expressing his concern over what he believed was a
“discriminatory and unfair report.”397 Despite the objections, the US voted in support of the bill
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it had co-sponsored and only after the fact, in a press release, acknowledged that Chile had
indeed made some progress toward lessening its abusive practices.398
A tense correspondence was exchanged between Carter and Pinochet over the UN report
and resolution from October 1977 to January 1978. The tone of these messages clearly indicated
that no love was lost between the two heads of state. The State department described Pinochet’s
response to Carter’s letter from October 31 as “an icy, but still respectful, expression of defiance
to the United Nations and to the United States on the subject of human rights.”399 The State
Department went on to conclude that “Pinochet is bitter over what he sees as our failure to
understand Chile’s position and our interference in Chilean internal affairs. He knows our views,
which have been expressed to him by the President, and rejects them.”400 Carter did not even
respond to the last letter, as his advisors saw no practical benefit, given that it would merely
restate the American position, of which Pinochet was already well aware.401
Human rights began to affect more than just bilateral relations between leaders, and
spilled over into more than just matters pertaining to the UN. In early 1978, the White House
discovered that Kissinger had found a loophole in the arms embargo enacted by Congress in
1976 that had allowed for more than $55 million of arms to be transferred to the Chileans in
1977, with an additional $18 million of arms remaining in the pipeline.402 By virtue of the arms
already having been sold and promised, the administration’s decision over whether the stop the
remaining arms transfers or not was indeed a serious one. The government was forced to
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undertake a comprehensive assessment of the entire premise of the “pipeline,” which at least
temporarily halted the weapons deliveries.403 The eventual determination will be that the pipeline
was to be officially terminated, effective January 1, 1980. This decision was a two-fold response
to the continuing human rights abuses and the failure of the Chilean government to hold
accountable and extradite to the US the three Chilean intelligence officers who assassinated
former Chilean Minister Orlando Letelier in Washington in 1976.404
Beyond just cutting off access to the pipeline, the US also decided in 1979 to terminate
all loans from the Export-Import bank in response to the continuing human rights violations in
Chile, hardening its stance against Chile at the exact moment that the policy could have been
relaxed. From the perspective of the Inter-American Affairs and Economic bureaus of the State
Department, the limitation or denial of export-import credits would only hurt relations with
Chile, and was an unnecessary step given that human rights were actually improving in Chile.
The bank itself saw no reason to limit loans, and had no legal basis to do so unless “the President
makes a determination on human rights grounds.”405 Despite the support given by many within
the state department for relaxing the existing restrictions, the Human Rights division strongly
condemned any policy change, and instead called upon the president to declare that “the
continuation of restrictions on Ex-Im transactions with Chile is in the national interest and will
clearly and importantly advance U.S. human rights objectives.”406 In making such an assertion,
which the President did in October 1979, it was once again made clear that under the Carter
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administration, human rights had been elevated to the highest concern in foreign policy
determinations.
Across the Atlantic, the Labour government of Jim Callaghan welcomed the Carter
administration’s policy changes toward Chile and the cooling of relations with the junta. The
British prime minister and the US president were to form an enduring friendship. While the
British had already severed ties with Chile on the grounds of human rights (even withdrawing
their ambassador in 1976 following the torture of a British doctor), the years between 1977 and
1979 still represented a significant period for the development of Anglo-Chilean relations and
the place of Chile in Anglo-American relations. In the spring and summer of 1977, the British
government undertook a complete review of its policy toward Chile, as part of an effort to
evaluate whether significant progress had been made in Chile to warrant a relaxation of the
hardline stance the Labour government had taken since coming to power in 1974. During this
time, the government weighed the relative pros and cons of both policy options—continuing on
its current trajectory or adopting greater moderation in its negative responses to Chile.
Evaluating its five policy goals toward Chile, the policy review concluded that there had indeed
been progress in the human rights situation (goals one and two) and the British believed
themselves to be at least partially responsible for those changes, since they had been the most
direct and vocal in their condemnations of human rights violations in Chile.407 Despite the
deterioration of relations between the UK and Chile, the foreign office acknowledged that British
interests had not been harmed, although the possibility of that indeed seemed greater moving
forward.408
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The policy review concluded that nothing within Anglo-Chilean relations necessitated a
change of approach, but nevertheless, the two options of continuing on the status quo or adopting
a more flexible response remained on the table. In deciding which approach to adopt moving
forward, one of the critical considerations within Whitehall was the direction of the new Carter
administration. Almost immediately after Carter took office, the British began reaching out to
their contacts in Washington to evaluate the administration’s stance on Chile, which as noted
above, was a hard thing to determine in the early months of the administration. While unable to
say with certainty what the administration would do, most within London were convinced that
Carter’s emphasis on human rights would lead to a hardline approach toward Chile. In March,
Minister of State Ted Rowlands determined that he would consult with Washington on Chile
policy on his first trip to Washington.409 In that meeting between Rowlands and Pat Derian, the
State Department’s coordinator for Human Rights, the two countries exchanged ideas and
information about the situation in Chile, the British informed the US of their current
considerations about relaxing the sanctioning policy, a move that Derian opposed. Derian
acknowledged that a policy debate was indeed going on in the White House and State
Department as to how hardline the stance should be, but she indicated her preference for a policy
modeled after Britain’s rather than one of accommodation.410 In fact, the British came out of that
meeting convinced that the US was likely to go even further than they were in regard to Chile,
choosing to vote against any form of international loans for Chile.411 All of this served to
convince the British that they should not consider changing their policy, since the Carter
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administration’s policy toward Chile—however it ended up in its final form—would be
beneficial to the British by reinforcing their position.412
Nevertheless, the British saw this as an opportunity to influence the Americans.
Following Rowlands’ meeting with the State Department, the British instructed their UN
delegation to use the Anglo/US bilateral talks on the UN “to encourage the Carter
Administration, which still has to formulate a clear policy on Chile, to adopt a stand similar to
our own.”413 From the British perspective, given the prominent place of Chile within British
foreign policy, American assistance with bringing about the same aims “could set an example for
those Western governments whose attitude to Chile has been less than whole-hearted.”414 In this
regard, the British would indeed succeed. The US assumed the mantle of leadership on Chile
within the UN under Carter, most notably in the aforementioned 1977 resolution on Chile. While
the British also believed that it was a bit more condemnatory than necessary, they still supported
the American draft bill, and voted in favor of the resolution.415 Additionally, the British were
among the few to highlight the inconsistency between the stated American policy toward Chile
and the close commercial and business ties between the two countries. This contrast became a
common topic of conversation between the British ambassador to the US and the American
government. The British were adamant that the Americans should not soften their position on
Chile at all.416
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What emerges, then, in the period from 1977 to 1979 is a clear convergence of AngloAmerican ideals about human rights and foreign policy in Chile. Chile had long been a source of
tension between the US and UK, from the Nixon-Heath debates over the threat posed by
Allende, to the Wilson government’s frustration that the Ford administration was not actively
addressing the human rights issues in Chile. Under Carter and Callaghan, however, the two
countries’ strategies were brought in sync, even though the Americans had more influence and
significance in Chile. Thus, at least for a brief span, Anglo-American Latin America policy was
running in tandem, rather than opposition, concerning Chile.

Human Rights in Argentina, 1977–79
When the Carter administration took office in 1977, relations with Argentina were in a
difficult place. The military coup that overthrew the Perón government had indeed been
welcomed, but human rights violations were already underway and only worsened after the
military cracked down on the opposition with counterterrorism measures, both within the
confines of Condor and within its own bureaucratic structures. Despite repeated complaints by
the United States government since 1976, the Argentines had made no progress on addressing
American concerns—a reality that should have surprised few, given Argentina’s historic
reputation as the Latin American state most impervious to American pressure.417 The advent of
the moralizing Baptist president and his even stronger concerns about human rights only
convinced General Videla, the president of Argentina, that the United States was more intent
than ever on making human rights a condition for aid and relations. As a result, “the human
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rights situation in Argentina bedevil[ed]” American-Argentine relations, causing a rapid
deterioration.418
For the Carter administration, there were two primary bilateral issues affecting relations
with Argentina. First and foremost was human rights. The United States number one goal and
priority was to see an end to the human rights abuses carried out by the Argentine government.
To achieve this goal, the United States cut Argentine military sales credits for 1978, and denied
access to already approved credits for 1977. The US also began expressing its concern for human
rights through its votes on loans for Argentina in the international financial institutions.419 All of
these were efforts to promote the American human rights policy in such a way as to pressure
Argentina into action. The second priority in American-Argentine relations, however, was
nuclear non-proliferation. Argentina had the most advanced nuclear program in Latin America,
and was the closest to becoming operational on its own accord. This was particularly troubling to
the United States since Argentina had not yet ratified the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the InterAmerican treaty that governed and inspected nuclear programs within the hemisphere through
the OAS. Argentina’s failure to ratify meant that any advances in its nuclear program would not
be inspected, and therefore not be safeguard under international protocol.420 It’s worth noting
that nuclear proliferation on the part of Argentina could have indeed constituted a substantial
geostrategic security threat that could endanger the wellbeing of the American nation. Yet, the
security concern was subordinated to the human rights concern. Repeatedly throughout the
administration, the State Department and NSC addressed the question of proliferation with the
Argentines, but never elevated the issue to enough of a concern to warrant reconsideration of the
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hardline stance on human rights. In 1978 there was some concern that human rights was the
reason for Argentina’s delay in ratifying the Treaty of Tlatelolco, but the US merely continued
its approach of trying to keep the “nuclear dialogue apart from the human rights issue,” rather
than reorienting its policy.421 This overarching concern for the deleterious effects of human
rights violations illustrates the e priorities of the Carter government: the risk of further alienating
Argentina into defiance of nuclear international agreements was not taken into sufficient
consideration.
Throughout 1977, matters only continued to deteriorate. The Argentine government
continually felt that it was attempting to make progress on human rights, only to have
Washington fail to acknowledge the progress and continue its punitive measures. The Argentine
leaders took a very negative and pessimistic approach to improved relations with the US, and
believed that the Americans failed to understand and appreciate the threat that terrorism posed to
Argentina.422 In 1978, however, Argentina took on even more prominence for American foreign
policy as the eyes of the world turned toward Buenos Aires for the 1978 World Cup. Among the
many foreign dignitaries on hand for Argentina’s victory at home was Henry Kissinger, who met
with the Argentine government while there. While there, Kissinger praised the Argentine
government for its advances in human rights, and his remarks were used by the countries of the
Southern Cone to undercut the Carter administration at the 1978 OAS General Assembly, much
to the disdain of the NSC.423 Furthermore, Pastor and others in the NSC saw Kissinger’s intent to
deliver a speech critical of Carter’s human rights policy just two weeks after getting back from
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Argentina as a major concern, but one that had to be handled delicately given the
administration’s need for Kissinger’s help securing the passage of the SALT II Treaty and other
international agreements.424 Yet, Kissinger had indeed raised a question that the administration
would consider: Was their policy working and were tangible steps being made in Argentina that
warranted policy revisions?
In response to a series of questions from Brzezinski regarding the status of policy toward
Argentina, Bob Pastor offered a thorough assessment of US policy. Kissinger had indeed been
correct that some improvements had been made in human rights, but Argentina was still
universally seen as one of “the world’s most serious human rights problem countries,” and the
country with “the worst record in the hemisphere.”425 Even still, the improvements did lead the
US government to relax its practice on voting against all loans to Argentina in the international
financial institutions, instead choosing to merely abstain, while it also approved some foreign
military sales. The government was also working toward an agreement with Argentina that
would spend its existing military sales credits before new congressional prohibitions went into
effect in October 1978.426 All of this was indicative of improved relations. Yet from Pastor’s
perspective, the State Department—who was driving most Argentina policy—had gone too far in
its punitive measures in that it was threatening to hurt American economic interests in
Argentina.427 Nevertheless, Pastor concluded that on the whole, “I think Kissinger’s observation
that if we don’t turn our policy around to the Southern Cone soon, we will have them allied
against us is out-of-date-and wrong. . . . What Kissinger failed to see, after completing his talks
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with the military leaders in Argentina and Brazil, is that Jimmy Carter has inspired a younger
generation of Latin Americans.”428 From Pastor’s perspective, that Argentina still desired close
relations with the US despite the overly punitive policies advocated and adopted by State
indicated that the US was indeed winning the battle in the Southern Cone.429
Pastor’s optimism, however, was soon tempered by his outrage over the way the State
Department was leaving the NSC out of policy development. When Secretary of State Cyrus
Vance and his team decided not to allow Argentina to use its remaining military sales credits,
Pastor declared, “This is just the latest set of decisions in a disastrous policy. We are exactly
back where we hoped we wouldn’t be: dribbling out decisions rather than agreeing to a
strategy.”430 While Pastor was not alone in his frustrations, his belief that American policy had
been disastrous was not shared by all within the White House. Citing the difficulties of working
with the Argentine government and its practice of making progress and then regressing, Jessica
Tuchman Matthews, the NSC’s human rights specialist, saw no way policy could have been
improved, as the US was merely reacting to what was happening in Argentina.431 Indeed,
Mathews’ assessment of the Argentine government’s pattern of progress and regress would
prove to be correct, as the 1979 human rights report on Argentina indicated that despite promises
to the contrary, no improvement had been made on the human rights front in 1978.432 As a result,
State advocated a re-hardening of policy toward Argentina, a move that the entire NSC staff
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opposed.433 Brzezinski advocated for delaying any policy change, noting that Argentina wanted
better relations with the US because "the US under Carter has the prestige and the morality
which could contribute to the idea that the Argentine military government is legitimate.”434 From
Brzezinski’s perspective, any hardening of the policy at the very moment that Argentina had
finally agreed to allow the Inter-American Human Rights Commission into the country could
potentially compromise American objectives. Ultimately, Brzezinski’s position would carry the
day, and rapprochement with Argentina occurred throughout 1979 and into 1980. The Carter
administration recognized the progress made on human rights by the Argentine government,
giving Argentina what it had long desired.435 Thus, what emerges from an analysis of the Carter
administration’s approach to Argentina is a clear emphasis on human rights that at times
prioritized human rights over other American interests and frequently was a source of conflict.
The debates over the severity of punitive actions indicate the extent to which many within the
administration believed human rights progress could be affected by the United States.
Throughout these debates, however, the inclusion of human rights and its near single-handed role
in determining the status of American-Argentine relations suggests a great deal about the way the
Carter administration approached national security.
Only one other country, outside the United States, experienced the same degree of
tension and difficulties with Argentina. Anglo-Argentine relations under Callaghan remained
troubled, albeit for more reasons than just human rights. To be sure, human rights figured
significantly into Britain’s already difficult relationship with Argentina from 1977 onward. In
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February 1977, the Labour party’s Latin America Study Group issued a report on the status of
human rights violations in Argentina and Chile, condemning human rights violations in
Argentina and the Argentine government’s collusion with Chile and the rest of the Southern
Cone in targeting political opponents.436 In doing so, the Labour Party connected their deeply
held concerns about human rights in Argentina to the ongoing debates over the Falklands, citing
the possibility of human rights violations against the islanders as a concern should the islands be
ceded to Argentina.437 In issuing such condemnations against Argentina, the Labour Party
connected itself to the efforts of the United States in pushing for greater progress in human rights
in Latin America, but also noted its deep-seated concerns about the extent to which the United
States still kept itself closely tied to the regimes in the Southern Cone. So the Anglo-American
convergence on the human rights issue was not as harmonious as it may have seemed at first
sight.438
Despite this condemnation of human rights violations in Argentina in February, the full
extent of Argentina’s violence in the Dirty Wars was not known to the British until the fall of
1977. The British received their first set of statistical evidence of the wide-scale human rights
violations in Argentina in October 1977.439 To the FCO’s South American desk, this information
was “fairly hair-raising stuff.”440 The confirmation of the estimated figures of disappearances
and political prisoners being held only further alarmed the FCO.441 Nevertheless, the British
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remained hemmed in on human rights in Argentina, unable to come down as aggressively as they
did in Chile. In speaking notes prepared for Ted Rowlands before a meeting with the Committee
for Human Rights in Argentina, the official line remained that, “The existence of the Falkland
Islands dispute inevitably limits our capacity to act effectively over human rights in
Argentina.”442 In this vein, the British government instead chose to use its position as a member
of the EEC as its vehicle for expressing opposition to the human rights situation in Argentina,
letting the EEC as a collective whole work toward resolution of the problem.443 Additionally, the
government noted that the types of military equipment that it was selling to the Argentine
government, namely frigates, could not be used for human rights violations, and thus, it saw no
reason to suspend military aid.444 As part of that meeting, Rowlands was confronted about the
hypocrisy between Britain’s ban on aid to Chile but its continued sales to Argentina. Rowlands
admitted that “Chile was treated as a special case; HMG’s policy toward Chile was therefore an
exception to the norm, whereas our policy toward Argentina was not.”445 In making such a
statement, Rowlands clearly reinforced the limitations of the Labour government’s commitment
to human rights as a component of national security determinations.
In light of Britain’s unwillingness to strongly condemn human rights abuses in Argentina,
many human rights activists attempted to use the publicity coming from the 1978 World Cup to
put pressure on the government to take a more hardline stance. Even though they lacked the
support for a British boycott of the event, they human rights lobby in Britain was able to utilize
the press and mass vigils to build popular support for the promotion of human rights. Despite
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their success in mobilizing the public to bombard the FCO with letters, the campaign failed to
achieve much success with members of parliament.446 Regardless, public opinion did begin to
change both within and without. By January 1979, pressure had resulted in the government
changing its policy on arms sales. While stopping short of an all-out arms embargo (out of fear
of repercussions on the Falklands situation), the Labour government did cease selling any
equipment that could be used against the Argentine population or the Falklands.447 And yet these
guidelines would not be consistently implemented, and the Falklands, not human rights, would
continue to drive the British policy toward Argentina.448
When taken together, the American and British approaches to Argentina could not be
much more different. While the British espoused a condemnation of human rights violations in
the country, human rights assumed a lower priority than economic and strategic interests. While
the United States also approved some arms sales to the Argentines during this period, it took a
much harder stance on the situation than did the British. Even when the State Department and
NSC disagreed over the severity of actions toward Argentina, the United States’ policy still
represented an unrelenting and uncompromising commitment to the protection of human rights
first and foremost. Additionally, the Carter administration did not display the same level of
discrepancy between its approach to Argentina and Chile that the Callaghan government did in
Britain. While there were indeed differences in the way the United States approached Chile and
Argentina, the approach to both countries represented a consistent implementation of the
administration’s policy on human rights. Thus, while there may have been convergence in the
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Anglo-American approach to Chile, the same could not be said for the nature of policy toward
Argentina.

The Iron Lady and Common Dictators, 1979–1980
By 1979, internal issues within the UK were plaguing the Callaghan government, who
was becoming increasingly belabored. When the Labour government was unable to deal with the
mounting threats posed by the oil strike in Britain, Callaghan’s government fell to a vote of no
confidence in April 1979, forcing him to dissolve parliament and call for an immediate election.
In the May election, the Conservatives returned to power, catapulting their relatively new leader
Margaret Thatcher into the premiership.449 Thatcher, who had won the Conservative Party
leadership election rather unexpectedly in 1975 over former Prime Minister Ted Heath, was not
an experienced foreign policy expert or leader, and in 1979, was struggling to solidify her control
within her own party. As such, she surrounded herself with a number of able advisors with
decades of experience, none more so than the new Foreign Secretary, Lord Carrington.450 Under
Thatcher and Carrington, Britain would rebuff a number of longstanding policy approaches in
Latin America taken by the Labour government, as the FCO sought its opportunity to correct
what it had perceived for some time as an unfair and excessive strategy for dealing with
Argentina and Chile.451 After a period of convergence in Anglo-American Latin America policy
brought about the emphasis of both Carter and the Labour Party on human rights, the election of
Thatcher signaled that divergence was on the horizon. Nevertheless, the Thatcher government
identified close relations with the United States as one of the cornerstones of its foreign policy,
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and so even in moments of divergence, policy changes were to be made after Anglo-American
consultation.452
With Chile, the conservative government was far less interested or concerned with the
situation than their Labour predecessors. Labour, after all, admittedly acknowledged that its
focus and approach to Chile was unique and a departure from the norm.453 Many conservative
politicians did not believe that Latin America was a region of great importance, and Chile in
particular was never even discussed in one of Thatcher’s cabinet meetings. In fact, prior to the
outbreak of the Falklands War, the Oversea and Defence Committee—the closest equivalent to
the NSC within the British cabinet system—only discussed Chile once.454 This general absence
of Chile in policy conversations was not just the result of disinterest; it also signified a degree of
agreement and lack of dispute over the policy approach itself. Thatcher herself saw little reason
to be critical of the Pinochet government. Writing about him after her retirement and his arrest
for crimes against humanity, she recalled:
I do not know how I would have felt if I had thought he was guilty of great crimes. I
would still have considered his arrest wrong. . . . But I never had to wrestle with that
problem because although I could not be sure about every detail of every accusation, I
was and am convinced that General Pinochet by his actions turned Chile into the free and
prosperous country we see today.455
In light of such assessments of the good done by Pinochet for Chile in saving it from what she
perceived to be a sure destruction at the hands of socialism, it is of little wonder that the Thatcher
government sought to relax the extremely hardline approach taken by Wilson and Callaghan.
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The first order of business in Chile was to restore the British Ambassador, whom the
Wilson government had withdrawn in protest in 1975 over the torture of British physician, Dr.
Sheila Cassidy. In a memo to Thatcher on September 17, 1979, Carrington identified the return
of the ambassador to Santiago as an immediate concern that should be addressed diligently and
thoughtfully. From Carrington’s perspective, the continued withdrawal of the ambassador did
nothing to improve relations with Chile, change Chile’s actions on human rights, or resolve the
still ongoing dispute over the treatment of Dr. Cassidy.456 The only real question, then, was not
if, but when, Britain should announce its intent to restore Her Majesty’s ambassador to Chile.
One of the biggest questions complicating the when was the status of US-Chilean relations. By
1979, the United States had identified the assassins in the Letelier case and had asked the
Chilean government to extradite them to the US to stand trial, but the Pinochet government
refused. Careful to not complicate Anglo-American relations, the British opted to wait on
announcing their decision about the ambassador until they knew for certain what actions the
United States intended to take in response to Chile’s intransigence over extradition.457 In
December 1979, Carrington and Vance discussed the situation, at which time the secretary
informed his counterpart that the US was sending its ambassador back to Chile and was instead
only embargoing aid. From the American perspective, it “was always better to have an
ambassador in country, whatever the difficulties.”458 Having thus guaranteed that the decision
would not result in unintended consequences for the special relationship, Britain informed the
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Chileans of its intent to return its ambassador to Santiago, which took effect February 20,
1980.459
Additionally, with an ambassador in place, the government set to work to lift the arms
embargo upon Chile, as it was seen as negatively affecting British economic interests, and only
further reducing the likelihood of gaining Chilean arms contracts in the future.460 Ambassador
John Heath took advantage of opportunities to address the human rights issue with the Chilean
government, knowing that agreements toward progress on human rights would make it possible
to lift the arms embargo. Having secured these victories in early July, the government saw its
moment.461 Less than three weeks later, Lord Carrington announced the lifting of the arms
embargo on Chile, a move the government had long supported. Human rights had never been a
meaningful concern for the Thatcher government, but it remained a substantial enough issue
within public opinion that it did require at least token gestures from the government before
making significant policy changes.462
Meanwhile, similar moves were underway in Argentina, as the British attempted to
improve relations with the Argentine junta in hopes of achieving a more amicable settlement
over the still contentious Falklands issue—the cloud hanging over all aspects of Anglo-Argentine
relations. Critical to all decisions with regard to Argentina was a move by the conservative
government to de-emphasize human rights and remove it as a precondition for determinations
about Britain’s security and economic interests. Both the head of the chancery in Buenos Aires
and Hugh Carless, the British chargé d’affaires, encouraged the government to back away from
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its heavy handed emphasis on human rights in 1979. In an assessment of the status of the
subversive war, Carless concluded, “The lesson for HMG and other likeminded governments is
that the low-key approaches to express our concern about individual cases is the method most
likely to produce results in the field of human rights” noting that “strident foreign criticism of
Argentina’s human rights record is not likely to be productive—quite apart from any
exacerbating bilateral issue, such as the Falkland Islands.”463 This decision was accepted by
those in power, to the point that the British did not make any informal appeals to the Argentine
government on human rights after 1978.464
With the Thatcher government predisposed to back down from the emphasis on human
rights, the door was open for the government to achieve the return of its ambassador to Buenos
Aires. After all, disputes over the human rights issue had been the prevailing obstacle in the
restoration of ambassadorial relations (even if it had not been the direct cause for withdrawal).
The Argentine Foreign minister had been the first in January to recommend the move, but the
Labour government had been unwilling to make the necessary concessions to restore proper
relations. Upon the conservative takeover in May, Minister of Sate Nicholas Ridley personally
visited Argentina in July and announced the decision to normalize relations between the two
states. To the Argentines, this decision seemed a positive step in bringing about a resolution of
the Falklands dispute.465 The British, however, saw all of these moves as designed to bring
about improved relations with the Argentine government and reduce the likelihood of a conflict
over the Falklands. Thus, by January 1981, the policy approach of the British government had
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moved dramatically away from that of the United States. While the Carter administration
continued its emphasis on human rights at all costs, the Thatcher government rapidly
decentralized human rights and instead sought to normalize relations and support the regimes in
Chile and Argentina. This divergence in policy again demonstrated the way that both sides
conceived of and defined the core interests of the state and the place of Latin America in national
security policy.

Human Rights and the Understanding of National Security in Latin America
The latter-half of the 1970s saw a concerted effort on the part of both the United States
and Great Britain to pursue a new foreign policy that was guided by human rights. While
emphasis on human rights and its place in foreign policy was not new in 1974 or 1977, the
prominence that was attached to it was certainly greater than had been seen previously. In doing
so, both countries changed their definitions of national security as they reoriented their policies.
This was not an accidental or unintentional change. In PRM 17, as part of identifying the
direction of the United States’ Latin America policy, the Carter administration listed as a guiding
principle, the “Diversification of Political and Economic Relationships,” defining this as
showing “a greater tolerance for regimes of widely different political philosophies,
distinguishing on the basis of their respect for fundamental human rights.”466 Despite claiming
that these guiding principles were merely “a new approach—rather than a new policy,” the
reality of this decision was that it stood in direct contrast to the policies of the United States
under Nixon and Ford, where a state’s political ideology was critical to the conception of
protecting national security. Whereas previously, the fear of socialism had led the United States
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government to see national security threats in places that did not actually threaten American
security, now human rights would be the measuring stick by which all threats were assessed. In
both cases, the definition of national security was unmoored from its foundation in realist
thought, but nevertheless, the Carter administration redefined it in a still new and distinct way
from before.
Additionally, the hard line approach taken by the US was not motivated by any real
security concern in Argentina and Chile. In assessing the threats in the region, the Carter
administration concluded that “U.S. security is not currently threatened” anywhere in Latin
America.467 Furthermore, the study went on to specifically identify the United States’ national
security interests, listing “access to lines of communication, the Panama Canal, and essential
bases.”468 Tied to this, was a belief that the national security of the United States was enhanced
when it was able to provide Latin America with a “sense of security that is essential for their
development.”469 Such a stance is interesting, in that the United States’ human rights
commitments resulted in massive arms embargos against Argentina and Chile, going beyond just
munitions that could be used against its civilians. This caused alarm in Chile for instance, where
the regime in Santiago frequently felt as if their security was under threat by “Peruvian
revanchism and the Peruvians’ new arsenal of Soviet Weapons.”470 In this regard, then, it could
even be argued that the United States, in choosing to emphasize human rights over all other
concerns, was actually contradicting and counteracting its traditionally defined national security
goals through its redefinition of national security to include human rights. In doing so, Carter’s
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redefinition of national security allowed him to see human rights violations as a potential threat
by virtue of destabilizing the region and tarnishing the reputation of the US as the main guardian
of freedom and democracy in Latin America. In doing so, Carter was able to reconcile his call
for self-determination with his commitements to human rights.
From the British perspective, the human rights pivot began earlier and ended sooner, but
nevertheless, at least toward Chile, was as pronounced a focus as it was in the United States. The
Labour governments’ approach toward the human rights violations in Chile (and to a lesser
degree Argentina) were met with a radical policy departure from the conservative approach of
the Heath government and the subsequent Thatcher government. In doing so, human rights
became the standard by which Britain assessed its policy and security decisions toward Chile.
Yet, what also becomes clear, is that for the British, Chile was more of a special case than the
rule. Chile and Argentina were far from the only military dictatorships in Latin America in the
1970s. All of the Southern Cone, as well as Brazil, were ruled by dictatorships, and yet the
British still maintained good relations with all of them at the same time that they had no
ambassador in either Santiago or Buenos Aires. In this regard, then, it is clear that British
national security policy as pertained to Chile and Argentina was more affected by the domestic
political realities and convictions of the Labour Party and its constituents rather than any
grounding in the geostrategic interests of the state.471 Furthermore, while the Falklands was
arguably not of any great geostrategic interest (as will be argued in more detail in the next
chapter), the mere presence of British civilians in the Falklands could be sufficient to argue that
punitive measures that led to a deterioration of relations with the Argentine government over
human rights actually undercut Britain’s national security. Thus, in the final assessment, the
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human rights pivot in the foreign policy of the United States and Great Britain in the 1970s
represented a policy convergence, as both sides moved toward a similar redefinition of national
security. This new definition, with its human rights emphasis, ran contrary to the traditional
understandings of national security and represented a significant, even if short-lived, change to
the way the two countries understood and acted upon national security.
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Chapter 5
“The most important single test . . . since Suez:” Great Britain, the Falklands War, and the
Special Relationship

The Falklands War was a watershed moment in recent British history. It served as a
defining moment for the Thatcher government, as a pivotal reassertion of British power on the
world stage. It was seen by many at home as a resounding victory against an unjust Argentine
invasion of British territory, and resulted in a significant popular uptick in support for the
Thatcher government.472 The Falklands Conflict, however, was more than just a turning point for
a belabored Conservative government. It was a critical test of the enduring nature of the special
relationship between the United States and Great Britain. In a 1982 post-mortem report on the
United States’ policy on the Falklands Conflict, British Ambassador to the United States, Sir
Nicholas Henderson, concluded, “The Falklands Crisis was the most important single test of
US/UK relations certainly since Suez and possibly since the end of World War Two.”473 Such an
assessment by one of Her Majesty’s most seasoned diplomats is certainly nothing to be taken
lightly. The fact of the matter remains that for much of the conflict, British policy with regard to
the Falklands crisis ran contrary to that of the United States. In doing so, it forced the United
States to choose between two special relationships—Latin America or the United Kingdom. As a
result of these intentional British decisions, strain was placed upon Thatcher’s relationship with
the United States. While the strain was ultimately resolved, the Falklands crisis nevertheless
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represented a significant moment for the special relationship itself, as the British began to
redefine the nature of the alliance and reassert its position with regard to its transatlantic partner.

The Anglo-Argentine Falklands Dispute to 1982
Anglo-American conversations about activities in the South Atlantic were far from new
in 1982. In fact, the US and Britain’s discussions over the sovereignty of the Falklands and the
British policy toward the islands were nearly as old as the British claim to the islands itself.
Britain’s claims to the Falklands Islands originate in 1765, when it claimed the territory, which
had already been claimed by France, and was subsequently sold to Spain. This claim, however,
became more complicated, when in 1831, three American fishing vessels and their captains were
seized off the coast of the Falklands Islands by the Argentine government. The dispute between
Argentina and Britain was amplified by the US Ambassador to Buenos Aires, Francis Baylies,
and his predecessor, US Consul George Slacum, who cited the British claims of sovereignty over
the islands as justification for the illegal nature of Argentina’s actions. Slacum had first been
alerted to this possibility by the British envoy out of an attempt to maintain British interests in a
negotiation between the US and Argentina. Instead, it became exactly what the US needed to
reject the validity of the Argentinian actions all together.474 Once Baylies arrived in Buenos
Aires, he not only continued to advance the British position with Argentina, he also took matters
even further, offering a quid pro quo to the British in which the United States would endorse the
assertion of British sovereignty, in exchange for a recognition of US fishing rights along the
island.475 While Baylies’ offer was not sanctioned by the Jackson Administration, nor seriously
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entertained by the British, it does represent the extent to which the United States endorsed
Britain in the early years the Anglo-Argentine dispute over the Falklands. When the British
seized control of the islands in 1833, just a few short months later, the United States chose not to
invoke the Monroe Doctrine, itself an acknowledgment of the US government’s belief that
Britain maintained a pre-1823 claims to the islands.
From 1833 to 1968, Britain’s claims to its sovereignty over the Falklands remained
largely unchallenged. As Klaus Dodds has shown, it was during this period that the Falklands
became a critical component of Britain’s South Atlantic Empire, which was predominantly
targeted at its protection of territorial rights in Antarctica. For the most part, the Falklands were
not part of the question of British imperial decline, as the islands had a small, native population,
and the colonists who lived there were content to remain part of the empire.476 Nevertheless, the
century and a half dispute with Argentina would soon reemerge. By the mid-1960s, the British
government was ready to resolve its longstanding conflict with the Southern Cone state.
Following the 1960 creation of the UN Committee on the Situation with Regard to Granting of
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, the UN General Assembly approved a 1965
resolution calling on the British and Argentines “to proceed without delay” on negotiations over
the status of the territory, and to report back to the UN on its progress.477 Following the
resolution, the British and Argentines entered a fruitful round of negotiations, culminating in a
draft memorandum of understanding (MOU) in which the Wilson government was prepared to
cede the small island chain once the interests of the British community on the islands were all
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agreed upon.478 Given the willingness of the British to negotiate and the relatively small
population of Brits on the island, this should have been a straight forward and easy negotiation.
From 1968 until 1982, Conservative and Labour governments alike went round-after-round of
international arbitration with the Argentines, but to no avail.479 Despite the progress made in the
first round of negotiations, news of the MOU was greeted with unexpected parliamentary
opposition in Britain and opposition from the Islanders themselves, prompting the government to
declare that any such agreement between the UK and Argentina over the Falklands would have
to be done in accordance with the wishes of the islanders themselves. 480
The credit for this largely debated territorial negotiation lies with the newly created
Falklands Lobby. Following the Wilson government, and especially his newly created Foreign
and Commonwealth Office’s (FCO) decision to make the Falklands inhabitants more amenable
to Argentine control in 1968, Governor Haskard, the Colonial Office-appointed governor, came
to Britain to drive home the British identity of the all-white Falklands residents and express their
deeply held opposition to Argentine sovereignty. Despite Haskard’s best efforts, however, the
Islands’ executive council (and its unofficial members) were unconvinced of his success. On
their own accord, they took to the British Press and parliament, creating the Falklands Island
Emergency Committee (FIEC), later the UK Falklands Islands Committee (UKFIC). This group
of politicians and activists capitalized the media and the three major political parties. By the mid1970s, there was substantial support within the metropole for maintaining control of the
Falklands Islands, based largely upon the desires of the islanders themselves.481
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Nevertheless, the Falklands continued to be an international dispute, monitored closely
by countries throughout the world. The UN continued to pass resolutions calling on Argentina
and Britain to accelerate the negotiation process so as to resolve their disputes as soon and
possible and restore the territorial integrity of the Falklands, something the special committee on
decolonization felt the British grossly violated when they seized the islands in 1833.482
Nevertheless, negotiations continued to progress, as the hope of a settlement continued to remain
high. In 1974, both the Tory government of Ted Heath and the Labour government of Harold
Wilson had supported an agreement to have a condominium in the Falklands, in which the
territory would be jointly administered under a co-sovereign agreement by both states.483
Nevertheless, like the previous agreement, this plan was also rejected in response to the desires
of the islanders. While it is impossible to know whether or not such a policy of shared, co-equal
governance would have produced an effective, permanent resolution of the long-standing
conflict, that the British and Argentines were willing to attempt such a model says a great deal
about the desire of both sides to reduce the tension in the Anglo-Argentine relationship.
By the mid-1970s, however, the need for the British to resolve the conflict over the
Falklands was beginning to take on significant economic ramifications. With the economy in a
tailspin in 1976, to the point that Wilson resigned (although ostensibly not over the economy)
and was replaced by Callaghan, the threat of a potential conflict in the South Atlantic brought
with it the specter of astronomical defense costs. For an economy that was already struggling, the
threat of a costly war to defend a territory no bigger than the Falklands and with as small a
British population as the Falklands seemed irresponsible to the Callaghan government. As such,
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the government was more disposed toward a negotiated settlement, even if it had to do so
without its ambassador (who had been withdrawn at Argentine request in 1975).484 Even still,
attempts at reaching a settlement stalled. After more than a decade of negotiations, matters
seemed to be no closer to a settlement than they were in 1965; if anything, they were further
from it.
The inability to arrive at a settlement in many ways also reflects a change in the British
perception of the Falklands and their understanding of the islands’ significance for British
interests. Following the election of the Labour Government in 1974 and the military coup in
Argentina in 1975, human rights became a prominent issue in the Falklands, as it did elsewhere.
In a statement on the situation in Argentina and Chile in 1977, the Labour Party’s National
Executive Committee concluded that given the current state of human rights violations in
Argentina, they could not in good conscience recommend turning the Falklands over to
Argentina, knowing that they would likely soon become victims of Argentine state-sponsored
terrorism.485 According to Hugh Bicheno, a member of the embassy staff in Buenos Aires,
Callaghan had personally gone so far as to exclaim, “I’m not handing over a thousand eight
hundred Britons to a gang of fucking fascists.”486 Such strong sentiments from the prime minister
indicate the extent to which human rights indeed played into the conversation about the
Falklands. It had been one thing to suggest turning the islands over a decade before; it was
another matter to turn the islands over to a government that you knew were in the throes of
committing grave human rights atrocities against its perceived enemies.
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Human rights were not the only concern for Britain, however. As Grace Livingstone has
so effectively shown, while not the primary motivation, oil certainly figured prominently into the
conversations being had in parliament and cabinet meetings about the future of the Falklands.487
In 1971, the British government commissioned its first geological survey of the waters
surrounding the Falklands, concluding in 1975 that they possessed a strong commercial
potential.488 By the time the study’s conclusions were ready in 1975, the British Department of
Energy was keenly interested in the results, as it was being heavily lobbied by British
corporations hoping to profit on the newly available oil reserves.489 The evidence produced from
the 1971 study was sufficient for Callaghan, then foreign minister, to suggest to Wilson that joint
Anglo-Argentine access to oil reserves around the Falklands could be a possible angle to achieve
progress in the negotiation without giving up British sovereignty—a plan the Argentines
rebuffed.490 Despite its failure to open a door to more constructive dialogue, the interest in oil in
the Falklands only increased from the private sector as the world found itself reeling from the oil
shocks and energy crises of the mid-1970s. Nevertheless, from 1977–79, the British were willing
to cede the oil rights to Argentina in exchange for maintaining sovereignty, fearful of what it
would look like politically if they sold the Falklands out in the name of maintaining access to
oil.491 While the decision to cede oil rights shows that oil was only a marginal interest of the
British government, the consideration of oil rights as such a prominent issue indicates its
significance for the way Britain defined its interests in the Falklands.
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Finally, the UK had yet a third significant interest in the Falklands—Antarctica. As was
noted above, the British fundamentally conceived of the Falklands as part of their broader South
Atlantic Empire, not the least of which was their territorial and research holdings in Antarctica.
That the Falklands, under an unfriendly regime, could become a threat to access to Antarctica
was not lost on anyone at the time. US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, sensing the way that
Argentina envisioned controlling the islands, famously described the Falklands as “a dagger
pointed at the heart of Antarctica.”492 The Falklands were merely one of several island chains
controlled by the British. The others, the South Georgia Islands and the Sandwich Islands, were
more intimately connected to the work of the British Antarctic Survey, but nevertheless, all three
island chains were a subject of dispute between the UK and Argentina, and all three represented
significant components of British control and access to the Antarctic.493 Failure to keep any one
of the three archipelagos could potentially endanger the control of the others. For British
officials, it represented a domino theory of decolonization. Collectively, the emphasis on human
rights, the potential for oil, and the concern over access to the Antarctic all affected British
policy toward the Falklands by the late-1970s. Such considerations entered into Britain’s
conception of its national security, making the Falkland Islands more than just dots on a map. By
connecting the Falkland Islands to core notions of economic and geostrategic interests in the
form of energy and natural resources, the British had established traditional, national security
concerns that could be affected by the Falkland Islands. Given the islands’ significance to these
strategic interests, Britain presumably could not afford to lose the territory.

492

Henry Kissinger, quoted in Peter Calvert, “The Argentine Malvinas Factor,” in Alex Danchev, ed.,
International Perspectives, 51.
493
Dodds, Pink Ice, 142–45.

157

When Margaret Thatcher entered office in 1979, there was a noticeably different feel in
Britain with regard to the Falklands than a decade earlier. On the whole, Thatcher, much like her
predecessors, was not overly concerned with Latin America. Upon coming to power, the
Conservative government quickly downplayed its concern over human rights issues in Chile, as
Thatcher backed the anti-communist military dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet, and overlooked
the same human rights violations of Argentine President, General Galtieri.494 The real turning
point, however, would be the Falklands Crisis, which “was the point where Latin America forced
itself into the forefront of the British political agenda for the first time since the early years of the
[nineteenth] century.”495 When the Thatcher government took office, negotiations were already
under way, and had been for over a decade. The government was largely looking to settle the
issue along the plans of a leaseback strategy, which would give the islands officially back to
Argentina, with the British leasing it for the next 50-75 years.496 The problem with such a plan,
however, was that the British were adamant that no solution would be arrived at without the
consent and support of the islanders themselves, and in the case of the leaseback solution, the
islanders overwhelmingly rejected it. This became the sticking point on nearly all negotiations
between the UK and Argentina.
The August 1981 seizure of power within the Argentine government by General Galtieri
signaled a turning point in the dispute between the two sides. Galtieri was much more committed
to restoring what he believed to be rightful Argentine control of Las Malvinas. This set the stage
for a contested series of negotiations in New York in February 1982. In advance of that meeting,
the Argentine government had indicated that they were seeking full sovereignty, and only full
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sovereignty—anything less would be unacceptable. This hardline approach seemed to doom the
meetings from the start, with the British delegation unwilling to entertain any questions to the
British claims over the islands.497 When talks failed, and sensing the growing tension over the
issue, Thatcher ordered the creation of a contingency plan on March 8.498 These contingency
plans would be needed sooner than any could have predicted, however. Within just a few weeks,
the Foreign Minister, Lord Carrington, was convinced that a showdown with Argentina over the
Falklands would occur sooner than later.499 That fear was confirmed, when on April 2, 1982, an
Argentine naval fleet landed on South Georgia Island.

Argentina and the Falklands Question
From the British perspective, Argentina’s invasion of the Falklands was an unprovoked
act of war against Her Majesty’s territory that must be responded to with the full weight and
force of the British military. Yet, the Argentinians believed their actions were merely an act of
reasserting their sovereignty and claim to a territory that had been wrongfully taken from them.
Citing the original occupation of the islands, Iles Malouines (later Malvinas), by France (and the
subsequent French sale of the territory to Spain) as the actual rights of ownership to the territory,
Argentina claimed the territory after its independence from Spain. The 1833 British seizure of
the Falklands and its subsequent occupation came after forty years of uncontested Spanish rule,
turned Argentine rule.500 Under international law, the legal transfer of land from France to Spain
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to Argentina represented a legitimate, and valid claim to the territory. When the UN’s special
committee on decolonization first took up the Falklands/Malvinas question in 1964, the
Argentine government asserted its claims to the territory, arguing that, “The Malvinas Islands are
in a different situation from that of the classic colonial case. De facto and de jure, they belonged
to the Argentine Republic in 1833 and were governed by Argentine authorities and occupied by
Argentine settlers.”501 Under such conditions, then, the British would have been guilty of the
hostile seizure of territory that it had no claim to under international law. As such, Argentina
would have maintained its right to justifiably evict the British colonial authorities.
Furthermore, from Argentina’s perspective, the claims to the Malvinas went deeper than
just original ownership. In an advertisement taken out in the New York Times in the midst of the
Falklands War in April 1982, a pro-Argentine lobbying firm in the US noted that Argentina’s
claims to the islands stood in stark contrast to Britain, who had no geographic claim and only a
historical claim of invasion. Argentina on the other hand, was just 250 miles from the Malvinas,
and argued that Britain had historically accepted Spanish ownership of the territories under
treaties in the eighteenth century. Furthermore, the Argentines cited the efforts of the UN to
encourage negotiation and Britain’s refusal in reaching a settlement as evidence of their own
righteous cause.502 The advertisement concluded that on April 2, “After 149 years of Argentina’s
claim of sovereignty and 17 years of negotiations which Great Britain rejected or evaded,
Argentina has recovered the Malvinas without casualties to a single British inhabitant or
soldier.”503 While the advertisement in the New York Times was clearly designed to persuade the
American people of the righteousness of Argentina’s action, characterizing the British as 18th
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century imperialists, its perspective nevertheless represents very real nationalist sentiments in
Argentina about the Falklands/Malvinas dispute. The geostrategic and historical connections
between Argentina and the Malvinas made the territory much more than just another item in a
trophy case of conquered territory. For Argentina, the opportunity to “establish possession over
the petroleum, fishing, krill, and other maritime resources and to control access as well as fortify
its claim to a corresponding sector of Antarctica,” represented all powerful motivations for
action.504 Thus, Britain’s subsequent response to the Argentine invasion of the Falklands must be
understood through the lens of the international legal climate and competing nationalist
ambitions at work on both sides of the dispute. The Argentines claimed, their actions were
justified. From Britain’s perspective, they were an act of war.

British Policy during the Falklands War
The invasion of the Falklands by Argentina caused an obvious uproar within Britain. This
was seen as an attack by a foreign power upon British soil. The British immediately began to
mobilize domestic and international support for a counteraction against the Argentines. On April
3, they introduced a resolution before an emergency meeting of the UN Security Council,
condemning Argentina’s actions and demanding an immediate withdrawal of Argentine forces in
the Falklands. The resolution passed by a vote of ten to one with four abstentions. The lone
opposing vote had come from Panama in a show of regional solidarity and support for
Argentina’s opposition to what it believed was British colonialism.505 Beyond action in the
Security Council, Britain encouraged many of its closest allies to condemn Argentine actions. In
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the immediate aftermath of the invasion, the United States, NATO, the Council of Europe, and
the foreign ministers of the European Community all expressed their opposition to Argentina’s
armed invasion and called for a peaceful resolution of the conflict.506 French President Francois
Mitterrand even took the initiative to call the prime minister personally to express his sincerest
sympathy for the plight they were experiencing and offer to the full support of the French
people.507 The significant level of international opposition to the Argentine invasion convinced
the British of the righteousness of their cause, and caught the Argentines off guard, since they
had “thought there would be a fuss maybe, but not much more.”508 Yet building international
consensus for British action was only half of the battle for the Thatcher government. She still had
to pacify nationalist sentiment at home, not the least of which was her own indignation over the
incident.
In an address to the House of Commons, Prime Minister Thatcher reiterated the British
sovereignty and the desires of the British citizens on the island, while stating, “We cannot allow
the democratic rights of the Islanders to be denied by the territorial ambitions of Argentina.”509
In the eyes of the British, the invasion of the Falklands was an affront of many deeply held
western, democratic values. In a policy guidance memo, Lord Francis Pym, the new Foreign
Secretary following Lord Carrington’s resignation over the Falklands dispute, informed the
British diplomatic corps across the globe that beyond the obvious classification of the attack as
an unprovoked act of war, Her Majesty’s Government believed that the Falklands invasion was
an act of aggression that must be checked, lest it lead to “much graver crises later,” a seeming
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reference to Britain’s historical experience at Munich in 1938.510 Additionally, the British
rejected the prevailing international sentiment that the Falkland Islands were being held as a
British colonial possession, and instead argued that it was Argentina who was attempting to
subvert the will of the Falklands inhabitants, violating the self-determination of the Falkland
Islanders, and acting in a manner “tantamount to colonialism.”511 The British efforts to
characterize the Argentine actions in the Falklands in this manner reflected the extent to which
they were attempting to build both international and domestic consensus behind their own
actions. Argentina acting first actually allowed the British to assume the moral high ground, as
they appeared to be the ones committed to peaceful resolution of the conflict rather than force.
While the British were certainly not opposed to the use of force in response to Argentine actions,
any decision to do so would allow them to claim innocence for starting the conflict and justify
their actions in the name of self-defense and the high-minded liberal ideals of self-determination
and democracy.
In light of the overwhelming international support for the British position, the British
government adopted a number of economic sanctions on Argentina, including suspension of
export credit, a blockade of all imports, and freezing Argentine assets in the UK.512 While at
least publicly hopeful that diplomacy would prevail, Britain privately believed that the conflict
would require military intervention on their part, and subsequently dispatched a naval fleet to the
islands, authorizing them to attack any Argentine ships in the waters off the Falklands.513 Citing
Argentina’s failure to abide by resolution 502 and its demands of immediate troop withdrawal,
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the British argued that sending troops of their own was merely a function of exercising the right
to self-defense.514 Meanwhile, the British offered their full cooperation to the mission led by US
Secretary of State Alexander Haig to achieve a peaceable solution. While the British hoped to be
able to resolve things diplomatically, they nevertheless were committed to their principles and
their refusal to surrender either their sovereignty or the people of the Falkland Islands to
Argentina. The British also knew that that any military effort, should matters come to that, would
need the support of the United States against Argentina. From the British perspective, however,
the Haig negotiations seemed a win-win scenario. On the one hand, the nature of shuttle
diplomacy took time for Haig to go back and forth between the two involved parties, which
allowed the British fleet the necessary time to mobilize and sail to the Falklands.515 Additionally,
Haig was well aware of the British perspective on the situation and was, himself, admittedly proBritish, despite having been the architect of much of the progress made in improving relations
with Argentina.516 Knowing this, the British were confident that Haig would advance their
interests and convey their position adequately to the Argentines, careful not to arrive at any
negotiated settlement that would be politically costly to the British government. In fact,
throughout the diplomatic process, Haig reassured the British ambassador in Washington that he
would “hang very tough” in his conversations with the Argentines.517 Thus, as negotiations
began, the British remained confident that they would eventually carry the day.
Despite the efforts of Haig, the gap between the British and Argentine positions was
simply too far to successfully bridge. In their frequent conversations with Haig, the British
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maintained that any attempt at settlement would have to involve Argentine withdrawal from the
islands, a provisional government that explicitly committed to protecting the rights of the
islanders, and an open window for the conclusion of negotiations over the long-term settlement
of the sovereignty and territorial dispute. From the Argentine perspective, these terms were
designed to prolong the status quo ante bellum by creating a system in which the two sides
would continue to go round after round in round in bilateral negotiations, only to make no
progress. As such, the Argentines flatly rejected the British conditions for negotiation in lateApril.518 With Argentina rejecting the terms, Britain portrayed itself as the rational actor with
reasonable terms who was tasked with negotiating with an unstable, intransigent government in
the military junta.519 This view was only strengthened by reports from Haig following his
conversations with Galtieri and foreign minister Costa Mendez. 520 Britain’s policy only became
even more clearly defined as a result of the failed negotiations. The overwhelming perspective in
Britain was that Argentina was being belligerent and unreasonable, and this made London’s
actions all the more justifiable.
Following failed negotiations and with aid from the Americans, the British began military
operations against the Argentine force on May 1, 1982. While the Thatcher government
remained ostensibly committed to achieving a diplomatic solution, by May, she had become
convinced that “without effective military pressure, the Argentine leaders will not be brought to
implement Security Council Resolution 502.”521 As such, she gave the green light to begin the
aerial and naval components of the conflict, all the while hoping that they would not end up in a
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formally declared war with Argentina.522 Thatcher did acknowledge that as Prime Minister, the
blood of every British soldier lost would be on her hands, and, accordingly, was anxious to keep
the conflict from devolving into a catastrophic military showdown. As a preventative measure,
even after initiating military action, she continued to push for economic sanction and other
methods of starving Argentina into submission. She called on the US, Japan, the commonwealth
countries, and her European allies to go even further in their economic sanctions in hopes that it
would bring Argentina to its knees without requiring tremendous loss of British life.523 Thatcher
was indeed reluctant to use war as a means of conflict resolution. Like many of her counterparts
in the EEC, Thatcher had learned the lessons of the world wars, and had increasingly become
wary of wreaking such destruction and havoc upon the continent again. The UK had largely
withdrawn from notions of power exertion that privileged the military over more diplomatic
alternatives. As John Mueller has observed, since 1945, the fear of expanding conflicts into a
global war largely succeeded in minimizing the use of war.524 Thus, it was Thatcher’s hope that
if the Americans announced even stricter economic sanctions the conflict would be shortened
and she could avoid the loss of British life and the political consequences it entailed.
Yet within days, the situation between the Argentines and British would once again be
flipped on its head. Following the sinking of the Argentine cruiser, the ARA General Belgrano,
the junta became even more intransigent and unwilling to negotiate with the British or submit to
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any international arbitration.525 This attitude change proved detrimental to the peace process, as
the same day that the British sunk the Belgrano, the US and Peru had put forward a peace plan
that Britain was willing to consent to with minor amendments.526 Nevertheless, Argentina
rejected the plan, and the moment for peace had disappeared.527 Soon, however, Britain
experienced its own watershed moment, with the sinking of two British cruisers in mid-May.
With the clash finally resulting in the loss of British lives and battleships, everything
fundamentally changed for Ms. Thatcher. There was no longer any room to compromise. Too
many people had died, and too many ships had been lost in the fight for the islands to give them
up. Negotiation was no longer on the table. Sovereignty was no longer up for debate. The islands
belonged to the British and would remain with the British so long as the islanders desired.
Thatcher felt she had no option but to retake the islands and reassert British dominance in the
South Atlantic. When on May 31, President Reagan’s suggested a cease fire and withdrawal,
Thatcher compared the situation in the Falklands to an attack upon Alaska—a comparison
Reagan did not find particularly relevant.528 Yet despite the poor metaphor, her main point was
that the territory was British, the British military had “borne the brunt of this totally alone,” and
then choosing to leave as soon as the Argentines left and turning the island over to a
multinational peacekeeping mission would be tantamount to desertion.529 Thus, by May 1982,
both the British and Argentines had clearly drawn a line in the sand. There would be no
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negotiating—a conclusion the UN Secretary General would also reach following his efforts to
mediate the conflict pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 505.530 After two months of
fighting, the Falklands War was seemingly going to be a fight to the surrender.
A few short days later, Thatcher sent a letter to General Galtieri, warning him that the
most difficult battle was yet to come, promising that the British flag was soon to be restored to
Port Stanley. Knowing that lives would surely be lost, Thatcher wrote, “On my side, grief will be
tempered by the knowledge that these men died for freedom, justice, and the rule of law.”531
Thatcher was convinced that Britain’s military might and just cause would indeed prevail. On
June 14, 1982, the Argentines surrendered, the Falklands were back under British control (which
the British military commander described as “the government desired by their inhabitants”), and
the colonial governor was back in office.532 For her part, Thatcher was hailed for her “resolution,
courage and singleness of purpose.”533 The war had been won, and for many, it had only been
won through her leadership and dedication to the cause of Britain.

The American Response to the Falklands War
How one viewed the Falklands conflict largely depended upon whether they were in
London or Washington. While the Thatcher government was convinced of the righteousness of
its cause, its American counterparts took a different approach to the Falklands dispute and
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conflict. Despite utilizing the British claim to avoid the seizure of ships in 1831, the United
States had long advocated a policy of neutrality on the Falklands’ sovereignty question.
Nevertheless, throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the US had thrown its support behind the British,
at least nominally, by supporting the United Kingdom on UN resolution voting. In all three UN
resolutions concerning the sovereignty of the Falklands prior to the conflict in 1982, the United
States abstained from voting, a move that amounted to a symbolic expression of disapproval
without going so far as to vote against the measures.534 The United States’ approach to the
Falklands was not lost on the Argentines, who actively attempted to persuade the Ford
administration to support their country in the UN, rather than staying out of the Anglo-Argentine
dispute over the island. Even while admitting to the Argentine foreign minister that the Falklands
no longer served a purpose for the British, Kissinger was unwilling to budge on American
neutrality on the Falklands sovereignty dispute.535 Any efforts to change policy were
complicated by the difficulty America faced between its relationship with Britain and its
relationship with Argentina.
When the Carter administration took over in 1977, the US continued its stated policy of
neutrality, trying desperately to stay out of the ever intensifying conflict. On multiple occasions,
Carter reassured the Argentine president and foreign minister of the United States’ neutral
position on the conflict and desire for a peaceful settlement.536 For instance, in conjunction with
the signing of the treaty on the Panama Canal in September 1977, Carter met with all of the
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heads of state of Latin America in a series of bilateral meetings. The Falklands/Malvinas issue
was among the five central issues discussed in the meeting with General Videla of Argentina.
Even as matters were tense between the US and Argentina, the Americans were careful to not get
themselves caught in the midst of a territorial dispute that had little bearing on American
interests, instead favoring neutrality and expressing its support for the continued round of
negotiations.537 These ideas were only reinforced by the conclusions of the US Ambassador to
Argentina in 1979, when he visited the Falklands. After a thorough study, he concluded that “the
eventual end of Britain’s admittedly anachronistic colonial rule” would come sooner than
later.538 The report went on to state the US had no political or economic interests, and that the
threat of a Soviet base on the islands was miniscule should Argentina reclaim the territory.539 As
such, the Ambassador saw no reason to alter the American position of neutrality, given the
seeming inevitability of Argentine success in the negotiations.
When the Reagan administration took office in January 1981, the mood regarding the
Falklands was largely unchanged. Reagan found in Galtieri and the military government of
Argentina a like-minded anti-communism and a willingness to support American forays into
Central America.540 Throughout the first year of his administration, Reagan and his foreign
policy staff worked diligently to repair the weakened state of relations with the Southern Cone
countries in the wake of Carter’s human rights centered policy. Relations improved to the point
that the Argentine government became convinced that the Reagan administration was on its side
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in the dispute over the Falklands, even “testing the diplomatic waters” in bilateral meetings
between Reagan and Galtieri to evaluate the potential for American support should Argentina
mobilize against the Falklands.541 According to some reports, however, American support for
Argentina was even stronger than just an implicit endorsement. One account notes that after a
meeting between the Argentine government and General Vernon Walters, there was an
understanding between the two countries that should Argentina seize control of the Falklands,
the US would be allowed to build a military base their akin to the Diego Garcia base.542 While
there are no American records that corroborate this account, there is evidence from within
Argentina that the regime in Buenos Aires saw a potential opening to offer the US a naval base
should they gain control of the islands, presumably in exchange for the Americans dealing with
the British.543 Regardless, what does remain clear is that relations with Argentina were greatly
improving and arguably better than they had been in decades. As such, Reagan was hesitant to
jeopardize the newly improved relationship.
Meanwhile, across the Atlantic, Reagan found a close ally and closer friend in Margaret
Thatcher. While some have attempted to focus on the negative moments in their relationship in
an attempt to portray the Reagan-Thatcher relationship as difficult, it is widely acknowledged by
historians that the personal relationship between the British and American leaders was unusually
close during the 1980s.544 Thatcher’s monetarist economic policies and ardent anti-communism,
mixed with her tough political will and critical assessment of political realities made her a
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natural ally for Reagan on the world stage. Their shared conservative ideals were part of a
broader transatlantic move to the right in the 1980s. Yet, despite the close friendship between the
two, the Thatcher government’s policies towards the Falklands placed the United States in an
uncomfortable position—being forced to choose between two friends in Britain and Argentina.
When tensions began to escalate in the spring of 1982, the British sought help from the
United States in forcing Argentina to back down from its advances upon the island. The
Americans recognized that any effort that appeared to be a one-sided American attempt to help
the British and condemn Argentina would destroy the progress they had made with Buenos Aires
over the last year. On the flip side, the Reagan administration also knew that failure to act would
create problems with Britain, given Britain’s request for assistance. Thus, instead of asking the
Argentines to back down, the US opted to repeatedly urge both parties to avoid conflict, while
staying out of “the substance of this bilateral dispute.”545 Crucial to the United States’ ability to
remain neutral on the issue, however, was an avoidance of armed conflict between the two
powers. When the possibility of an armed invasion of the islands by the Argentine government
arose in late-March, the situation became a matter of great concern for the Reagan
administration. By April 1, it was clear that the Argentines had amassed a force capable of taking
the Falklands through a military invasion, which could come as early as the next morning. The
United States clearly perceived a need to intervene before it reached that point. From the
perspective of the State Department, if Argentina were to invade the Falklands, the situation
would be irreversible. They concluded, “We may have no good options at [the point of invasion].
Once in possession of the Falklands it is very unlikely the Argentines will leave voluntarily,
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regardless of what we do or threaten.”546 In light of the difficult situation the United States found
itself in, at the request of Prime Minister Thatcher, Reagan personally reached out to the
Argentines to hopefully prevent such an attack.547 In his conversation with President Galtieri,
Reagan reiterated the nature of the improved and close friendship between the US and Argentina,
and cautioned his counterpart against any type of aggression on the Falklands that would destroy
those good relations.548 Nevertheless, the effort was to no avail. From Argentina’s perspective,
“the UK had refused to relinquish sovereignty for 149 years and time had run out.”549 The next
day, Argentina invaded the Falklands, quickly hoisting its flag in Port Stanley.
Even after the conflict broke out, the United States was hesitant to go all in on the side of
the British. The United States was opposed to Argentina’s use of force, but remained neutral on
the issue of sovereignty—much to the annoyance of Ms. Thatcher.550 Despite British insistence
on America withdrawing its ambassador and condemning the Argentine actions in the OAS, the
US refused to do either out of fear of alienating Argentina, specifically, and Latin America more
broadly.551 Hearkening back to the days of the Suez Crisis of 1956, American policy makers
knew that the Falklands Conflict posed a great challenge, but they believed the United States was
uniquely able to navigate and resolve the issues, optimistic that the American government
possessed the skills and resources necessary to keep the situation from becoming a full blown
international conflict.552 The Americans, however, were not the only ones drawing comparisons
to Suez. The Tory government in Britain was well aware of how the US had acted in Suez,
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prompting American officials to believe that they would be unsuccessful in merely informing the
British of what they expected them to do. After all, it seemed that “their pugnaciousness aims in
part to get us to act.”553 Just days after the invasion, US Secretary of State Al Haig began a series
of conversations with the involved parties to attempt mediation, availing the Brits and Argentines
of Reagan’s offer to mediate the conflict as a third party arbiter. Haig knew that there would be
no way to achieve a settlement if the letter issue were sent to the UN or OAS, as both sides
perceived bias in the two organizations. As such, it was agreed that Haig would personally be
dispatched in a month-long series of shuttle diplomacy negotiations, designed to “sober both
sides up” and force them to arrive at a reasonable settlement. 554 Haig’s task, however, amounted
to nothing short of a herculean effort. On one side of the Atlantic, he faced a blustering Prime
Minister who exclaimed that, “she had not sent a fleet into the South Atlantic to strike a bargain
with an aggressor.”555 On the other side, he had a military dictator who believed that he could not
“haul down the Argentine flag” without being run out of office.556 Despite Haig’s frequent trips
across the Atlantic and his extreme diligence to seeking a negotiated, peaceful settlement, by
mid-April, it was clear that negotiations would not be successful, and Haig was recalled to
Washington upon completion of his current round of talks.557
With conflict looming, the Reagan administration was left to choose between two allies,
two special relationships: one with Great Britain and one with Latin America. Even before the
negotiations broke down, the US was preparing for a tough decision between Argentina and
Britain in an OAS vote over the potential of invoking the Rio Treaty. This was a conflict the
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United States had long feared would happen. In a showdown between Britain and Argentina, the
United States was not just caught between its personal affinities for the two countries, but
potentially, between their legal obligations under the Rio Treaty and the North Atlantic Treaty.
Should a full blown war break out, the United States would be pledged to aid both states under
the respective collective security agreements.558 At a meeting of the OAS Foreign Ministers,
April 26–28, Haig noted that the situation over the Falkland Islands was already being addressed
by the UN Security Council, and as such, the United States government concluded that “it would
be neither appropriate nor effective to treat this dispute within the collective security framework
implied by the Rio Treaty.”559 In the final resolution, the OAS expressed its earnest desire that
both sides cease their current actions of escalation and move toward a peaceful settlement of the
issue, while simultaneously condemning the European Community’s economic and political
sanctions against Argentina, which passed at British urging.560 The United States had
successfully managed to avoid a condemnatory resolution in the OAS that would invoke the Rio
Treaty. This was a major victory for Haig, even if the British still found the resolution wholly
unacceptable.
Having avoided an unpleasant outcome in the OAS vote, the breakdown of negotiations
and Haig’s assessment of the Argentines as unwilling to compromise led the United States to
formally support the British. Yet, the decision to support the British over the Argentines had
been made nearly from the beginning. As has already been discussed, Haig was himself an
anglophile who desired to see Britain victorious in the dispute, even though he was the primary
actor trying to achieve a mediated settlement. Additionally, Larry Eagleburger, the Assistant
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Secretary of State for European Affairs (and one of the principal actors in the United States’
Falklands policy) had determined weeks before negotiations broke down that the Americans’ lot
would be cast with the British, as a quick British victory was seen as the best possible outcome
to lead to a long-term resolution.561 Furthermore, American public support was also behind the
British. In a poll conducted just over a week after the initial Argentine invasion, half of all
respondents supported the British and over sixty percent believed that Argentina did not have a
valid reason to seize the territory.562 All of these factors culminated in President Reagan
informing Prime Minister Thatcher of American public support. He went on to say, “There can
be no doubt about our full support for you and the principles of international law and order you
are defending. You can count on that support in whatever forum this issue is debated. You can
also count on our sympathetic consideration of requests for assistance.”563 As such, the United
States committed to offer materiel aid to the UK, end all military aid to Argentina, and cut off
Argentina’s access to Ex-Im Bank credits.564 In doing so, the United States provided Britain with
“significant if not decisive” assistance in the form of “intelligence, equipment, and spare parts
and the assumption of some British naval roles in the North Atlantic.”565 It is certainly hard to
imagine a situation in which the United States would show that kind of cooperation and aid to
any other nation. The United States had been forced to choose between its special relationships,
and that choice had been made abundantly clear.
Nevertheless, the United States remained committed to minimizing the damage that it
knew would come to its relations with Latin America over its decision. Even before announcing
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its public support for the British, the Reagan administration was already at work on an
assessment of the damage done to the special relationship with Latin America and was
formulating an approach that would hopefully contain the damage.566 Once it was made public
that the US was indeed aiding Britain, reports came in from Latin America showing that, “Initial
reactions of Latin governments to U.S. actions [in the South Atlantic crisis] reflect concern about
continued U.S. commitment to the inter-American system. Many predict a weakening of
hemispheric relationships.”567 In light of this unsurprising assessment, Reagan sent personal
letters to the heads of state of several Latin American countries, the most notable of which were
Brazil and Peru. In these letters, Reagan explained the rationale behind American policy and
expressed his continued neutrality on the sovereignty question.568 While the letter did little to
convince the Latin Americans that the United States decision to aid Britain should not impact
hemispheric relations, the letter nevertheless represents the extent to which the US was willing to
go to minimize the damage caused by choosing the special relationship with Britain over its
special relationship with Latin America.
Furthermore, even though the United States was supporting the British, it did not mean
that the two sides saw eye to eye on every matter or that the Americans could fully impose their
will upon the British. With British losses mounting on the naval front in the first few weeks of
May, the United States sought another opportunity for peace—a settlement that would have
ended the hostility. While the British were reluctant to back down from their position, they
agreed to go along with the American plan, all the while disagreeing with the US that it was
possible to negotiate with the Argentines in good conscience.569 Despite these efforts,

566

Information Memorandum from Burt to Haig, April 27, 1982, in FRUS 1981-88, vol 13, 401.
Telegram from the State Department to the Embassy in Brazil, May 2, 1982, in ibid., 441n2.
568
Ibid., 441–42.
569
Message from Thatcher to Reagan, May 5, 1982, in ibid., 480.
567

177

negotiations again broke down, as the British continued to attack the islands while the United
States repeatedly sought negotiation and peace settlements. Ultimately a cease fire was reached
on June 14, and the conflict was ended, but not without damage done to both the AngloAmerican and US-Latin American relations.

The Falklands Crisis and Future Relations with Latin America and the World
When the fighting was over, and the Argentines had withdrawn, Britain and the Thatcher
government had weathered the storm. They had emerged victorious in the conflict and their
sovereignty of the Falklands remained intact, but the damage done to Britain’s relations with
South America, the United States, and others would not soon be erased. From the very beginning
of the conflict, it was universally acknowledged in Britain that South America almost universally
supported the Argentine sovereignty claim over the Falklands, but like the UK and Argentina,
many states were also caught up in territorial disputes of their own. Acknowledging the
connection between the resolution of the Falklands conflict and the potential solutions to their
own territorial disputes, most Latin American states were hesitant to go all in on Argentina, as
evidenced in the OAS vote of April 28.570 Nevertheless, Britain also acknowledged that the only
real country in South America that they could be confident would not side with the Argentines in
the dispute was the military dictatorship of Chile, a country that Britain had become friendly
with and that was currently embroiled in its own territorial dispute with Argentina over the
Beagle Channel.571 In the final assessment, however, Britain remained optimistic that Latin
America’s refusal to uncritically support Argentina, instead choosing to uphold standards of
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international law, signaled that the restoration of good relations with Britain would be achievable
sooner rather than later.572
Latin America was not the only region in which Britain saw its relations strained by the
crisis. Relations with several other nations outside the west, but within the Western orbit, were
seen as particularly troublesome, namely Japan, South Africa, and Israel. In all three cases, the
countries under consideration opposed British efforts at the UN or failed to offer the full,
unconditional support expected of allies. Israel, for instance, increased its arms sales to
Argentina during the crisis, despite having promised the British that there would be no new
contracts. Japan had only offered support begrudgingly, and even then, forced the UK to veto a
security resolution after acting against expressed British desire, signifying “a division in Japan
between those who understood the importance of supporting a fellow-member of the Western
club over a matter of principle, and those who were influenced by the prospect of damage to
Japanese interests in Latin America.”573 The British expected their allies to act like allies and
support their issues in international organizations. When they failed to do so, it strained relations
between those states and the UK.
Furthermore, Britain also understood that its actions to preserve its sovereignty over the
Falklands held significant implications for the remainder of its colonial holdings in Latin
America and elsewhere. The British believed that their actions in the Falklands had
communicated to their colonies and the rest of the world that they took their colonial obligations
very seriously and saw those obligations as intractable commitments. Nevertheless, Gibraltar,
Hong Kong, and the British Indian Ocean Territory were all subjects of territorial disputes.
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While none of those disputes were as contested as the Falklands had been, the British were
confident that in light of its overwhelming response to defend the Falklands, Spain, China, and
Mauritius, respectively, would be more hesitant to pursue a hardline approach to the disputes,
instead seeking to resolve issues through negotiation.574 Similarly, the British were concerned
that Argentina’s bold moves against the Falklands would inspire Venezuela to move against
Guyana and Guatemala to advance upon Belize. While Belize and Guyana were no longer
official British colonies (Guyana having gained independence in 1966 and Belize in 1981), the
UK’s concern defending these former possessions certainly remained high, and the Falklands
crisis convinced the government of the need to increase its military presence in those countries to
deter the likelihood of attack.575 Such actions were now deemed necessary to prevent another
Falklands from occurring.
The Thatcher government’s concern over its colonial and former-colonial holdings across
the world, as well as its relations with its allies, shows the extent to which the Falklands Crisis
transcended the bilateral relationship between the UK and Argentina. The decisions made by the
British had indeed affected every aspect of its relations with other countries. The choice to
protect what it perceived to be a vital sovereign territory, despite having previously been willing
to negotiate a settlement that would potentially turn the islands over to Argentina, sent a strong
message to the world about British foreign policy. The protection of its imperial relics was not a
responsibility the British took lightly, nor would they respond favorably to allies not assisting
them in their efforts to do so, and the Falklands War had convinced the world of as much.
In the United States, the ending of the conflict in June 1982 was really just the beginning
of new problems for the Reagan administration. Despite its best efforts to stay out of the conflict,
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the Falklands War had forced the United States to choose between its two special relationships,
and it had chosen Britain, even if it was reluctantly. In the immediate aftermath of the
announcement, reports arrived at the state department that, “in private, many Latin leaders were
shocked by what they saw as an abrupt U.S. shift that jeopardizes the Inter-American system”
[emphasis in original].576 It was perhaps the British, however, who best summarized the impact
of the Falklands crisis on inter-American relations. In their post-mortem review of the political
costs of the conflict, they observed: “The crisis vividly demonstrated to the Latin American
countries that the Western Alliance matters more to the United States than hemispheric solidarity
and that the Monroe Doctrine does not apply when one of the American states is perceived by
the US as the aggressor.”577 Such an assessment really arrived at the heart of the Latin American
perception. The United States had shown its true colors, so the countries to its Southern
hemisphere thought, and any talk of an Inter-American system or a regional solidarity would
henceforth be dismissed as hypocritical, rhetorical pandering.
The surprise and shock that many of the Latin American countries felt was only amplified
by the solidarity with which the region had supported Argentina in its anti-colonial mission. The
strongly held positions by those within Latin America proved decisively that, “The conflict over
the Falklands resulted in strains in our relations with Latin America that have serious
implications for U.S. interests and objectives in the region.”578 Among other things, the decision
to aid the British “increased the potential for instability in Central and South America,” and
fueled “instability and irredentism in Argentina, which implies new opportunities for the USSR
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to gain access to a strategic position in the Southern Cone.”579 Such assessments of the strain
placed upon relations with Latin America had brought the United States into precarious position
with its national security. Having lost some of its influence in South America, the NSC perceived
the situation in Latin America to be threatened from a security and cooperation perspective. The
regional political and military balance in South America had been disturbed as a result of the
conflict, and significant long-term damage was done in regard to bilateral relations between the
US and Peru and Argentina, two of South America’s largest and most powerful states.580 The
conclusions from all of the American policy makers confirmed the same thing—in siding with
the British, the United States had compromised its national security.

Conflict, Tension, and the Special Relationship’s Ultimate Fate
When taken on the whole, it is easy to see why Sir Nicholas Henderson concluded that
the Falklands War was indeed the greatest test to the special relationship since Suez. Nowhere in
the world was the impact of the Falklands Crisis more clearly seen than in the Anglo-American
special relationship. In fact, in the spring of 1982, the Suez parallels and eerie similarities to
1956 were not lost upon anyone on either side of the Atlantic. In Britain, the US Embassy was
reporting that while American responses to the early phases of the conflict were seen positively
by British officials, the memories of Suez were lurking under the surface, particularly among
members of the Conservative Party.581 In the US, the NSC staff, in discussing the follow up to
the Argentine invasion of the islands noted, “The Thatcher government is at great risk and could
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well fall over this crisis; it will be important for us to avoid a Suez- or Skybolt type situation
where we are perceived to have thwarted the one lever (military threat against Argentina)
capable of turning the crisis around in Britain’s favor.” 582 This was such a real concern over a
second Suez occurring that Secretary Haig felt compelled to assure “Henderson there would not
be a ‘Suez’ situation, where the US pressured the British to back down from taking military
action.”583 The frequent references to the most significant crisis point in post-war AngloAmerican relations certainly indicates the significance attached to the event by both parties.
Yet, acknowledgement of the seriousness of the crisis alone was not sufficient to keep the
United States and Great Britain from disagreeing frequently, and at times, rather vehemently,
over policy. In the run up to the invasion, the British found the American neutrality to be
incomprehensible, particularly in light of the fact that they “had helped the Americans in many
ways that were not always to [their] advantage.”584 After the Argentines did invade the islands,
the strain within the Anglo-American relationship only heightened. The British government was
angry about what it perceived to be a “weasely statement” from the White House calling on a
peaceful settlement of the issue and expressing American neutrality.585 Furthermore, the British
Government, even after the conflict was over, believed that while the US had not encouraged the
Argentine attack, the Argentine leadership had at least surmised that the American neutrality and
Argentina’s support for CIA action in Central American would keep the US from siding with
Britain, should they invade the Falklands.586 Thus, to a certain extent, the British blamed the
American position for emboldening the Argentine government in the first place.
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The tension, however, did not end there. The Americans viewed their British counterparts
with equal disdain and disbelief during the conflict. Immediately following the Argentine
invasion, the Prime Minister asked the US to end military assistance, cut off imports, and
discontinue export guarantees. In evaluating these measures, National Security Advisor William
Clark observed, “These rather extreme proposals which we cannot agree to, make clear the near
hysterical pitch to which the UK has propelled the political debate in London.”587 Speaking in
similarly emotionally charged language, the British were so bold as to assert that the United
States’ refusal to side with the British on this dispute would undermine the Americans’ efforts to
maintain hegemonic control over the Latin American states, while simultaneously damaging the
American image of the defender of the West and threatening to destabilize and shatter the entire
western alliance.588
This emotionally charged period did not soon abate, even though the United States
publicly came out in support of the British and began offering its full military assistance. In early
May, President Reagan had delivered a message to the Latin American heads of state that
infuriated their British allies. According to Ambassador Henderson, who was sent to meet with
Secretary Haig to express Her Majesty’s Government’s displeasure, Reagan’s remarks failed to
criticize the Argentine invasion and “implied that the US regards the Falklands as a colonial
issue”—which was not actually an incorrect critique.589 Furthermore, even Reagan and Thatcher,
the normally close friends, found themselves at a fundamental disagreement over American
desires for a settlement even after the US publicly came out in support for the British. The two
had a rather heated exchange in a May 1982 phone call in which the president was trying to
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explain his new position for an international force to mediate the conflict. From Thatcher’s
perspective, once British lives had been lost and British ships sunk, there was no room for any
negotiation; the British must retake the islands. Furthermore, despite Reagan’s strong insistence,
Thatcher saw no situation in which the international force would restore British institutions and
law better than the British themselves. The issue was a direct attack against British soil in her
view, and as such, there could be no compromising. Reagan, seemingly worn out and aware that
he would not be able to convince Thatcher of his position finally just apologized for intruding
and ended the phone call, unable to get a word in edgewise.590 These types of situations were
commonplace occurrences during the Falklands conflict.
The most significant dispute, however, came in the form of the US support for
Argentina’s UN resolution on the Falklands in November 1982. When the Argentine government
submitted a resolution before the UN calling for a negotiated settlement to the issue of the
Falklands with broad support of many Latin American countries, the United States gave the
resolution serious consideration. Despite having some initial objections, the US succeeded in
getting the Argentines to modify the language, to the point that they were willing to support the
Argentine resolution in the full UN vote.591 When the US informed the British of its intent to
support the Argentine resolution, the Thatcher government was infuriated, informing the
President that her government was “utterly dismayed” by the contents of the telegram informing
them of the American decision.592 Thatcher went on to call the resolution “a matter of prime
concern to the Britain” and asked him to “think again.”593 Reagan attempted to reassure the
angry Iron Lady by reiterating the United States’ opposition to settling the matter by force and
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clarifying that the US had long supported a peaceful, negotiated settlement and been neutral on
the sovereignty question. He explained that the Argentine resolution in no way changed those
basic positions, but Thatcher was unwilling to listen.594 Instead, she replied by calling the
decision a vote “to support a dictatorship against the home of democracy.”595 She went on to
remind him, “I have supported you in every way I know because of my faith in the AngloAmerican relationship and your personal commitment to fundamental principles. . . . But if
America votes in the way you propose, my task will be immeasurably harder.”596 Reagan finally
concluded the conversation between the two friends by essentially acknowledging an agreement
to just disagree—"our understanding of these events is indeed quite different.”597 What emerges,
then, from this exchange over the UN resolution is a clear strain upon relations, months after
fighting had stopped. The Falklands did not cease to be a strain upon the special relationship just
because a cease fire was reached. While Sir Nicholas Henderson may have ultimately concluded
in his post-mortem report that the special relationship had weathered the storm of the Falklands,
perhaps he was premature in that conclusion.
In the constant back and forth between the United States and Great Britain over the
Falklands, the decisions made by both sides reflect an underlying conception of national security
that was critical to the way policy was developed and the way the crisis played out. At the outset,
it would be easy to assume that for the British, there were real, strategic interests at stake that
threatened Britain’s traditional conceptions of national security. There were some 2,000 British
citizens living on the islands, which were overwhelmingly controlled by a British company; the
islands were in close proximity to the British Antarctic territory and research stations; and off the
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coast of the islands were fishing and mineral rights that could potentially translate into
significant economic advantages for the British. The problem, however, in assuming that the
preservation of these interests were critical to Britain’s decision to send the military to protect
the islands in the name of national security is that until right before the invasion, the Thatcher
government was entertaining a leaseback strategy that would have ceded the territory, with its
inhabitants and resources, to the Argentines. While it is true that the connection to Antarctica and
the British claims in the region grew in significance after the invasion, it nevertheless remains
that at the point of decision for the British, those considerations were not as fully formed as they
would be by the end of the conflict.598 Thus, it is clear that in April 1982, maintaining access to
the economic and geostrategic interests in the Falklands were not a high concern for the Thatcher
government.
So, if Britain’s conception of national security was not based in a deeply rooted
commitment to protect at all cost its access to resources, what factors did represent threats to
British national security in the South Atlantic? First was Britain’s conception of its colonial
obligations and its desire to protect its empire. While being annoyed at the United States during
the conflict for portraying British action as merely a colonial response, the British themselves
concluded, as discussed above, that after the Falklands, no one would be able to claim that
Britain did not take its “colonial obligations” seriously.599 Centuries worth of colonialism could
not easily be erased from British psyche. The Argentine invasion of the Falklands represented an
attack upon a British colonial holding, and Britain’s reputation was at stake should it choose not
to act. Hiding behind the shield of self-defense and its protection under the UN Charter, the
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British were able to advance their colonial impulses under the banner of national security.
Additionally, Britain’s decisions to use military force in the Falklands were the result of
domestic political pressure upon the Thatcher government, and its commitment to values of the
liberal world order. Throughout the conflict, the British government frequently cited the
protection of democracy, an interest in the human rights of the islanders, and the promotion of
self-determination among its primary motivations for action. In this regard, Thatcher’s attempts
to maintain domestic political consensus among the Tories through the use of liberal ideas
connected the Falklands War to a broader shift in the notion of national security and its
connection to liberal internationalism. Thus, in examining the way that Britain justified the
Falklands as a national security concern, it is clear that while some strategic concerns may have
belatedly entered into the conversation, the real ability to classify the Falklands War as a national
security crisis came in the form of promoting liberal internationalism and its ability to hide its
colonial impulses behind the veneer of self-defense and the advancement of western political
idealism.
On the other side of the Atlantic, the United States had made a decision that negatively
impacted its national security in Latin America, but it had been done in the name of promoting
national security in another regard—highlighting the way the Reagan administration would
define its national security. In May 1982, the Reagan administration completed its first
comprehensive review of national security strategy, culminating in National Security Decision
Directive (NSDD) 32. As such, it outlined eleven global objectives for guiding all national
security decisions. While many of those principles dealt solely with limiting the influence of the
Soviet Union in various capacities, the second objective stated that the United States would seek
“to strengthen the influence of the U.S. throughout the world by strengthening existing
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alliances.”600 Such a definition of America’s national security priorities and objectives meant that
in making a choice between the relationship with Latin America and the relationship with Great
Britain, the United States had chosen to emphasize the strengthening of the Anglo-American
alliance as a critical consideration for the conduct of national security policy. While the very
inclusion of strengthening alliances as an objective of national security could be considered a
departure from the realist foundations of national security as a concept, the way in which the
implications of choosing Britain over Latin America manifested itself as a national security issue
is telling in other regards as well. As has already been mentioned, in its post-partum review of
policy toward Latin America in the wake of the Falklands Crisis, the administration expressed a
concern that its decision could inadvertently open the possibility for expanded Soviet influence
in the Southern Cone region. Regardless of how real or great the threat of Soviet influence in the
region was, that there was an opening for an increased Soviet presence ran contrary to another of
the eleven national security objectives in which the US committed to “neutralize the efforts of
the USSR to increase its influence.”601 In this regard, then, the United States actually
compromised its national security in one area by choosing to instead prioritize another area of
national security. In the final balance, the choice between two competing notions of national
security as represented in the Falklands Conflict was the result of the way the US had defined
national security in such a broad way as to include alliance politics and abstract conceptions of
influence.
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Conclusion—The Falklands War and the Special Relationship
Several critical observations can be made about the Falklands War and the crisis it
represented for the special relationship. The first is that the special relationship between the US
and Great Britain must always be understood in the context of the special relationships the
United States has with others. In particular, it must be understood within the context of a special
relationship between the US and Latin America. In this regard, then, Latin America is much
more significant to the relationship between the US and Great Britain than has previously been
understood. Most of the work on outside regions affecting the special relationship has been about
areas in which post-war decolonization was still developing—the Middle East and Southern
Africa. Yet, as shown in this case, the Falklands Conflict shifts that geographic narrative in
significant ways.
The second thing the Falklands Conflict demonstrates is Britain’s reassertion of itself in
the relationship. On several occasions, Thatcher reminded Reagan of all the times the British had
gone to bat for the Americans, even when it was against British interest. Those times would not
be simply ignored. Maggie was not afraid to speak her mind to Ronnie and would not allow her
positions to be bulldozed by the American desires. Prior to the Falklands Conflict, the United
States had largely driven the narrative and set the agenda on Latin America, but that did not
mean the Americans could keep the British from grabbing the reins in 1982.
Finally, the Falklands conflict illustrates how alliances work in the face of competing
interests and unstated expectations for each other. Though often unspoken, there is an inherent
quid pro quo always at work within an alliance. After years of British acquiescence to American
initiatives in Latin America, there was a clear expectation for America to follow the British line
on the Falklands. When they hesitated or refused, tension emerged as these unspoken rules were
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violated. Thus, in the final estimation, Henderson’s assessment of the Falklands Conflict proved
to be true—it was indeed the greatest test to the alliance since Suez, and while this time it may
have weathered the storm, there was no denying that the alliance had been stressed, strained, and
changed as a result.
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CONCLUSION
Special Relationships, National Security, and the Future of Anglo-American Policy

When taken on the whole, the American and British foreign policies toward Latin
America—and the Southern Cone states in particular— in a decade, between 1969 and 1982, that
was crucial for the Cold War in the American subcontinent, provide an instructive prism of the
complex nature of the special relationship between the two transatlantic allies. Despite the more
than 5,000 miles that separates Washington from Santiago and Buenos Aires, and the more than
6,000 miles that separates London from the two Southern Cone capitals, Chile and Argentina still
figured prominently into Anglo-American conversations and were a frequent source of tension
and disagreement between the two allies. Given that Chile and Argentina were so remote to the
US and Great Britain and yet played the role they did in foreign policy says a great deal about
the way the respective leaders in Washington and London conceived of national security and its
relation to the concept and implications of a special relationship. Additionally, the precedents set
by the Americans and British through their interactions with Chile and Argentina also introduce
larger trends and practices that would manifest themselves in future conflicts. While things may
have calmed down in the Southern Cone after 1982, the US and Great Britain had reimagined
their respective foreign policies in such a way as to continue to impact the trajectory of AngloAmerican foreign policy across the region and the globe.

The Nature of Special Relationships
The preceding chapters have examined, to various degrees, the interaction between the
United States, Great Britain, and Latin America (namely Chile and Argentina). This analysis is
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the product of a series of special relationships identified by the foreign policy establishment in
Washington. The United States frequently found itself having to choose between two special
allies in setting its national security policy and priorities. In doing so, the American government
identified the criteria it used to establish and determine what constituted a special relationship,
and how a state, or region, might come to gain a special relationship. For policymakers at Foggy
Bottom and inside the NSC, these special relationships were the product of historical
relationships, and decades of interaction. In the Nixon administration’s initial assessment of
Latin American relations, it appealed to the “days of the Monroe Doctrine” as the origins of the
“protective relationship toward the Latin American nations” that currently manifested itself in
the Inter-American System and its special relationship.602 Similar ideas were cited by the Ford
administration, who noted that the historical relationship between the US and Latin America
caused them to perceive issues, such as communism, differently within Latin America than in the
rest of the world.603 Even the Carter administration noted that America’s “historical hegemony
and its freight of paternalism,” was at the foundation of the special relationship.604 The AngloAmerican special relationship was also the product of common historical and political
connections. In his Iron Curtain speech, which famously outlined the idea of special relationship,
Winston Churchill cited a “fraternal association of the English-speaking peoples” and our
“kindred Systems of society” as the bedrocks upon which this special relationship had already
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been built.605 Thus, in both relationships, the alliance was cemented through historical
interactions.
The nature of special relationships as a product of history is even more significant when
placed alongside the factors the United States explicitly listed as incorrect factors in the
relationship. By 1976, the State Department noted that despite the common refrain regarding USLatin American relations, “geographic proximity” and “cultural and economic ties” were not
factors contributing to the special relationship.606 In fact, the Americans went so far as to note
that while geography may have affected relations with Central America and the Caribbean,
“Argentina, Chile, Uruguay and Paraguay are farther away than Europe.”607 Furthermore, the US
also cited its closer “cultural affinity with Western Europe” and its “economic dealings across
the Atlantic” as much more “intimate and important to us.”608 Thus, what emerges from such
conceptions of a special relationship is a situation in which historical realities play a much
greater role than geostrategic concerns or national security. In fact, the very factors most closely
tied to traditional conceptions of national security and its foundations in realism were dismissed
as factors contributing to a special relationship.
Beyond what this analysis of Anglo-American Latin America policy illustrates about
what constitutes a special relationship, it also demonstrates that there are degrees of
“specialness.” The United States was often forced to choose between its special allies, whether it
be in choosing the Chileans over Britain in the mid-1970s over human rights, or choosing to side
with Britain on human rights over the Chileans or Argentines in the late-1970s, or choosing to
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ultimately risk its relations with Latin America over the fear of significantly damaged relations
with a NATO ally, and arguably its closest ally, in Great Britain during the Falklands War. Every
time the United States was forced to choose, it had to weigh the damage done to both sides. In
the case of Britain’s strong condemnation of the human rights violations at the hands of the
Pinochet regime from 1974–76, the United States chose Chile, knowing that it could well afford
to alienate the British on the policy without losing the relationship. The Chileans, on the other
hand, represented a far more volatile situation, and a principled stance against human rights
would have undercut the Ford administration’s efforts to support anti-communism in Latin
America. By 1977, however, the new Carter administration saw human rights as too important of
an issue to compromise on, and instead chose to deal with the consequences of condemning its
southern allies, all the while improving relations with the Callaghan government in Britain.
These examples illustrate that when two special relationships come into conflict within American
foreign policy, the United States chooses the one with the least likelihood for negative
ramifications, and when both choices have negative consequences, Washington sides with the
more special, enduring relationship of the like-minded, i.e. with Britain.
Finally, this study of the special relationships the United States has with both Great
Britain and Latin America serves of as a reminder that the utility and value of a special
relationship can change as policy priorities, political ideologies, and national security concerns
change. Frequently within US-Latin American relations, the special relationship was called into
question. When the Ford administration’s “New Dialogue” succumbed to resentment by the
Latin American states and growing pressure for more influence within the Inter-American
system, some within the State Department believed it was time to move past the idea of a special
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relationship and the paternalism that such a concept entailed.609 Kissinger, however, preferred
the special relationship as the vehicle for his diplomatic overtures to the region, and it won the
day. Yet, even in Kissinger’s application, the US was forced to acknowledge that such an
approach must be taken with caution and “modernized” to meet the demands of an increasingly
independent Latin America.610 When the Carter administration took office just a few months
later, the new foreign policy team dismissed the notion of a special relationship, noting that
many of the components of the special relationship as it had been understood were either
impractical or undesirable to maintain.611 While they noted that “to reject the special relationship
in toto” risked “discharging a potential asset in the North-South dialogue and in maintaining
hemispheric security,” they later concluded that national security was not under threat in the
region.612 Thus, without a substantial threat to national security, the special relationship with
Latin America, from the Carter administration’s perspective, no longer provided enough value or
utility for American foreign policy to outweigh the baggage of paternalism that it carried. These
examples, then, show that in making decisions about special relationships, the United States
always considered them in terms of value and utility for advancing its other security interests.
When the government determined that a special relationship no longer advanced its strategic
interests or the projection of American power, it was easily cast aside in favor of new approaches
and policies.
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New Ideas of National Security
Beyond the lessons about the special relationship, this analysis has also brought to light
questions of national security, and the meaning of the concept that has undergirded both
American and British foreign policy since the Second World War. The notion of national
security had developed in conjunction with an increasingly realist approach to international
relations that privileged the political, geostrategic, and economic interests of the state and their
connection to the manifestation of power. The realism of national security brought with it
constraints and limitations of action in areas that were outside of the interests of the state. Yet,
throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the idea of national security underwent a significant redefinition
that ebbed and flowed as leaders and political parties changed in both Washington and London.
In places like Santiago, Buenos Aires, and Port Stanley, these new definitions were put to the
test, as the British and Americans alike flexed their muscle in new ways to address new issues of
“national security.”
In the case of Allende’s Chile, the democratic election of a socialist represented a grave
national security crisis for the United States and the Nixon-Kissinger team. The United States
poured hundreds of thousands of dollars into preventing Allende’s election and undermining his
government after it was unsuccessful in keeping him out of office. Yet, through all of this, Chile
represented only minimal concerns for American national security. Allende did not endanger any
geopolitical or defensive interests, and many of the economic interests affected were already in
mediation before Allende came to power. Nevertheless, the situation was a national security
crisis. In this regard, it is ironic that the self –proclaimed arch-realist Henry Kissinger would
adopt such a negative position toward Chile. In doing so, the Nixon administration redefined
national security to include a vehement ideological component that saw democratic socialism as
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an insidious threat, despite any evidence that American interests were at risk. In this regard,
Kissinger’s actions reflected more of a disposition toward liberal internationalism with its
ideological fervor for democracy and free enterprise, than they did the realism of national
security. The British, on the other hand, approached the situation through a traditionally realist
lens, realizing the opportunities available to advance their own interests in Chile, and in doing so,
alienated their American allies.
The opposite, however, was true once Labour came to power in Britain and right-wing
dictatorships came to power in Chile and Argentina. The British, all the sudden, elevated
ideology, namely the protection of human rights, to the level of a national security concern. In
doing so, they emphasized the basic rights of individuals (at least in certain places) as a moral
responsibility of all states. Yet, even in this regard, the British were playing fast and loose with
the idea of national security. Their lack of concern for human rights in places like South Africa
indicated that their national security policies were also affected by ideological and historical
interactions. The Labour Party’s condemnations of Chilean human rights while maintaining
relations with Argentina, despite its equal guilt on the human rights front, was the result of a
much stronger emotional and ideological attachment to the Allende government by Labour
politicians. Furthermore, this embrace of human rights occurred in conjunction with Britain’s
entry into the European Community in 1973 as most of the European Countries were veering
left. By the mid-1970s, the Scandinavian Countries, especially Sweden, were embracing social
democracy, Germany was being led by Helmut Schmidt’s SPD, and even France was witnessing
the rise of a leftist challenge to DeGaulle, despite Mitterrand’s 1974 electoral defeat.
Additionally, the communist parties in France, Italy, and Spain with their Allende-inspired
Eurocommunism deepened their ties to social democrats throughout the continent. In this
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climate, the Labour government in Britain easily found a common ideological disposition and
shared purpose with its new community.613 In this regard, the UK’s redefinition of national
security in the mid-1970s represented not only a retreat from realism on the basis of human
rights, but also, the creation of a national security policy manipulated by the localized interests of
the party leadership and the historical experience between Britain and Chile—none of which are
part of the realist foundations of national security.
Much of the same could be said for the United States under President Carter. Carter’s
emphasis on human rights was elevated to the level of national security priority from the very
beginning. From Carter’s perspective, the United States had lost the moral authority to act in the
world by failing to condemn immoral actions and the violations of the basic rights of human
dignity. As such, he saw America’s ability to manifest power declining. In doing so, his
redefinition of national security to include human rights represented a move toward Wilsonian
ideals and the embrace of liberal internationalism. In yet other ways, it could also constitute a
more nuanced form of realism that saw human rights as a means of advancing the United States’
soft power on the global stage, even if it risked alienating allies in Latin America. With the
Carter administration’s move away from strictly realist assumptions, the United States and Great
Britain had converged in how they defined national security and viewed the world.
Finally, the Falklands War provided the context for yet another redefinition of national
security. From the British perspective, there were indeed economic and geostrategic concerns at
work in the crisis, but they were minimized, as the British government was willing to trade its
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interests in the Falklands to Argentina, in the weeks before the invasion. When Argentina seized
control of the islands, British actions were motivated by its historic notions of imperialism and
liberal internationalist rhetoric of human rights and self-determination. The Falklands War was
not fought by the Thatcher government to protect oil, fish, or the Antarctic. It was fought to
maintain British prestige and empire. Similarly, the United States supported the British with aid
and troops, despite having no interests endangered by the Argentine attack upon the Falklands.
To the Reagan administration, the protection of its alliance with Great Britain represented a
critical component of its national security policy. Even though the United States’ decision to
support the British actually hurt its national security within Latin America, the Reagan
administration deemed the protection of the special relationship critical.
In each of these cases, American and British policy decisions resulted in changes to the
definition of national security. In doing so, national security was stripped of its connection to
realism, and instead was applied as a sweeping justification for liberal internationalism,
ideological predilections of state leaders, and historical connections to empire and hegemony.
Through frequent changes to the criteria necessary to deem an issue a national security crisis, the
term national security was reduced to a near meaningless modifier. If national security could be
redefined so often and so distinctly, one must wonder if the term had any actual meaning. Thus,
it is the argument of this work that the redefinition of national security, as seen in Latin America
between 1969 and 1982 severely compromised the utility of national security to describe the
interests of the state. Instead, the notion was transformed from a concrete set of ideas about the
political, geostrategic, and economic interests of a state into a catch-all term that politicians
could manipulate to serve any political purpose and justify intervention anywhere around the
globe.
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The Implications for Future Action
In light of the ways the United States came to define national security and the interplay
between its special relationships, the stage was set for the policies and precedents of the period
between 1969 and 1982 to continue into the future. Nowhere would these conceptualizations of
national security and the nature of special relationships be brought into tension more than in
Grenada in 1983. The Caribbean island of Grenada had long been on the Reagan
administration’s radar as a hub of Marxist ideology within the western hemisphere, something
that the Republican president perceived as a particularly insidious threat. As early as March
1983, in his famous speech announcing the Strategic Defense Initiative, Reagan had cited
Grenada as a potential strategic danger to the United States. When the Marxist government of the
island was overthrown in a violent coup led by the far left on the island, Reagan acted decisively
in authorizing a unilateral invasion of the country to restore order. Reagan’s decision to invade
Grenada was justified on two basic premises—the presence of 1,000 US citizens (mostly
students) and the re-establishment of democracy and stability within Grenada in the name of
protecting human rights and promoting regional security.614 Furthermore, the Americans cited
international law and the request for American intervention by the Organization of Eastern
Caribbean States (OECS) as the legal basis for its intervention into a sovereign state. On October
25, 1983, American troops reached the island and the invasion began, with the country quickly
being subdued in just three days.615
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From Reagan’s perspective, the invasion of Grenada was a simple decision. It was a
matter of resisting communism in the name of national security. From the very outset of his
administration, the active opposition to communist activity had been made priority number one,
as Reagan and his national security staff believed that the Soviets (and in Latin America, the
Cubans) were actively advancing global communism and must be rolled back, not just
contained.616 In doing so, Reagan, like Nixon before him, fundamentally defined national
security along ideological lines, separate and apart from national security’s foundations in
realism. Additionally, under such conceptions, the Marxist government of Grenada is of
particular interest. The United States’ decision to intervene in 1983 in the name of fighting
communism seems hardly justifiable solely on the basis of ideology, though, given that a Marxist
government existed before the coup that led to the prime minister’s assassination in late-October.
Similarly, the notion that the invasion to protect students was also filled with inconsistencies,
since the threat to students had existed well before the coup.617 Furthermore, the State
Department claimed geostrategic threats posed by the Soviets and Cubans as evidence of the
righteousness of the American position. Yet even Assistant Secretary of State Ken Dam noted
that, “While we are still assembling and evaluating the evidence, what we have found suggests
that Grenada would have become a fortified Cuban/Soviet military outpost.”618 It is interesting,
however, that all of Dam’s claims about the evidence are presented as future rather than present
realities. At the point of intervention, then, the US was acting preemptively on the basis that
Grenada could become a national security threat in the future. The failure to explain the Grenada
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intervention along solely ideological and strategic terms indicates that the government’s decision
to intervene could also be seen as part of the conception of a special relationship with Latin
America that historically was characterized by American intervention in the states of the Western
Hemisphere. Furthermore, the appeal for assistance by the OECS invoked America’s special
relationship with its hemispheric neighbors. Failure to respond to the call by the OECS would be
an affront to Inter-American relations. Thus, ideology and a historically defined special
relationship once again combined to redefine national security in the American diplomatic
lexicon.
The other critical component of the Grenada invasion was the damage done to the special
relationship with Great Britain. While Reagan personally made his decision to intervene on
October 22, he did not consult the British, who still maintained a level of control over its former
colony and current member of the commonwealth, until October 24.619 Meanwhile, the British
Foreign Secretary had stood before Parliament on the morning of October 24 and denied that the
US was planning any invasion of Grenada, and claimed that there surely would have been
consultation with Britain before any action was taken.620 It would be four hours later when
Reagan finally sent a telegram asking Margaret Thatcher for her advice and counsel on the issue.
Yet much to her dismay and anger, Reagan wrote back later in the day informing her that he had
decided to invade before she could even respond.621 In reality, of course, Reagan had decided it
forty-hours before. Thatcher was so upset by Reagan’s blatant disregard for Britain, her interests,
and her relationship with the United States, that she not only sent him a terse reply, but phoned
him immediately. Thatcher’s tone was so incendiary and condemnatory of American actions that
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Reagan was visibly shaken after the call.622 From Thatcher’s perspective, the American actions
to invade Grenada represented intervention in a sovereign nation over an internal political
dispute. While her actions in the Falklands War had made clear that she supported the right of a
country to defend its own territory from invasion, she did not believe that any country had the
right to intervene in an internal dispute of another. In her conception of national security, the
tangible interests of the state must be affected. Ideological disagreement over governance did not
constitute legal or acceptable justification for intervention in the name of national security.623
The humiliation that Reagan had caused to the Thatcher government by not consulting its closest
ally, especially in a matter that involved a state over which Queen Elizabeth II was still the head
of state, would not soon abate. The special relationship had been called into question, because
the United States had prioritized its ideological commitment to keeping communism out of Latin
America in the name of its special relationship with the Caribbean states. In choosing its special
relationship with Latin America over its special relationship with Great Britain, great strain was
placed upon the Anglo-American relationship that would call its very existence into question.
If the U.S. invasion of Grenada cast the two transatlantic allies at odds over notions of
self-determination and national security, the first post-Cold War conflict, against Saddam
Hussein’s Iraq restored a harmony of interests and purpose between the two special allies. Even
their notions of national security, converging with visions of a new international order – or “New
World Order,” in the rhetoric uttered by President George H. W. Bush – came to be harmonized
again. Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 was greeted with a quick,
overwhelming use of military force on the part of the United States and Britain as the leading
players among a coalition of nations. In sending troops into Kuwait in the early weeks of 1991,
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the United States justified its actions in the name of self-determination and the promotion of a
new world order based upon the equality of sovereign nations and a commitment to peace. Under
George H.W. Bush, these ideas had been made national security priorities, as the security of the
nation was tied to the security of the international environment, which Bush believed could only
be preserved by the commitment to peace, the respect of international law, and the promotion of
democratic values.624 Some strategic interests certainly entered the conversation, such as the
access to oil and the protection of allies, like Saudi Arabia. Yet these considerations were less
about actual American and British interests, and more about the imperialistic control of oil and
other resources in the Middle East that had characterized Anglo-American policy for decades.625
Through all of these considerations, the Gulf War echoes the Falklands Crisis, in that the AngloAmerican ability to cast the war as a national security crisis came by promoting liberal
internationalism and its ability to hide their colonial impulses behind the veneer of self-defense
and the advancement of western political idealism. In doing so, this new definition of national
security that was devoid of connections to realism once again proved pivotal in shaping foreign
policy decision making.

Conclusion
In the final analysis, the United States and Great Britain made decisions in Latin America
from 1969 to 1982 that had far reaching consequences. The two transatlantic allies frequently
redefined national security a distinctive way that separated the notion of national security from
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its traditional foundations in realist thought. Instead of seeing the world through a realist lens, the
way the two powers defined national security was the result of more than a century of historical
interaction with Latin America and their own historical experiences with ideology, imperialism,
and colonialism. Critical to this redefinition, the United States and Great Britain each perceived
their respective special relationships in such a way that influenced their decisions to intervene in
matters of national security. The United States’ special relationships with Latin America and the
United Kingdom represented more than just a rhetorical coincidence. The conflicting special
relationships often resulted in tension, depending upon which alliance the United States chose to
privilege in a given circumstance. The frequent redefinition of national security to address issues
in the Southern Cone and the often conflicting special relationships illustrate the prominence that
Latin America had in the Anglo-American bilateral relationship. Despite not having been a
source of colonial dispute in more than 150 years, Latin America played a more prominent role
in transatlantic relations between the English-speaking nations than regions in the midst of the
decolonization of the post-World War II era. In the end, Anglo-American Latin America policy
illuminates the way that the US and Great Britain conceived of national security and relations
between allies, bringing with it new precedents and policies that would continue to manifest
themselves across the globe for decades to come.
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